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ABSTRACT 
 
Participation at workplaces encompasses different mechanisms used to involve the workforce 
in decisions at all levels of an organization – whether direct or indirect – conducted with 
employees or through their representatives. In its various pretexts, the issue of employee 
involvement has been a recurring theme in economic theories, industrial relations, and human 
right instruments. 
Human dignity, freedom, equality, solidarity and justice are the core values inscribed in the 
European Charter of Human Rights. The Charter reiterates the constitutional traditions and 
international obligations common to the Member States, the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Social Charters adopted by the 
Union and by the Council of Europe and the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union and of the European Court of Human Rights. But legal engineering cannot ensure high-
intensity levels of democracy and distributive justice. The European Union faces many 
challenges that jeopardise the Welfare State model and increase inequalities and social 
exclusion. One narrative explains these issues by the inevitability and the consequent 
democratic deficit of the EU. One of the areas where democratic decision making is often 
overlooked is the workplace. This book aims to explain how employee participation is 
connected to democracy, human dignity and solidarity and provides examples that economic 
democracy can ease the negative effects of economic turmoil.  
This book analyses employee involvement from a dual perspective: as an economic tool that 
enhances competition and as a human right that develops human dignity at workplaces. The 
introductory part deals with participation as an element of economic and industrial democracy. 
The second part of the analysis of participation forms a dual perspective and gives an overview 
of different economic theories dealing with participation and presents the relevant human rights 
instruments. This is followed by an overview of the European regulatory framework and its 
potential pitfalls. The possibility to expand employee involvement to reach global coverage is 
examined in a global context in the fourth part. The fifth part examines the effects of employee 
participation during the recent economic crisis in Europe. An extensive case study of Hungary 
demonstrates the regulatory gaps of the European participation model, and finally the sixth part 
concludes the overall findings related to workplace democracy. 
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PART I. – INTRODUCTION 
1. Economic and Industrial Democracy 
The right to participate in decisions affecting one’s life is a basic value in a democratic society. 
This principle should be present in all areas of civil society, encompassing political and 
economic spheres, and including workplaces (Kollonay-Lehoczky, 1990). Robert Dahl argues 
that people involved in certain kinds of human association possess an inalienable right to govern 
themselves in democratic process (Dahl, 1985). If democratic decision-making is required at 
the state level, then it is also justifiable at the workplace level (Mayer, 2001). Involvement in 
decision making that affects one’s life is an essential part of human dignity (Sinzheimer, 1920). 
The voice of workers has traditionally been represented by trade unions through collective 
bargaining (Bogg & Novitz, 2014). Employees’ right to be directly involved in issues related 
to the workplace gained recognition much later – the theory of economic democracy reaches 
back to the Weimar Republic. 
 Economic democracy, as a socio-economics theory, promotes a more equal distribution 
of wealth to reduce poverty, unemployment, and starvation. In that sense, it has three aspects: 
workers’ participation, leading to production control; individual security, meaning fair access 
of everyone to common resources, such as water, land or raw materials; and the enhanced 
purchasing power of individuals.  
Economic democracy constitutes a core element of Hugo Sinzheimer’s work. The 
central point of his argument was that a subordinated worker must be recognized as a human 
being. Whereas employers’ right to command workers at a workplace is inherent in the notion 
of capital, argues further Sinzheimer, it is important to identify the limits of the power arising 
from private property. In Sinzheimer’s view, labour law could serve as a tool to free workers 
from the abuses of employers’ power and thereby contribute to the democratization of the 
economy. Similarly to political democracy, economic democracy could contribute to the 
emancipation of individual workers vis-à-vis economic power (Sinzheimer, 1927). Participation 
could enable all economic actors to jointly form the economic conditions of the workplace and 
share responsibility related to the jointly made decisions. Therefore, employees would be freed 
from subordination, and equality would be brought to the economic sphere. 
Political and social democracy could only exist if they are accompanied by economic 
democracy. Sinzheimer witnessed the reconstructualization of labour law: in the name of free 
competition the employers took advantage of the individualistic regulatory system, leaving 
trade unions vulnerable. Such managerial practices radically reduced the value of work, which 
had an undesirable effect on society. According to Sinzheimer, an economic constitution 
(Wirtschaftsverfassung) can put labour in equal power position to capital by enabling labour to 
make decisions together with property owners. Protecting labour has essential importance for a 
society, as the working power of man is not only an individual but also a social asset. The 
worker serves the employer directly, but the society indirectly; thus the society owes an 
equivalent return for his service, and this equivalent is the protection itself (Dukes, 2008). 
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The notion of the economic constitution focuses on the role a state plays or could play 
in ordering or constituting the economic institutions and actors by laws. Thus, the economic 
constitution encompassed laws that regulate (allow for, encourage, prohibit or constrain) 
worker participation in decision making (Dukes, 2014). Thus, the economic constitution is 
much broader than the law of the labour market and also than collective agreements. It 
encompasses all legal instruments concerning the economic sphere, which suggests a concern 
with democratic participation as a means of emancipating workers. Also, it goes much further 
than the conservative understanding of a constitution as a bill of rights, it is seen, rather, as an 
agent of social progress (Dukes, 2014). Through labour law the state recognizes the economic 
actors and empowers them to act, for example through legally binding norms concerning 
collective bargaining, and at the same time, sets limits to their power. The notion of economic 
constitution also clarifies the role of labour law. According to Sinzheimer, the overarching 
purpose of labour law was to free workers from subordination to employers by securing the 
freedom of meaningful participation in regulating the economy, while respecting the autonomy 
of economic actors. Sinzheimer, on a Kantian recognition of human dignity, argued that the 
democratization of the industrial sphere through the economic constitution might have brought 
equality and real freedom for workers – freedom which is not manifested in the way freedom 
of contract allowed exploitation, but freedom from subordination in employment relations 
(Sinzheimer, 1927). 
The idea of economic democracy also gained significance as a criticism of formal 
democracy, because democracy cannot be divided from the economic structure in which it 
exists (Sen, 1999). The concept of economic democracy is often juxtaposed with industrial 
democracy, as it promotes workers’ participation in corporate governance with a view of 
democratizing employment relations within the companies (Kahn-Freund, 1977). 
To ensure economic empowerment, most proponents claim that basic necessities and 
sufficient purchasing power should be guaranteed to everybody and local control should be 
exercised over economic decisions. It is argued that modern property relations externalize costs, 
subordinate the general well-being to private profit and deny the justifiability of democratic 
voice in economic policy decisions (Smith, 2003). The classical liberal argument claims that 
ownership and control over the means of production should belong to private firms and can 
only be sustained by means of consumer choice, exercised daily in the marketplace (von Mises, 
1951). In contrast, proponents of economic democracy generally argue that modern capitalism 
periodically results in economic crises characterized by deficiency of effective demand, as 
society is unable to earn enough income to purchase its output production.  Thus, economic 
democracy could mitigate the gap between demand and supply and support access to political 
rights (Harvey, 2011). Both market and non-market theories of economic democracy have been 
proposed to encompass economic democracy.  
Although they are related in many ways, industrial democracy and economic democracy 
convey different meanings. These differences are much related to diversity in industrial 
traditions. Historically, industrial democracy became an effective force within workers’ 
movements primary as an idea of representative democracy (Müller-Jentsch, 1995). The 
principle of industrial democracy implies replacement of unilateral regulations with joint 
decisions on matters concerning workplaces or employment conditions. Citizenship rights in 
employment allow the workforce to partially or completely participate in the running of an 
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industrial or commercial organization (Arrigo & Cassale, 2010). Industrial democracy is a 
system that increases the extent and means of employees’ involvement in their work 
environments. In a broad sense, it could include participation in setting agendas, 
implementation of various policies, or election of boards of directors. Industrial democracy has 
many benefits, such as improved communication, more effective policies and the better morale 
of employees. It fosters engagement; employees tend to implement policies better if they are 
not only in charge of execution but are also part of the decision-making process. Industrial 
democracy, therefore, reduces insubordination: employees feel that even though decisions and 
orders are imposed on them, they could make their own choices in ways that fit their personal 
interests the best. 
Industrial democracy challenges both the authoritarian and the bureaucratic structures 
of a capitalist enterprise and the centralized regime in state socialist planned economies. In that 
sense, participation was also the dissolution of the Taylorist-Fordist model, which favoured flat 
hierarchies and direct orders, and it takes into account the fact that workers are not only bearers 
of labour power, but members of democratic societies from which they derive a set of civil, 
political and social rights (Marshall, 1950). The Hawthorne studies evidenced as early as the 
1930s the ability of employees and employee groups to exercise informal control of 
productivity (Mayo, 1933). The recognition of legitimate power for employees paved the way 
for the development of the concept of industrial democracy. This paradigmatic transformation 
brought new production concepts and management techniques, which offered more leeway for 
self-regulation and responsibility to rank-and-files (Argylis, 1960). Such techniques also 
supported the legitimacy of management at workplaces. However, implementation of 
participative models has usually been made with an eye toward securing higher level of 
competitiveness. 
It is argued that without participation, workers’ alienation is inevitable at workplaces, 
which, in the long run, involves that they become indifferent to public affairs as citizens as well, 
which is a real danger to democracy as a whole (Kahn-Freund, 1960). Critics claim, however, 
that participation is often used by managements as a manipulative device to weaken trade 
unions and control workers’ mood or morale (Rehnman, 1968). The sceptical arguments claim 
that even in extensive worker self-management regimes, employers retain control of power. 
2. The Notion of Participation 
Participation in decision-making processes could exist in many different ways, starting from 
the mere right to be informed, it could also include consultation, and the strongest influence 
could be provided by means of co-determination. Employee participation could be of a different 
nature, depending on the models of workers’ representation, the public or private nature of the 
employment relationship, the organizational dimensions of enterprises and markets, as well as 
the relationship between legislative and contractual sources. Naturally, participation reflects the 
industrial relations systems within which it is applied. The increasing globalization of capital, 
product and labour markets has increased the need for effective and functioning models of 
participation. However, the co-existence of the different systems has led to paramount 
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difficulties in defining the meaning, and especially the boundaries of employee participation 
both in academia and in practice. 
2.1. The International Labour Organisation’s Approach to 
Participation 
The subject of employee involvement at workplaces has been of interest to the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) for many years in the production of regulatory provisions 
(International Labour Organisation, 2004). Based on the studies published on various national 
systems of employee participation, it is safe to conclude that the term participation does not 
have a single, unambiguous meaning. The actual definitions include diverse notions and 
disciplines concerning a non-unitary and diverse set of workers’ rights originating in laws, 
agreements, or both. The notion of employee involvement – in a European context often used 
as synonym for participation nowadays –is based in most countries on a distinction of powers 
and roles between employers and employees (Blanpain, 1994). Through the different means of 
participation, workers seek to influence certain decisions made by the enterprise that employs 
them. Another interpretation considers participation as a means to modify or improve 
employment relationships and conditions and, in many cases, also the socio-economic 
conditions of a society (Walker, 1975). Focusing on the socio-economic aspects of 
participation, this approach focuses on employees’ influence on decisions concerning 
employment and conditions of life and work (Arrigo & Cassale, 2010). This all-inclusive 
definition, including collective bargaining, does not coincide with the wide consensus of 
scholars. 
 The ILO defines the concept of participation as “any workplace processes or 
mechanisms that allows employees to exert some influence over their work and the conditions 
under which they work” (Arrigo & Cassale, 2010). A wide spectrum of practices is included in 
this definition from consultation of employees concerning aspects of the production process or 
workplace environment to co-determination in decision-making by employee representatives, 
or even the full control of workers in managements, such as the model of cooperatives or 
kibbutzim. Thus, this definition could be divided into four approaches which may co-exist in 
the same workplace: 1) indirect participation through employee representation; 2) direct 
participation, practiced face-to-face between employees and the (representative of) employers, 
like quality circles or autonomous work groups; 3) financial participation, meaning the different 
schemes through which employees are able to benefit from the enterprises financial 
performance;1 4) employee participation on boards of management. 
 The above definitions encompass great many aspects of participation; however, this 
book considers participation (interchangeably used with involvement) in a stricter meaning. I 
use the term participation/involvement in its meaning of direct participation and as a form of 
indirect representation through employee representation at enterprise level, which allows 
employees to influence decision-making processes at their workplace. 
 
                                               
1 An employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) is an employee-owner method that provides a company's workforce 
with a stock ownership interest in the company, usually as a part of the employees’ remuneration package. 
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2.2. The European Dimension of Participation 
The system of employee participation in companies’ decision-making shows considerable 
differences across Europe. Neither the institutional structure nor the intensity of participation 
is on a similar level, arising from differences in thr basic theory of industrial relations between 
the Member States of the European Union (EU). The most significant differences could 
probably be detected between the Anglo-Saxon, the German and the Scandinavian models. In 
the Anglo-Saxon system, institutionalised participation show little compatibility with the 
traditional patterns of industrial relations, whereas in Germany and in the Scandinavian 
countries industrial relations could be characterised as cooperation-based. But even where 
institutionalised workers participation exists, for example in France, it often remains on the 
level of mere information and consultation. There are other models of employee involvement 
as well, most notably the southern European system – like the Mondragon cooperatives –, and 
the Eastern-European (post-soviet) model. Co-determination in its strict sense does not exist in 
the majority of the Member States. However, a lower level of institutionalisation concerning 
participation does not automatically mean less influence on management decisions, as the 
activity of trade unions or persuading the management by informal means could result in high 
levels of actual control in decision making (Biagi, 1995).  
The different culture of industrial relations is the result of the different political, cultural 
and economic developments of the Member States. As Manfred Weiss points out, in view of 
the heterogeneous situation it would be largely unrealistic to shape the structure of participation 
identically throughout the EU, the most that could be achieved would be to approximate the 
systems in a functional sense (Weiss, 2000). However, approximation was indispensable, as the 
EU was no longer a mere market and economic community but was on its way to a social union. 
The first approximation regarding workers’ participation in the EU concerned specific 
matters, such as collective redundancies, the transfer of undertaking, and safety and health 
issues based on the initiations of the first Social Action Program of 1974. The Directive on 
collective redundancies was passed in 19752 followed by the Directive on the safeguarding of 
employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses 
two years later. 3  Both Directives provide for information and consultation of workers’ 
representatives according to the law and practice of the respective Member State. Thus, 
employers are only obliged to inform and consult employees’ representatives in accordance 
with the rather vague term of participation as it exists in national law or practice. 
Not only was approximation limited to the mere right to information and consultation 
in these Directives, but even that only succeeded to a very limited extent. (Weiss, 2000). Even 
though, by the amends of the Directive on collective redundancies in 19924 and of the Directive 
                                               
2 Council Directive 75/129/EEC of 17 February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to collective redundancies, OJ L 48, 22.2.1975, p. 29–30. 
3 Council Directive 77/187/EEC of 14 February 1977 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of 
businesses, OJ L 61, 5.3.1977, p. 26–28. 
4 Council Directive 92/56/EEC of 24 June 1992 amending Directive 75/129/EEC on the approximation of the laws 
of the Member States relating to collective redundancies, OJ L 245, 26.8.1992, p. 3–5. 
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on transfer of undertakings in 1998,5 the EU tackled the issue of transnationality, the importance 
of these Directives on the transnational level remained marginal compared to the effect of the 
establishment of a European Works Council (EWC). The adoption of Council Directive 
94/45/EC was considered as a breakthrough in light of the long learning curve after the failure 
of the Vredling proposal. The Directive introduced European Works Councils or alternative 
procedures in order to ensure information and consultation for employees of multinational 
companies on the progress of the business and any significant decision at the European level 
that could affect their employment or working conditions. Council Directive 94/45/EC was 
repealed and replaced in 2009 by the Recast Directive 2009/38/EC.6 
The EU used the stimulus of the positive experience with the Directive on European 
Works Councils to revitalise the project concerning workers’ participation in the boards of the 
European Company, which was at a fatal deadlock by the 1990s. The EWC further encouraged 
the EU to another far-reaching step: instead of prescribing information and consultation only 
for certain specific issues, the national systems of information and consultation was 
approximated in a comprehensive way by Framework Directive 2002/14/EC on information 
and consultation.7 This Directive sets minimum principles, definitions and arrangements for 
information and consultation of employees at enterprise level within each country. Leveraging 
on the key success factor of the EWC Directive, Member States enjoy substantial flexibility in 
applying the Directive's key concepts (employees' representatives, employer, employees, etc) 
and in implementing the arrangements for information and consultation. 
Employee participation constitutes a characteristic element of the European human 
rights instruments, such as the European Social Charter, the Charter on the Fundamental Social 
Rights of Workers, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The common 
aim of these human rights instruments is to treat workers as citizens of enterprises. Hermann 
and Jacobi call the members of European Works Councils the “ambassadors of the European 
civil society” due to their remarkable potential to develop a strategic management structure, 
which represents the common interests of a multinational workforce and which formulates and 
represents common employment interests (Hermann & Jacobi, 2000, p. 95). Manfred Weiss 
argues that if democratisation of the economy is understood as a promoting and stabilising 
element for democracy in society. Workers throughout the EU should have a similar chance to 
influence decisions by which they are affected (Weiss, 2000). Therefore, in a globalised 
environment, the right to participate in decision making had to be extended beyond national 
borders, and it became necessary for the EU to address the transnational dimension of 
involvement. Hermann and Jacobi acknowledged its social importance, but emphasised the 
economic dimension of participation, while Weiss pinpointed its societal nature and its 
connection to democracy. I argue that both as an economic tool and as a human right, 
                                               
5 Council Directive 98/50/EC of 29 June 1998 amending Directive 77/187/EEC on the approximation of the laws 
of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, 
businesses or parts of businesses, OJ L 201, 17.7.1998, p. 88–92. 
6 Directive 2009/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 on the establishment of a 
European Works Council or a procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of 
undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting employees (Recast), OJ L 122, 16.5.2009, p. 28–44. 
7 Directive 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2002 establishing a general 
framework for informing and consulting employees in the European Community - Joint declaration of the 
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on employee representation, OJ L 80, 23.3.2002, p. 29–
34. 
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participation should not remain a privilege of European citizens, but must be treated as a 
universal right of all workers employed by Europe-based multinational corporations. 
2. Comparison of Participation with Other Forms 
of Representation 
It is important to note the difference between direct and indirect forms of representation and 
the direct and indirect forms of participation. Workers could participate in decision-making 
either directly in person or indirectly through their representatives. Direct participation is based 
on a one-on-one, often face-to-face interaction between employees and their managerial 
counterparts, whereas indirect participation assumes that the views or concerns of employees 
are communicated by a representative of employees. Direct forms of participation (sometimes 
called consultative or deliberative participation) tend to be small-scale and decentralized, like 
quality circles or autonomous work groups, integrated usually into decisions about daily work. 
The traditional form of indirect participation in Europe occurs through works councils. Works 
councils are, in general, legally established representations, elected or appointed by all 
employees in an establishment, irrespective of their membership of trade unions. 
 Autonomous and semi-autonomous groups are teams that determine and carry out work 
tasks, quality control, decide on incentive payments and discipline members who do not meet 
performance standards. They serve to complement or partially replace the traditional manager-
subordinate structure and have the greatest degree of independence (Arrigo & Cassale, 2010). 
Quality circles are small groups of employees, which meet regularly on company time, aiming 
to improve quality and productivity within their own work areas. Management may or may not 
implement their suggestions, which signifies a lesser degree of autonomy; however, it provides 
an opportunity to workers to influence the manner of manufacturing. Works councils are 
standing bodies providing for the information and consultation of employees at a workplace 
level. Members are elected by all the workforce of an establishment or an undertaking.8 
2.1. Trade Union Representation and Participation 
The institutionalized system of employee representation through works council is generally 
connected to the labour movements of the Weimar Republic. However, some rudimentary 
forms of representation could be found in an earlier stage of history. The Works Council Act 
was a part of the framework established by the Weimar Constitution. 9  Article 165 of the 
Weimar Constitution provided for the cooperation on equal footing between workers and 
employees in order to look after their economic and social interests. The scheme provided for 
                                               
8 Article 7 of the Additional Protocol of the Social Charter provided for that the requirements of Article 2 of the 
Additional Protocol are satisfied if great majority (80per cent) of the workers is protected under its provisions, 
however, workers excluded in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 2 were not taken into account in establishing 
the threshold for workers concerned. 
9 Adopted on August 11, 1919. Ceased de facto operation with the enactment of the Enabling Act on March 23, 
1933. 
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a parliamentary form of governance, similar to and parallel with that of the political state. The 
detailed regulations of Factory Works Councils were promulgated in the Act on Works Council, 
but District Workers Councils and the National Economic Council had never been set up. 
Industrial democracy can be divided into two categories: the direct and indirect forms of 
participation. A systematic differentiation between Trade Union representation and 
participation was first made by Csilla Kollonay Lehoczky (Kollonay-Lehoczky, 1997). She 
defines participation as a form of indirect representation, exercised through representatives 
directly elected by employees, in contrast to trade union representation, which is a form of 
representation through an organisation separate from employers or the community of 
employees. From this basic distinction other differentiating factors follow. 
Trade Union representation could be traditionally described as a form of representation 
which protects employees’ interest against those of the employers. The main function of a 
Trade Union is to secure the biggest possible benefit for employees from employers’ profits in 
different ways, mostly through the machinery of collective bargaining or other forms of wage 
negotiations. In contrast, participation leverages on the common denominator of employers’ 
and employees’ interests: its goal is the prosperity of the workplace. Discovering and keeping 
employers’ competitive advantage on the market is not only in the interest of employers, but 
also essential for employment security. 
The differences in the field of interest also determine the available instruments. The 
integrative nature of participation assumes that instruments facilitating cooperation between 
parties will be used to achieve shared goals. 10  The confrontational relationship between 
employers and trade unions anticipates, at least in principle, that bargaining between parties is 
adversarial or distributive (Arrigo & Cassale, 2010). Thus, trade unions’ most frequently used 
legal tool is collective agreement, while participation is likely to be effectuated through 
information, consultation and sometimes co-determination procedures. However, a narrowing 
gap between the positions of the parties and the reconciliation of their interests could also be 
detected (Casale, 2000).11  
Access to information during decision-making is essential for employees. Following the 
definition provided by Directive 2002/14/EC 12 , information is the “transmission by the 
employer to the employees’ representatives of data in order to enable them to acquaint 
themselves with the subject matter [of the future decision] and to examine it.”13 Compared to 
the mere transmission of information, consultation assumes a more complex, bilateral exchange 
                                               
10 This integrative nature of participation could be detected in the wording of Art. 1 (3) of Directive 2002/14/EC: 
“When defining or implementing practical arrangements for information and consultation, the employer and the 
employees’ representatives shall work in a spirit of cooperation and with due regard for their reciprocal rights 
and obligations, taking into account the interests both of the undertaking or establishment and of the employees.” 
11 For a more detailed analysis see, G Casale, Experiences of tripartite relations in Central and Eastern European 
Countries (2000) 16/2 The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations. 
12  Directive 2002/14 established a framework for informing employees and consulting with them in the 
establishments in the European Community. It applies to all undertakings employing at least 50 employees or 
establishments employing at least 20 employees in the European Community, according to the choice made by the 
Member States. 
13 Article 2 (f) of Directive 2002/14/EC. 
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of information. Consultation is defined by Directive 2002/14/EC as “the exchange of views and 
establishment of dialogue between the employee representative and the employer.”14 
Co-determination creates an obligation to agree; therefore, it creates a single will in the 
decision-making process. With other words, co-determination is more than a consensus in a 
subject matter between the parties. Consensus of parties in individual cases is reached by two, 
albeit concordant declarations of an employee and an employer. Another important difference 
is that consensual decisions are only binding on the parties, whereas agreements concluded 
through co-determination could be binding on others as well. For example, a workplace 
agreement concluded by works councils and employers on safety and health related matters 
applies to all employees. Co-determination naturally requires information and consultation. It 
could appear in distinct levels, via works councils and, in some cases, as board-level 
participation. Co-determination exists in a limited scope both in terms of subject matter and in 
industrial relations traditions providing for such a right. 
There are important differences in the organisation structure. Traditionally, trade unions 
have autonomous organization, separate and independent from that of employers. Employee 
participation, on the other hand, does not require a separate organisational structure. 
Representatives are executing their participatory rights in accordance with the structure of their 
respective employers. The differences in the organisation structures lead to the next 
differentiating factor: on the one hand, a trade union is a form of indirect representation: the 
representatives are delegated in accordance with the organisation’s internal structure and 
regulations, trade union officers represent the union’s interest. Participation, on the other hand, 
is based on direct representation, where representatives are elected directly by the employees 
and they are responsible directly to their elector, namely employees. 
There are historical differences too. The origins of trade unionism go back to the 19th 
century and are related to the deterioration of working conditions in the era of industrial 
revolution. Participation took an autonomous legal and organizational form only in the years 
following the First World War in Europe. The idea was, by and large, associated with the 
principle of economic democratization in the Weimar Republic in the 1920s (Naphtali, 1968). 
However, some sort of participation was established in other European countries around that 
time: the Whitley Councils 15  influenced the creation of works committees in the United 
Kingdom in 1918, laws on works councils were issued in Austria in 1919, in Czechoslovakia 
in 1920, and some forms of factory committees were recognized in Russia in 1917. However, 
the rise of the national socialist ideology set aside the participation movement until the end of 
the Second World War. Then, in the early post-war years the idea was revisited and widely 
debated in the then Federal German Republic. On an international level, participation became 
topical in the 1960s and made headway especially in America and in some countries of Asia. 
                                               
14 The conditions are further articulated by Art. 4 (4) regarding the appropriate timing, method and content of the 
consultation. 
15  Whitley Councils, also called Joint Industrial Council, were originally a series of councils made up of 
representatives of labour and management for the promotion of better industrial relations. The Councils were 
named for J. H. Whitley, chairman of the investigatory committee (1916–19) who recommended their formation, 
were first instituted as a means of remedying industrial unrest. Many of them later developed into wage negotiating 
bodies. 
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2.1.1. Single and Dual Channel Systems 
Employee participation, irrespective of its degree of evolution or stability, is a part of a complex 
system of collective relations within an enterprise. National models of collective representation 
have an apparent influence on participation methods. On the one hand, in certain national 
systems, negotiating and participatory methods have developed on the basis of a single-channel 
model of union representation, as no a priori distinctions exist between the holders of the rights 
of information, consultation and the holders of the collective bargaining powers. Thus, the same 
actor can be at the same time representatives of workers at the workplace holding participatory 
rights and be a bargaining party. In single-channel models, enterprise-level employee 
representation is often carried out by external trade unions. 
 On the other hand, in other national systems, the dualism of the two concepts is apparent. 
In dual channel models the holders of involvement rights and the holders of bargaining powers 
are separate. In this model workers’ general representation in the enterprise is entrusted in a 
single body elected by all workers, while unions are guaranteed autonomous forms of presence 
at the workplace, which allow them to protect the rights of their members. Legal provisions 
generally govern electorate procedures, and ensure that democratic principles are formally 
respected. A dual-channel model exists, for example, in Germany, which can be characterized 
by the autonomous sphere of the co-determination, consultation and information procedures of 
works councils, even though that these processes could, in some cases, lead to company-level 
agreements. 
The relationship between participation and collective bargaining is very complex, in 
some national contexts the exact borders are not easy to detect. A theoretical distinction 
assumes that participation is rooted in and is operated through the concept of cooperation rising 
from the shared goals of employers and employees. Collective bargaining, in contrast, is 
assumed to be based on the conflicts of interest of the parties. Recent developments in national 
industrial relations, however, contradict this distinction, making the material boundaries 
between their respective areas of autonomy uncertain. 16  Even the path followed by the 
European Union combines elements of two models. The EU lawmaker does not have a preferred 
model,17 a certain degree of interaction emerges in Directives between collective bargaining 
and employee involvement rights. 18 
Also, the contraposition of unions and workers’ direct representation is tempered by the 
fact that works council representatives are often union members.19 A number of factors play 
part in this development, most notably unions’ right to develop autonomous forms of workplace 
                                               
16 See, for example, the recent changes in the Hungarian system, whereby works councils are allowed to conclude 
a collective agreement-like contract with the employer, covering all aspects of the employment relationship, except 
wages (Section 268 of the Hungarian Labour Code (Act No 1 of 2012)). 
17 Art 153 of TFEU (ex-art 137 of TEC) does not give the Union specific competencies regarding the right of 
association, the EU lawmaker can only provide for the rights of employee representatives. 
18 Under Directives 2001/86 and 2003/73 collective bargaining is intended to select and regulate the forms of and 
the arrangement for involvement, and in collective redundancy procedures, consultation with the workers in 
intended to reach an agreement (Directives 98/59 and 98/50).  
19 See the former Hungarian Labour Code, which linked union representativeness to the results of the works council 
elections (Section 29 Para 2 of Act No 22 of 1992). 
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representation not solely to protect their members, but to create an effective communication 
channel to formulate a union’s strategy. 
Due to the different traditions of industrial relations among the Member States, there 
are many different forms of representative structures in the European Union. As a possible 
classification, the European Company Survey lists employee representation at company level 
as follows: single channel representation, where works councils are the sole eligible employee 
representation structure (examples are Austria, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands); 
dual channel representation, where both types of representation can be found, but works 
councils have a stronger role (examples are Belgium, France, Italy and Spain). In some Member 
States, the union-based system is present together with works councils (examples are Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, the UK, and to some lesser extent, Ireland); dual channel representation, 
with trade union shop stewards playing a prominent role (examples are Denmark, Finland, 
Portugal, Slovenia and Croatia); and single channel representation, where trade unions are the 
sole representative bodies (examples are Cyprus, Malta, Sweden and Turkey).20 
2.2. Direct Participation – Quality Circles 
Quality Circles (QC) appear as the basic form of employee participation, a forum that unites 
shop-floor workers, first-line supervisors, section and middle managers and trade union officers 
who freely and informally discuss issues of production and possible development of work 
conditions. Operation and themes of activity of the QC is based on the workers spontaneous 
choice and surveys show that improvements of productivity and quality, working conditions, 
development of human relations are usually on the agenda. 
QC is often associated with the Japanese production methods. In the 1960s labour 
productivity of Japanese manufacturing industries was the lowest of ten major OECD countries 
(OECD, 1970). Japanese companies attracted increased attention when, as a response to low 
efficiency, scientific quality control was introduced (Goldstein, 1985). The accumulated rise of 
quality circles could be explained as the companies’ response to the mounting shortage of 
qualified labour (especially engineers and technicians) in the rapidly expanding economy. 
However, the low growth period after the oil shocks of 1970s triggered the real organizational 
changes at majority of the established companies (Tsuneki & Matsunaka, 2008). 
According to the Japanese Industrial Standard (JIS), the term ‘quality’ is interpreted in 
the broadest sense to mean ‘everything that can be improved’. Thus, quality is not only 
associated with products and services or the way how machines are operated, but also includes 
all aspects of human behaviour (Watanabe, 1991). Thus, participation in a QC is usually a part 
of workers’ duties and the activities tends to extend beyond regular working hours and are 
usually unpaid. However, the unremunerated, voluntary participation of workers is based on 
economic motivation: an uncooperative attitude would result in a poor evaluation of the 
employee and endanger not only the chances of promotion or bonuses, but the individual’s 
position within the group. In Japanese methods advice and guidance on establishment of a QC 
are provided by either a unit manager or a special person designated as QC promoter, then 
                                               
20 Employee representation at establishment level in Europe – European Company Survey 2009, the on-line report 
is available at http://eurofound.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ef_files/pubdocs/2011/43/en/1/EF1143EN.pdf. 
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workers select their circle leader among the participants, who are either chosen to become 
members or volunteer to do so, and as a result, 83 per cent of the total workforce is participating 
in QC activities. 
The Japanese way of operating QCs is often compared to its Western counterparts, 
which tend to not achieve equally high results on productivity improvement. The difference in 
efficacy is often explained by the detached nature of the Western QC; it is argued that since the 
companies do not try to promote the movement as an integral part of corporate management, 
workers quickly become disillusioned and their enthusiasm gets quickly extinct (Cole, 1983-
1984). 
2.3. Financial and Board Level Participation 
Financial participation is a term applied to the various forms of employee profit-sharing and 
share ownership schemes which give employees a financial stake in the company for which 
they work. Usually a part of the profit is paid to employees in addition to their wages. This form 
of participation can also be characterised by sharing property rights with employers and it gives 
employees a residual right to the company’s profit. Neither profit-sharing nor shared-ownership 
schemes are necessarily associated with employee participation in corporate governance. In 
theory, stockownership may permit influence on decisions, but in practice it is a fairly limited 
option. Several studies confirmed that financial participation as a sole incentive has limited 
impact on business performance and employee involvement; but when it is combined with other 
policies (like professional trainings, job security or other forms of direct or indirect 
participation), the scheme may be positively linked with employee participation.21  
Workers’ representation on company boards is understood as one step further in 
changing the power structure in the economic field (Weiss, 2006). While in most Member States 
of the EU board-level participation is an important component of corporate governance, 
company law regulations on the relationship to the company of employee representatives in the 
highest enterprise organs reflect the broad spectrum of different national conceptions (Kluge & 
Wilke, 2007). 
Employee participation is referred to in Council Directive 2001/86/EC (supplementing 
the European Company Statute) concerning the involvement of employees. 22  Article 2(k) 
defines participation in particular terms as “the influence of the body representative of the 
employees and/or the employees’ representatives in the affairs of a company by way of the right 
to elect or appoint some of the members of the company’s supervisory or administrative organ; 
or the right to recommend and/or oppose the appointment of some or all the members of the 
company’s supervisory or administrative organ”. Council Directive 2003/72/EC 
                                               
21  See for example, M. Festing, Y. Groening, R. Kabst and W. Weber (1998): Financial participation and 
performance in Europe, 15 Human Resource Management Journal, 54–67; P. Kalmi, A. Pendleton, and E. Poutsma 
(2006): The Relationship between Financial Participation and Other Forms of Employee Participation: New 
Survey Evidence from Europe, 27 Economic and Industrial Democracy, 637-667; A. Pendleton, E. Poutsma, C. 
Brewster and J. van Ommeren (2002): Employee share ownership and profit-sharing in the European Union: 
incidence, company characteristics, and union representation, 8 European Review of Labour and Research 47-62. 
22 Council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 2001 supplementing the Statute for a European company with regard 
to the involvement of employees, OJ L 294, 10.11.2001, p. 22–32. 
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(supplementing the Statute for a European Cooperative Society) repeats this definition of 
participation.23 
  
                                               
23 Council Directive 2003/72/EC of 22 July 2003 supplementing the Statute for a European Cooperative Society 
with regard to the involvement of employees, OJ L 207, 18.8.2003, p. 25–36. 
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PART II. – THE DUAL NATURE OF EMPLOYEE 
INVOLVEMENT 
1. Weimar Origins 
The institutionalized system of works constitution and the form of employee representation 
through works councils are generally connected to the labour movements of the Weimar 
Republic. However, some rudimentary forms of such representation could be found in an earlier 
stage of history. At the beginning of the 19th century, to keep trade unions out of the plants and 
to provide more legitimacy to employers’ policies, employers voluntarily established some 
forms of employee participation. Most of these shop committees were unsuccessful due to the 
limited power provided to them and the strict limitations of their functions to unimportant 
issues. However, in 1898, during a big strike in the mining industry, strikers sent a delegation 
to Keiser Wilhelm II to seek his help in settling the industrial incident and to ask his support 
regarding the establishment of shop committees. The Emperor declared himself in favour of the 
shop committees and signed the ‘Berlin Protocol’, which granted the right to miners to set up 
shop committees (Stern, 1925). 
The Works Council Act (Betriebsratgesetz) of February 4, 1920 was a part of the 
framework established by the Weimar Constitution far ahead of its age.24 Article 165 of the 
Weimar Constitution provided that workers and employees, in order to look after their 
economic and social interests, have to cooperate with employers on an equal footing regarding 
the regulation of salaries, working conditions, as well as in the entire field of the economic 
development of the forces of production. The scheme provided for a parliamentary form of 
governance, similar to and parallel with that of the political state. The lowest unit, the Enterprise 
Workers Council, represented the interest of employees on a workplace level. The next unit in 
the industrial field was the economic district, represented by the District Works Council. The 
District Workers Councils were to be made up of an equal number of representatives of capital 
and labour. Finally, the highest unit was to be the nation itself, governed by the Reich Economic 
Council, also to be composed by the elected representatives of labour and capital in the same 
way as it was to be at the District Workers Council. 25 The detailed regulations of Factory 
Workers Councils were promulgated in the Act on Works Council, but District Workers 
Councils and the Reich Economic Council were never set up. 
The Act on Works Council constituted the most extensive and most important piece of 
social legislation of the era. It covered almost every aspect of labour and social legislation, like 
collective agreements, labour exchanges, mediation and arbitration. Even though the final text 
of the law was compromised, its significance is unquestioned. (Stern, 1925)26  
                                               
24 Adopted on August 11, 1919. The Act was abolished and replaced by the Act on the Order of National Labour 
on the 20th of January, 1934 that based the works constitution on the basis of the “Führerprinzip”. 
25 Article 165 of the Constitution of the Republic of Weimar. 
26 The first draft of the Act was heavily contested by both employers and trade unions. The proposal was turned 
over to a special committee to balance the needs of various political parties For example the works council co-
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In the light of the provisions of the Weimar Constitution, the dual nature of employee 
involvement appears in a sprouting form in the Works Council Act. The human rights approach 
is apparent in the concept of ‘collective economic interest’ of the employees and the envisaged 
parliamentary form of interest representation through the District Workers Council and the 
Reich Economic Council. This decision making process mirrors the Sinzheimerian ideal of 
economic democracy. Sinzheimer argued that involvement in the formation of their economic 
conditions empowers employees with real freedom in their employment, which they otherwise 
cannot enjoy in the process of negotiating their individual contract due to the imbalance of 
power between the contracting parties (Sinzheimer, 1936). In Sinzheimer’s views, the 
democratization of the economic sphere is necessary to free employees from subordination in 
employment relations, which is essential to safeguarding their human dignity (Dukes, 2011). 
The economic aspect shows that the improvement of the economic productivity of an 
establishment is as a common goal of both labour and capital, for which they have to strive in 
a cooperative manner.27 
However, works councils were never set up in the envisaged way. The ambiguity 
between the spirit of the law and its actual provisions could be detected in the repetitions and 
the unclear provisions used by the law. This vague language could largely be explained with 
the political unrest characterizing the post-war times. 28  Employers were frightened by the 
aggressiveness of extremist trade unions and soviets which spontaneously sprang up after the 
1918 revolution and gathered increasing political and industrial powers. The amazingly rapid 
growth in membership of the socialist union was also an alarming sign of their increased 
power.29  Thus, the establishment and the empowerment of works council represented the 
interest of capital to pacify the radical left at workplaces, but there was no genuine intention to 
share managerial prerogatives. Therefore, nominal rights were given to works councils to 
monitor the compliance of employers’ practices with the employment regulations, but it was 
not accompanied by executive power. 
The establishment of works councils was also an acceptable solution for trade unions, 
to keep extremists outside of their gates. Despite the successful incorporation of the system of 
works councils, there were fields where trade unions and works councils had to clash with each 
other. The friction resulted from the different objectives of the two organizations and from the 
fields of activity. The regulations concerning works councils interfered with the already existing 
schemes of trade union operation. According to the theory of economic constitution, works 
councils were supposed to be first and foremost representatives of workers at the establishment 
                                               
determination right on hiring was eliminated, but on dismissal it was retained The weakening of the power of 
works council was met with an outburst of opposition, delegations were continuously sent to the special committee 
to renegotiate the provisions, and during the second reading of the law, over 100,000 workers demonstrated at the 
Reichstag - the demonstration was ended by the police, shooting into the crowd, leaving 42 persons killed and 105 
wounded (Stern, 1925). 
27 Section 66 Para 1 of the Works Council Act of February 4, 1920. 
28 It has to be also noted that the coming into force of the Act of Works Council coincided with the Kapp Putsch, 
which was a coup attempt in March 1920, aimed at undoing the results of the German Revolution of 1918–1919, 
overthrowing the Weimar Republic and establishing a right-wing autocratic government. It was supported by parts 
of the military and other conservative, nationalistic and monarchist forces. 
29 In October 1918 the socialist unions had a total of 1,648,313 members, while in 1920 the total membership was 
over 7,000,000. A possible explanation given by Stern to the phenomena is that the returning soldiers and the 
unorganized and untrained workers who joined the German soviets automatically became members of the local 
trade unions (Stern, 1925). 
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and they were in charge to protect all employees regardless of their union affiliation. Moreover, 
works councils were in charge to safeguard industrial peace within the establishment to ensure 
continuous, high level productivity. Thus, responsibilities of works council would have had to 
supersede those of the unions. Some of the unions, therefore, complained that the operation of 
works councils hampers the growth of trade unions within the establishment (Guillebaud, 
1928). 
A clash between trade unions and works councils was also apparent about the issue of 
strikes. As the keepers of industrial peace, the law obliged works councils to prevent strikes or 
any other action interfering with the continuation of production, and even in case a strike was 
called by a trade union, workers’ representatives were not permitted to lead the action. Thus, 
admittedly, work councils successfully helped pacifying industrial conflicts, as they had an 
important role in preventing major wildcat strikes during the 1921-23 inflation, which caused 
the rapid devaluation of the mark and led to weekly changes of the Government food index, 
which was the basis of wage calculation (Stern, 1925). The limitations regarding strike activity 
have remained a distinguishing element of the rights and duties of works councils (Biagi, 1995). 
The concept of an economic constitution and the idea of works councils have long survived 
the overthrow of the Weimar Republic (Fritzsche, 1996) (Mommsen, 1998). The economic 
democracy theory was much more than the transfer of parliamentary forms of democracy to 
workplaces, but more importantly it conveyed the principle of democracy and the resolving of 
industrial conflicts through dialogue. The Works Council Act incorporated the duty of an 
employer to consider not only the interests of shareholders, but also those of the employees. 
The contemplation of employees’ interest improved the living and working conditions of 
workers and therefore largely contributed to better social development. Participation also 
introduced an important limitation on the misuse of economic power of employers. By 
establishing the long-term development of an establishment as a shared goal of labour and 
capital, the responsibility for the economic decision was also shared between the parties, but in 
a proportionate manner, which created a productive balance of interest. When seen this way, 
participation was an important factor in the stabilisation of the economic and social order. 
Finally, the Weimar model of participation chiefly influenced the current employee 
involvement system of Germany, which has had further impact on the European model of 
participation. 
2. Employee Involvement as a Question of  
Economic Competitiveness 
Employee involvement has been in the focus of economic researches for decades, and its 
importance is still extraordinary. Improvement of workers’ influence on management decision 
making has utmost importance in the quest for competitiveness in the 21st century. However, it 
shall not be overlooked that even in times when efficiency has a major influence on labour 
regulations, the primary goal of labour law is to balance the power-inequality between labour 
and management, employers and employees. 
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The methods of decision-making naturally affect the dynamics of an enterprises and 
have been studied by many economic scientists related to corporate theories (Berle & Means, 
1932). It is argued that the more participants are involved in decision making, the longer it takes 
to reach a conclusion, therefore the more expensive the process becomes (Freeman & Lazear, 
1995). Costs include direct and indirect elements, such as the time spent by management 
preparing for the information and consultation processes. In a competitive environment only 
those firms are able to survive, which deliver their products demanded by customers at the 
lowest price while covering costs (Alchian, 1950) (Demsetz, 1967). Also, the time delay could 
easily eliminate profitable market options that require prompt responses from the economic 
players (Freeman & Lazear, 1995). Moreover, producing outputs at the lowest cost is in the 
utmost interest of the residual claimants of the company as it increases net cash flows (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). Thus, employees’ interest in involvement is contrary to that of the residual 
claimants. 
Information asymmetries between workers and management can produce negative 
outcomes. First, the insufficient information flow between management and ownership leads to 
increased agency cost (Berle & Means, 1932). Second, the lack of exchange of information 
between labour and management could also create inefficient social outcomes: workers may 
fail to inform the management about ways to improve production efficiency, or if employees’ 
needs for voice remain unheard, employees may choose to exit, thus creating more direct and 
indirect costs for an enterprise (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Thus, the economic input of employee involvement could not be overseen. Many 
hypotheses exist on both sides, aiming to prove either the inefficiency or the efficiency of 
employee involvement. In the following section, examples of various economics theories 
dealing with participation will be introduced first, then empirical data from recent researches 
will be discussed. The following table gives a comprehensive overview on the presented 
economic theories related to employee involvement. 
2.1. Efficiency Theories 
Economic analysis of employee involvement started with the emblematic question raised by 
Jensen and Meckling, who asked if co-determination is so efficient, why do managers not 
choose it voluntarily (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). According to their theory, a firm is a black 
box operating in a way to maximize profit, and inside this black box there is a nexus of contracts 
that regulate the relationships between the individuals. Thus, the firm is a legal fiction where 
the conflicting objectives of individuals are balanced by the framework of contractual relations. 
Models denying the principle of profit-maximization are rejected by the market and employee 
participation is eventually abandoned for the traditional shareholder formation despite its 
inherent agency costs. 
In their response to the Jensen-Meckling theory, Freeman and Lazear claim that forms 
of employee involvement could effectively improve productivity (Freeman & Lazear, 1995). 
They argue that employee involvement enlarges the total pie what owners and employees need 
to share, but eventually owners tend to end up with a smaller slice altogether. Thus, absent fiat, 
employee involvement is not encouraged at enterprises, and employers provide less power than 
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is socially optimal for institutions fostering employee involvement. Analogously, since the size 
of the pie gets larger by the greater power of the works councils, employees would prefer more 
power than is optimal. The optimum level of power sharing also depends on the bargaining 
system of a country where a firm operates. Their figures suggest that employee involvement 
fits better to the labour relation systems where pay and other elements of the compensation are 
determined through relatively centralized collective bargaining. 
Social gains from employee involvement can only be maximized if the rules governing 
information and consultation processes are carefully bound the power of both labour and 
management, as well as fit the broader industrial relations system in which the representative 
bodies function. Even though many of the analysed firms voluntary established employee 
involvement to avoid unionization, most abandoned them, as the power provided for workers 
proved to be insufficient, and the alienated workers stopped cooperating with the management. 
Without real power to affect decision many firms eventually introduced wages and employment 
conditions in a unilateral manner (Freeman & Lazear, 1995). This pattern highlighted the 
prisoner’s dilemma, showcasing the cooperating-defecting solutions of works councils. When 
the gains from employee involvement, like any other cooperative arrangements, are based on 
long-term benefits, austerity measures discourage the operation of voluntarily established 
institutions. 
The benefit of information sharing depends on economic certainty or uncertainty. 
Management often relies on employee representatives to transmit bad news, such as plant 
closure to workers, as their credibility is greater than that of the management. By contrast, in 
affluent times, information given to the employees through their representatives is at the 
expense of the management. Social gains of full information, including profit information, 
would be especially valuable regardless of the economic situation, as it could increase flexibility 
within the organization. Apart from information sharing, consultation also could create 
enterprise surplus, as new solutions to firm-specific problems that neither party would have 
revealed separately could be discovered as an outcome of teamwork. However, workers only 
provide information that management does not have if they are empowered with the right to 
propose solutions (Freeman & Lazear, 1995). 
Employee involvement could not fulfil its role as a voluntary instrument. Moreover, 
sufficient rights must be allocated to employee representatives; otherwise additional economic 
surplus cannot be realized. Participatory rights of employees shall be safeguarded both in front 
of employers and other parties of industrial relations, notably trade unions.  
2.2. Path Dependence Theories 
The neo-classical approach to corporate governance applies the Darwinian notion of the 
survival of the fittest and envisages a process of natural selection within the market, which only 
allows the most efficient formation to survive. The heavily contested proposal of Hansmann 
and Kraakman in The End of History for Corporate Law, suggests that the shareholder-owned 
corporation has triumphed the contest for survival in the global market, and there is no need for 
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future research into any alternative models (Hansmann & Kraakman, 2001). 30 Hansmann and 
Kraakman argue that there is a normative consensus that corporate leaders should run the 
company in the best interest of their shareholders. Models designed to foster employee 
involvement are misguided experiments that force companies to remain with a less than 
efficient result. 
The evolutionary theory of Hansmann and Kraakman was contested on the ground that 
evolution is not a unidirectional process, but an open-ended one, which can be reformed (Njoya, 
2004). Deakin argues that the evolutionary theory proves nothing more than the the ability of 
the winning model to adapt to a certain past environment the best (Deakin, 2002). It does not 
mean, however, that this model is the optimal one or that it would be the most suitable one for 
present or future markets. Deakin’s argument emphasises the importance of adaptability: 
corporations adjust to specific market conditions without any quest for optimality. Adaptation 
is a long process which is shaped by historical conditions. Thus, institutional survival, or even 
supremacy, is not decisive. 
Theories related to path dependency suggest that the predominance of suboptimal 
corporate governance systems that exclude employee involvement is unrealted to efficiency. 
Boyd and Richerson argue that market participants have a natural tendency to adopt the 
practices of the majority, if this is the optimal choice. This frequency dependent bias assumes 
that the preconception is based only on the frequency of the practice and not an efficiency 
evaluation (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). Correspondingly, Klausner implies that markets have a 
natural preference for the present state and oppose changes, regardless of the efficiency 
associated with the existing model. Such status quo is present due both to the blind imitation of 
other firms, and to the high costs of the implementation of an even superior form of governance 
(Klausner, 1996). 
The different factors lying behind path dependence, such as culture, politics and legal 
systems make opting-out from the established system extremely difficult, even though more 
efficient alternatives may exist (Roe, 1996). Thus, the high transition costs of deviation may 
impede socially desirable innovations (Njoya, 2004). Roe and Bebchuk further argue that 
significant sources of path dependence can be detected in corporate ownership and corporate 
rules of the different countries, even though their economies might be quite similar to each other 
(Bebchuk & Roe, 1999). They identified two types of path dependence, one of which is 
efficiency based. They argue that even if a country’s legal regulations were created solely for 
higher efficiency, the already existing patterns of ownership and governance influence the 
relative efficiency of the rules. The discussion illustrates that natural selection by itself will not 
eliminate inefficient structures if players see it as optimal for their own operations. They offer 
the example of Germany assuming that even if employee co-determination laws changes and 
make a dual corporate board optional rather than mandatory, as long as labour leaders and other 
players benefit from co-determination and they have the power to resist changes, the existing 
model will survive regardless of its efficiency. This demonstrates that not only value 
maximization and self-interest govern the choice of decision makers regarding corporate 
governance, but culture and ideology as well. 
                                               
30 For critics see: D. Kershaw (2002): No End in Sight for the History of Corporate Law: The Case of Employee 
Participation in Corporate Governance, 2 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 34; J. Michie and C. Oughton (2002): 
Employee Participation and Ownership Rights, 2 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 34. 
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Even though increasing global competition should discourage companies from 
following inefficient models, globalization so far has not resulted either in the obliteration of 
outdated models or in standardization. Another example of Bebchuk and Roe is the case of the 
European Company. Even though the European Commission has been promoting the idea of 
Societas Europea, arguments between the Member States over matters like employee 
involvement still continue. Even though central political will easily imposes standardised rules, 
countries remain to follow their already existing patterns. The extreme costs of escaping from 
an inefficient system by reincorporation have to be considered as well (Bebchuk & Roe, 1999). 
Further to the above arguments, it could be noted that the lack of effective employee 
involvement might not be due to the inefficiency of the instrument, but to the path-dependency 
of the national corporate governance systems. Thus, expecting corporations incorporated in 
national systems that do not traditionally encourage employee involvement to voluntary adopt 
such a system would be futile. 
2.3. Property and Human Capital Theories 
Property rights theories in economy have addressed the problem of specification of individual 
rights that determine how costs and rewards are allocated among the participants of an 
organization. As it was explained above, firms have been seen as legal fictions, a nexus of 
contracts, whereas individual behaviour in organizations, like managers, employees or stock 
owners is greatly affected by these contracts. Specific attention has been given to contracts 
determining the relations between owners and managers, more precisely to those which are 
separating ownership and control (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
The separation of ownership and control leads to an agency relationship, where the 
principal engages another person, the agent, to perform services on behalf of the principal which 
includes the delegation of decision-making authority to the agent. Delegation of authority to 
agents (managers) leads to agency cost, which occurs as the sum of the monitoring expenditures 
by the principal, the bonding expenditure of the agent and the residual loss. In public companies 
the agency cost is borne by the shareholders, as owners bear the residual risk in the firm. In this 
model employees are not owners, as they do not bear the residual risk, since they decided not 
to shoulder the residual risk and to remain at arm’s length by contracting for a fixed sum by 
way of return (Njoya, 2004). Thus, it is efficient to vest ownership in shareholders and not in 
employees (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Property theories disregard two social and economic considerations. First, in years of 
economic constraints employers increasingly tend to share the residual risks arising from 
economic uncertainty with employees by lowering wages, deteriorating working conditions or 
reducing the level of health and safety protection. This forced participation in economic risks 
indeed leads to lower costs but it leaves the gate open to different forms of exploitation. Second, 
knowledge-intensive production greatly relies on highly skilled employees with significant 
firm-specific knowledge. Many economic theories suggest that specialized investments could 
gain a critical importance in determining the boundaries of firms and the allocation of risks, 
rewards, and control rights within firms. 
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The firm-specific human capital will only make employees more productive at their 
original employers. Becker explores the training investments employers and employees would 
make; according to his argument, in a competitive labour market employers are only willing to 
invest in firm-specific trainings and not in those that aim to improve the general skills of their 
employees, as they will not be able to collect the returns from the latter investment (Becker, 
1993). Employees will be able to use the general knowledge at other companies if they choose 
to exit, whereby the specific knowledge will discourage them from leaving the employer 
(Lazear, 2009). Thus, it would bring an employer and an employee to be in a bilateral monopoly 
position (Kessler & Lülfesmann, 2006).  
The firm-specific knowledge increases employees’ bargaining power as replacing 
workers with special skills will impose high costs on the employer. In knowledge-intensive 
industries, like automotive companies, employees are typically paid on an hourly basis and 
several incentives are available to reduce turnover. By contrast, employees in the garment 
industry are often treated like subcontractors, and additional benefits are seldom offered to them 
(Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1994). 
Human capital is not easily tradable and neither the firm nor any of its participants can 
own it. However, there are theories aiming to combine property and human capital concepts 
(Blair, 1999). If ownership involves the right to make decisions and an owner receives whatever 
remains after all payments specified by other contracts have been paid, all parties who invested 
in the firm, including shareholders and employees, should share the rights entangled in 
ownership. Where firm-specific human capital is important, property rights need to point 
toward employee control of the firm or at least participation in management. Otherwise 
employees, having the fear that the employer strips them off from the rents earned by the assets, 
will underinvest their human capital to the firm. Such action could negatively affect 
competitiveness, especially in knowledge-intensive production. Though the idea of risk-sharing 
has quickly (re)gained popularity, employees’ right to involvement in decisions that 
significantly affect their daily living has not yet attracted that much recognition, not even as a 
means to retain skilled workforce. 
2.4. Human Resource Management Theories 
Human resource management deals with policy areas like selection, training, job design, 
compensation, performance appraisal, communication, and employee relations. Employee 
involvement, from a human resources management perpective, acknowledges that employees 
and employers have different but legitimate interests in the employment relationship. Managers 
are no longer seen as the sole custodians of authority, and employees can bring their workplace 
experience to the decision-making table, therefore decisions are better supported. Involvement 
in decision making provides employees with an opportunity to examine management’s motives 
and the consequences of various options before settling on a binding decision. Thus, 
participation has long been in the scope of human resource management researches and has 
been studied from an organizational efficacy point of view (Dachler & Wilpert, 1978). Where 
employees had a greater amount of influence on decision making both the satisfaction level and 
the productivity of workers are higher. However, it has also been argued that the magnitude of 
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the positive effects of employee involvement is so small that it casts doubts on the overall 
practical benefits of the instrument (Locke, et al., 1986). 
The usual critical standpoint of employee involvement from human resource 
management point of view is related to the effects of the traditional agency problem, which 
negatively influences the organizational outcomes. Delegation of decision-making rights to 
workers increases the agency problem as the more participants are involved, the more sluggish 
the decision-making process becomes. The increased costs, the time and the efforts to 
coordinate the decisions are likely to have negative effects on the overall performance of the 
firm (Kandel & Lazear, 1992). 
Involvement increases the employees’ commitment and trust, reduces alienation and 
resistance to change. These factors motivate employees to work harder, which leads to 
increased productivity (Leana, 1987). Participation programs could enhance organizational 
performance by providing information to managers that is not otherwise revealed to them with 
autocratic management methods (Leana & Florkowski, 1992). Information sharing and 
involvement in decision making successfully reduce organizational change cynicism (Brown & 
Cregan, 2008). However, it has been increasingly recognized that when the different techniques 
of information sharing and participation are not accompanied by the sincere intention of the 
management to involve workers in decision making, employees quickly lose interest in 
employee involvement. This voluntary withdrawal from participation could lead to the false 
impression that employees are not interested in involvement. 
2.5. Behavioural Economic Theories 
Behavioural economics is a method of economic analysis that applies psychological insights to 
human behaviour to explain economic decision-making (Simon, 1959). It first gained attention 
in the 1950s, as a new direction in microeconomics, and after the financial crisis in 2007 it 
excited even greater interest. Formerly, descriptive microeconomics was relatively uninterested 
in the behaviour of individual economic agents, unless if it was necessary to provide a 
foundation for macroeconomics. Normative microeconomics did not need a theory of human 
behaviour either, from its perspective the only relevant question was how people ought to 
behave, not how they actually behave. Thus, classical economic theories of markets with perfect 
competition and rational agents were considered as deductive theories that did not require 
contact with empirical data once their assumptions were accepted. 
 Combining psychology with economic models has brought a completely new 
perspective. Rather than correlating statistical data or interviewing and surveying people on 
their views, it uses psychological experiments to test how people react to particular changes to 
their environment. Behavioural economics tries to offer an answer to the question, why 
individual economic agents behave in seemingly unreasonable ways, e.g., acting against their 
self-interest. 
 Behavioural economists have influenced labour law in basically four major fields: the 
effect of fair pay on the motivation to work; the effect of security in pay on productivity; the 
relevance of participation rights and job satisfaction in the workplace; and the differences 
between opting in and opting out of workplace schemes, such as occupational pensions 
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(McGaughy, 2015). Labour rights that correct inequality of bargaining power, protect security 
in pay, and promote workplace participation are able to redress considerable market failures.  
Probably the first experiment that had implications on workplace participation was the 
‘Howthrone experiment’ conducted by Elton Mayo at the Howthrone Works of the Westerns 
Electric Company in 1924 (Mayo, 1933). Mayo’s experiment competed with the scientific 
management theories of Taylor (Taylor, 1911). While Taylor wanted to prove that he could 
influence productivity by changing working patterns, break times and monetary incentives, 
treating workers as ‘intelligent gorillas’, Mayo’s studies, by contrast, wanted to influence 
productivity by recording the reactions, opinions and thoughts of workers. The intended major 
aim of the Hawthorne experiment was to check the effect of lighting intensity on production. 
However, due to technical problems, the very research did not lead to any results, so they 
continued the experiments with work times and break times. The observers were instructed to 
consult workers when they would prefer breaks and what sort of meals they would want. 
Productivity went up significantly when meals were given and brakes were introduced, but even 
more curiously, productivity continued to improve even after these benefits were removed. 
Though Mayo did not get what he wanted from his experiment, later his data have been studied 
and have continued to be studied today.31 
It was proven that the productivity of Hawthorne workers went up because they could 
genuinely participate in workplace decisions. This could serve as an explanation why workers 
continued to be productive even though the offered benefits were taken away. People whose 
work is ignored, disparaged, or discredited feel less motivated to keep working because they 
see that continued effort produces more harm than reward. There are many ways in which 
people at work could be acknowledged. Company managements can simply ensure that they 
foster a culture of recognition and ensure that people in the organisation are not left behind. 
Results have prescriptive implications for educating labourers about the goals of their work. 
This implies participation through work councils, representation on the company board and 
collective bargaining by trade unions (Ariely, et al., 2008). To maximize the protection of 
information and consultation rights of employees, it is a reoccurring idea to make it compulsory 
to set up and operate works councils at workplaces.  
It was underlined in the Howthrone-experiment that genuine participation generated the 
better productivity. However, works councils may facilitate information and consultation at a 
workplace, it would not be guaranteed that employees could exercise their right to participate. 
Companies barely report to employees or to their representatives more than the legal minimum 
(McCahery & Vermeulen, 2008). Access to non-financial data has remained a managerial 
prerogative throughout the EU. In addition, it was found that workforce and workplace 
conditions are not seen as key parts of sustainability by the management. In the field of 
codetermination on working conditions, less than ten per cent of the companies provided even 
partial information. Items going beyond the workplace, including issues related to sustainability 
                                               
31 See for example, Franke R. H. and Kaul J. D. (1978) The Hawthorne experiments: First statistical interpretation, 
American Sociological Review, 43(5), 623–643; Adair, J. G. (1984). The Hawthorne effect: A reconsideration of 
the methodological artifact. Journal of Applied Psychology, 69(2), 334–345; Stephen R. G. Jones (1992): Was 
There a Hawthorne Effect? American Journal of Sociology 98(3), 451-468; Wickström G, Bendix T. (2000): The 
"Hawthorne effect"--what did the original Hawthorne studies actually show? Scandinavian Journal of Work, 
Environmental, Health, 26(4), 363-7. 
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were not reported at all (Cremers, et al., 2013). At the companies examined, sustainability was 
clearly linked to corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies and non-financial reporting was 
often treated as a marketing tool to develop responsibility. However, even in this sense, these 
tools were mostly used to fulfil the needs of shareholders and less focused on those of the 
employees. Particularly in Greece and Bulgaria it was found that even those companies that 
have voluntarily put on international reporting obligations are reluctant to disclose information 
related to environmental issues, health and safety matters at work, business strategy and 
marketing. 
The recent financial crisis has brought another aspect to non-financial reporting: 
European Companies tend to increasingly consider CSR and sustainability as luxuries in times 
when elements of traditional social dialogue are at stake. Parallel to this phenomenon, they 
show significantly less respect for human rights, labour standards and environmental 
consciousness (Cremers, et al., 2013).  
 These findings underline the importance of genuine employee participation over the role 
of compulsory workplace settings. The mere obligation to provide information on pre-set 
matters and consult employee representatives does not create a dialogue between employers 
and employees. By creating dummy institutions to put a rubber stamp on employers’ decisions 
could simultaneously be a pretext for abolishing basic labour or human rights. But the 
obligation to protect the right of participation cannot be vested solely in the state actor or the 
employer. Genuine participation also requires the duty of understanding the importance of 
involvement and of activity on the employees’ side. 
3. Employee Involvement as a Human Right Issue 
in Europe 
Robert Dahl argues that people possess an inalienable right to govern themselves in a 
democratic process (Dahl, 1985). If democratic decision making is required on a state level, 
then it is also justifiable on a workplace level. However, the right to be involved in issues related 
to a workplace gained recognition much later than unionism, and its gradual and partial 
acknowledgement is still very dependent on political regimes. Even though it was already 
realized after the First World War that economic prosperity and social democracy cannot be 
achieved without the protection of the dignity of workers (Sinzheimer, 1927), employee 
involvement was only incorporated in human rights instruments in the late 1980s, and notably, 
only in Europe. The controversy about the acknowledgement of labour rights as human rights 
is even more palpable regarding the right to be involved in decision making at the workplace. 
This chapter first analyses the paradox of labour rights as human rights in general, and then 
reviews the existing hard and soft law instruments concerning the right of employee 
involvement. 
Features of the globalized economy have several adverse effects on working conditions, 
economic standards and collective rights. These new trends also highlighted that working 
conditions and patterns of economic and social conditions are highly interdependent. Thus, the 
need for the better protection of employees has emerged in the past decades. Even though 
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workers’ rights are acknowledged as human rights and appear in all major human rights 
instruments, relatively little attention has been devoted to them compared to the forces of 
globalization (Alston, 2012).  
Advocates of human rights and labour rights “run on tracks that are sometimes parallel 
and rarely meet (Bogg & Novitz, 2014, p. 323)”, and this paradox is rooted in the different 
purposes and personal scope of legal fields. While human rights are primarily oriented toward 
limiting the power of the state, labour rights predominantly aim to limit the power of private 
actors in the market. Regarding human rights, principal right-holders are individuals, while 
labour rights are more collectively orientated. As opposed to human rights, which are universal 
and possessed by all human beings by virtue of their humanity, the entitlement in case of labour 
rights can be defined as the set of rights that humans possess by their status as employees 
(Kolben, 2010). However, this status is rather fluid and the identity of the beneficiaries of labour 
rights is contested.  
According to Alexy, normative questions can be divided into ethical and legal-doctrinal 
questions (Alexy, 2010). The former one addresses why individuals have rights and which right 
they have; the latter one deals with the question whether a legal subject has particular rights 
within a legal system. In the first case, the question in not whether the legal system 
acknowledges a certain right, but whether the norm that stipulates it is applicable to a given 
individual. In the second case, the existence of the right in question is also doubtful. 
Regarding Alexy’s fist preoccupation, the personal scope of the right to involvement 
requires a closer inspection (Alexy, 2010). The beneficiaries of participatory rights are 
employees. Human rights instruments providing for the right to involvement also stipulate that 
the definition of employees lies in national legislations or practices of member states or 
contracting parties. This regulatory technique raises two questions: one is whether employee 
involvement is an individual or a collective right; and the other one is whether the vague 
personal scope affects the level of protection these international legal instruments can provide. 
The scope of right-holders forms an essential element of collective right theories.32 
Whereas the theories themselves vary greatly, it seems that a consensus is reached regarding 
the defining criteria for collective right: the ultimate interest that the right serves, and the nature 
of the right-holder (Miodrag, 2012). With other words, when a collective right is repelled, in 
any case it is the group, rather than any particular individual, who is wronged. 
On the other hand, it is questionable whether a group of employees employed by an 
undertaking is the same in nature as other groups subject to collective rights, for example trade 
union members? Trade unions are legal entities with representatives, they usually have a solid 
internal structure and registered membership. Thus, both trade union and its members could 
easily be identified as right holders. The group of employees on the other hand is a part of an 
undertaking, it lacks internal structure as their position within an undertaking is defined by a 
unilateral decision of an employer; and the group has no influence on its membership either. 
Moreover, individuals could perform work in great many ways for an undertaking. Due to its 
                                               
32 See for example Hart, H. L. A. (1982): Legal Rights, in his Essays on Bentham, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 
162–193.; McDonald, Leighton (1998): Can Collective and Individual Rights Coexist?, Melbourne University 
Law Review, 22 (2), 310–336.; Raz, Joseph (2010): Human Rights without Foundations, in The Philosophy of 
International Law, Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 321–338. 
29 
 
diverse nature, even in state socialist legal theories, the idea that the collective of employees 
has a special legal nature could not find solid support (Weltner, 1961).  
Not all groups can be defined by regulated admissions or membership fees, such as 
ethnic minorities. On the other hand, a group of employees is different from these groups; as 
opposed to ethnic minorities, it is unlikely that membership plays a constitutive role in 
members’ lives in terms of adopted values and life perspectives. Also, while social recognition 
is necessary for the membership of minorities (Alexy, 2010), it is not required for employees, 
as their ‘membership card’ is provided by a contract based on which they perform work for an 
employer. Another striking difference is that while the cessation of membership in groups 
depends on the decision of a right-holder, employment could be terminated by a unilateral (and 
sometimes arbitrary) decision of an employer.  
The human right nature of employee involvement has long been questioned. The ‘older 
brother’ of participatory rights, the right to bargain collectively gained recognition in a much 
less contested way and now is acknowledged by major human rights instruments. On the 
contrary, employee involvement first appeared in 1988 in the Additional Protocol to the 
European Social Charter. A year later, the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights 
of Workers also incorporated it, and subsequently it appeared in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of European Union (CFREU). However, the right to involvement does not appear in 
human rights instruments outside of the aegis of Europe. The low recognition could raise 
concerns whether the right to involvement is a fully-fledged human right, even though, both the 
European Social Charter and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU are indispensable 
human rights instruments of the European region and their importance is unquestioned.  
The European Social Charter is a human rights convention of the Council of Europe, 
which established a wide range of economic and social rights that are crucial for human dignity. 
Due to its wide geographic coverage, its role is indispensable in promoting human rights across 
the European continent. The CFREU addresses issues which form the core of labour law and 
industrial relations in Europe: freedom of association (Article 12), right of collective bargaining 
and collective action (Article 28), workers’ right to information and consultation within the 
undertaking (Article 27), freedom to choose an occupation and right to engage in work (Article 
15), prohibition of child labour and protection of young people at work (Article 32), fair and 
just working conditions (Article 31), non-discrimination (Article 21), equality between men 
and women (Article 23), protection in the event of unjustified dismissal (Article 30). Since its 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the CFREU has had the same legal value as the 
European Union treaties. Thus, inclusion of the right to information and consultation in this 
instrument signifies the stance of employee involvement as a fundamental human right. 
The question whether participation is an individual or a collective right has to be 
addressed. Article 27 of CFREU states that workers or their representatives must be informed 
and consulted. Thus, if no representative can be found on an appropriate level, then workers, 
either individually or as a group, have to directly informed or consulted. Neither the right to be 
represented, nor the duty to establish a standing body can be found in Article 27. That means 
the right to information and consultation is vested in individuals, who, when the circumstances 
so require, can form a representative body for themselves. However, the possibility to elect a 
standing consultative body does not affect the individual nature of employee involvement as a 
human right. 
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Thus, the right to information and consultation should be unconditionally enjoyed by 
every employee, with a possibility to exercise it with the assistance of a competent and standing 
representative body. Even though information and consultation are rights which must be 
guaranteed to employees, they rather represent a duty for an employer to provide this right. 
Thus, as the very core of the right, it requires an employer to be active in delivering information 
and consultation (Ales, 2009). 
3.1. The regulatory Framework of the ILO 
The term workers’ participation as used by the ILO means participation in decision-making at 
the enterprise level. The Philadelphia Declaration calls on the ILO to draw up programs to 
promote “the cooperation of management and labour in the continuous improvement of 
productive efficiency”. 33  To implement this call, the ILO has created a series of general 
principles. However, no convention has been adopted on information-consultation; thus, the 
Organisation uses soft law instruments. 
The normative framework of the ILO on information and consultation contains 
recommendations and declarations – measures, which do not have the binding force of the 
conventions and are not subject to state ratification. The recommendations list a whole series 
of themes to be included in information-consultation process at company level, and especially 
concerning working conditions (like hire, transfer or termination). The overall situation of a 
company and an explanation of decisions that directly or indirectly affect the situation of the 
personnel are also addressed by these documents. ILO’s soft law instrument indicate the 
necessity of ensuring a climate of comprehension and reciprocal trust at company level, as well 
as the importance of timely communication and consultation. 
Recommendation Number 94 (1952) on Cooperation at the Level of the Undertaking 
indicates that it is necessary to promote consultation and collaboration between employers and 
workers at company level for issues of common interest, which are not covered by collective 
bargaining or which are not normally subject of other procedures related to working conditions. 
Recommendation Number 113 (1960) on Consultation on Industrial and National Levels 
recommends appropriate measures for efficient consultation and collaboration to promote a 
mutual understanding and good relations, to develop the economy, to improve working 
conditions and to raise the standards of living. Recommendation Number 143 (1971) on the 
Workers’ Representatives affirms the need of a consultation before a dismissal of a workers’ 
representative becomes final.34 Recommendation Number 129 (1967) on the Communications 
within the Undertaking is even more explicit about rights and obligations of social partners in 
times of restructuring, and about rules which are supposed to guide information-consultation 
processes.  
                                               
33 ILO Declaration of Philadelphia, Declaration concerning the aims and purposes of the International Labour 
Organisation, 1944. Article III. para e) the effective recognition of the right of collective bargaining, the 
cooperation of management and labour in the continuous improvement of productive efficiency, and the 
collaboration of workers and employers in the preparation and application of social and economic measures. 
34 It is important to note that the duty of consultation is intended to coexist with collective bargaining, not to replace 
it. 
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Declarations are resolutions of the International Labour Conference used to make formal 
and authoritative statements. Although declarations are not subject to ratification, they are 
intended to have a wide application and contain symbolic and political undertakings by the 
member States. Adopted in 1998, the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights 
at Work is a commitment by governments, as well as employers' and workers' organizations to 
uphold basic human values. The Declaration covers four fundamental principles and rights at 
work, one of which is freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to 
collective bargaining. 35  The Declaration and its Follow-up provides several ways to help 
countries, employers and workers achieve full realisation of the Declaration’s objectives. There 
is an Annual Review composed of reports from countries that have not yet ratified one or more 
of the ILO Conventions that directly relate to the specific principles and rights stated in the 
Declaration. This reporting process provides governments with an opportunity to state what 
measures they have taken towards achieving respect for the Declaration. It also gives 
organizations of employers and workers a chance to express their views on the progress made. 
Each year a Global Report provides a dynamic and objective worldwide picture on the current 
situation of the principles and rights expressed in the Declaration. It serves as a basis for 
determining priorities for technical cooperation. Technical cooperation projects are designed to 
address identifiable needs in relation to the Declaration and to strengthen local capacities, 
thereby translating principles into practice. The Tripartite Declaration of Principles 
Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (MNE Declaration) offers guidelines 
to MNEs, governments, as well as to employers' and workers' organizations in areas of 
employment, training, conditions of work and life, and industrial relations.36 Its provisions are 
reinforced by certain ILO Conventions and Recommendations which the social partners are 
urged to bear in mind and apply to the greatest extent possible. The MNE Declaration provides 
for no specific ways of monitoring. Even though the ILO regularly collects data to monitor and 
analyse changes in actual working conditions and the laws which regulate them, such activity 
mostly contributes to identifying the gaps between law and the actual conditions. It is a tool 
used to assist the ILO in developing more effective policy responses. However, it does not aim 
to serve as an instrument to monitor the actual employers’ activity or support workers or 
workers’ groups with their individual complaints against an employer who fails to adhere to the 
instrument. 
Even though ILO regulators are well respected supranational non-state actors, these soft 
law measures have no binding force, monitoring, or adjudication in the background, thus, these 
measures are not suitable to provide uniform protection to the right to information and 
consultation. The ILO did not adopt a binding convention on information and consultation 
within undertakings, the revision of such standard setting has been reoccurring. In 2011 the 
Governing Body of ILO stated on its 312th session that in order to meet the challenges of 
globalization and rapidly changing markets, businesses are increasingly seeking for adjustments 
at workplace which could accelerate their competitiveness. According to the Governing Body 
it would be essential to provide standards meeting the new needs regarding social dialogue, 
                                               
35 Other principles are: elimination of forced or compulsory work, abolition of child labour and elimination of 
discrimination in employment relations. 
36 Adopted by the Governing Body of ILO in 1977, amended on its 204th session in 2000 and on its 279th and 295th 
sessions in 2006. 
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thus, revisiting ILO related recommendations is advised, including Recommendation No. 129 
on Communication within the Undertaking. It was suggested that in 2014 the ILO would be 
dealing with the matter; however, it was eventually not included in the agenda. The question of 
information-consultation is clarified in one of the chapters of Convention Number 158 (1982) 
(accompanied by Recommendation No 166) on Redundancies. This document deals specifically 
with the matter of economic, technological, structural or similar redundancies. In the event of 
such cases, the recommendation specifies that an employer should provide concerned workers’ 
representatives with all relevant information, including the reasons behind an envisaged 
redundancies, the number and the categories of workers likely to be affected and the period 
over which these are expected to be implemented, in order to limit the negative effects of the 
action in good time. 
3.2. The European Social Charter 
The European Social Charter (ESC) is a human rights convention of the Council of Europe, 
which establishes a wide range of economic and social rights that are indispensable for human 
dignity. Due to the wide geographic coverage,37 its role is indispensable in promoting human 
rights across the European continent. The Charter is, therefore, seen as the Social Constitution 
of Europe and represents an essential component of the continent’s human rights architecture. 
 The ESC obliges Contracting Parties to adopt or encourage measures enabling workers 
to have access to the requisite information about their employer as well as to be consulted on 
matters related to their employment. Article 21 of the ESC provides for the right to information 
and consultation about the situation of the enterprise and about planned managerial decisions 
with a potential impact to the employment situation. In order to make involvement meaningful, 
employees or their representatives have to be consulted in a good time about the proposed 
decisions. Article 22 concerns working conditions and gives more specific entitlements: it 
provides for the right to take part in the determination and improvement of working conditions. 
Taking part in protection of health and safety, in organizing social and cultural services as well 
as in the supervision of all these is expressly mentioned. Participation in these activities 
evidently must mean more than mere information and consultation; however, co-determination 
is not required by the Charter. The notion suggests that under Article 22 a more active role 
should be given to employees’ representatives with the aim of being engaged in a dialogue with 
the employer. 
Article 22 has similar structure to Article 21. First it lists the areas in which participation 
has to take place, and then provides for the exclusion of certain undertakings. Contracting 
Parties undertake to adopt or encourage measures enabling workers or their representatives, in 
accordance with national legislation or practices, to contribute to the determination and the 
improvement of the working conditions, work organization and working environment; to 
demand the protection of health and safety within an undertaking; to organize social and socio-
cultural services and facilities, and superve the observance of regulations on the above 
measures. For example, the Committee underlined in this context determination and 
                                               
37 The 1961 ESC or its 1996 revised version has been ratified by 43 (10+33) out of the 47 Member States of the 
Council of Europe.  
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improvement of the working conditions and working environment implies that workers may 
contribute, to a certain extent, to the employer’s decision making process. 38  Appendix 3 
clarifies the term social and socio-cultural services and facilities stating that it refers to facilities 
for workers provided by some undertakings such as welfare assistance, sports fields, rooms for 
nursing mothers, libraries, children’s holiday camps and the like. Appendix 3 also sets it clear 
that Article 22 does not affect either the powers and obligations of the Contracting Parties 
regarding the adoption of health and safety regulations for workplaces, or powers and 
responsibilities of respective monitoring bodies. 
A notable case concerning Article 22 was related to the compliant of General Federation 
of employees of the National Electric Power Corporation (GENOP-DEI) and Confederation of 
Greek Civil Servants’ Trade Unions (ADEDY) against Greece.39 GENOP-DEI and ADEDY 
challenged that legal regulations in Greece are not in conformity with Article 22 on the grounds 
that Greek law40 made it possible for a collective agreement at enterprise level to derogate from 
the provisions on remuneration and working conditions set out in a collective agreement 
concluded at branch level. It was argued that such regulation may encourage systematic 
deterioration of working conditions, which is in breach of Article 22. The Committee of 
Ministers in their Resolution41 concluded on non-application of Article 22. The conclusions on 
collective bargaining of the report on the high-level mission to Greece in 2011 of the 
International Labour Organization have been considered. However, it concluded that Article 22 
does not concern the right to collective bargaining. 
Articles 21 and 22 have common characteristics, such as the legal framework and the 
personal scope (Kollonay-Lehoczky, 2010). Contracting Parties undertake to promote the right 
to information and consultation by adopting or encouraging provisions that enable the 
involvement of workers or of their representatives in accordance with their national legislation 
and practice. The Explanatory Rules specify that these measures should be effective and 
adequate.42 Regarding personal scope, both Articles are applicable for undertakings operating 
for gain, therefore public servants and employees of public bodies are excluded from their 
scopes. The ESC enables Contracting Parties to further exclude employees working for spiritual 
or ideological undertakings and for small-sized employers, because the specific personal and 
material resources that are required to fulfil the provisions of information and consultation 
would mean a disproportionate burden on them. 
The ESC and adhering documents provide for the definitions concerning Articles 21 and 
22. The Appendix to the Charter defines the term workers representatives as persons who are 
recognized as such under national legislation or practice. National legislation or practice means 
that in addition to laws and regulations, collective agreements, other agreements between 
employers and workers’ representatives, customs, as well as the relevant case law is covered 
by the term. An undertaking is defined as a set of tangible and intangible components, with or 
without legal personality, formed to produce or provide services for financial gain, and with 
                                               
38 Conclusions for Armenia, XIX-3. 
39 General Federation of employees of the national electric power corporation (GENOP-DEI) and Confederation 
of Greek Civil Servants’ Trade Unions (ADEDY) v. Greece; Complaint No. 65/2011. 
40 Section 13 of Act No. 3899 of 17 December 2010. 
41 Resolution CM/ResChS(2013)2. 
42 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the Additional Protocol, Para 35. 
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power to determine its own market policy. The Explanatory Report provides an explanation of 
the notion of workers or their representatives, applicable for both Articles 21 and 22. According 
to this specification, the right to information and consultation can be exercised either by trade 
union representatives or representatives freely elected or otherwise chosen by employees of a 
given enterprise. There is no restriction on overlapping functions of employee representatives; 
they could be at the same time trade union officers too. While respecting the importance of 
autonomous regulations, the ESC’s supervisory body, the European Committee of Social Rights 
(the Committee) repeatedly emphasises that the right to information and consultation cannot be 
restricted only to workers who are covered by collective agreements. 
Regarding confidential information, Article 21 Paragraph 1 also contains special 
restrictions, stating that certain information which could be prejudicial to the undertaking may 
not be disclosed or subject to confidentiality. Paragraph 2 of the Additional Protocol enabled 
Contracting Parties to exclude employers employing less than a certain number of employees 
from the scope of Paragraph 1 by national legislation or practice.43 
3.2.1. Personal Scope 
The ESC ensures that information and consultation rights are provided for the great majority of 
the employees of an undertaking. These requirements are satisfied if 80 per cent of employees 
are protected under its provisions. The Committee stated that only employees in the public 
sector are, in principle, exempted from the provisions of Article 21, and in the public sector it 
is only applicable to workers, who are employed by publicly owned enterprises. Since 2007 the 
Committee, while deciding on the conformity with Article 21 of the Charter, has been referring 
to the minimum framework of Directive 2002/14/EC and to the seminal CGT judgment of the 
European Court of Justice.44 Directive 2002/14/EC applies according to the choice made by 
Member States, to undertakings with at least 50 employees or establishments with at least 20 
employees in any one EU Member State. Furthermore, when assessing compliance with Article 
21, the Committee considers, in accordance with the CGT-case, that for all categories of 
employees, regardless of their status, length of service or workplace must be considered when 
calculating the number of employees covered by the right to information and consultation.  
Regarding the case law of the Committee, non-conformity with Article 21 is seldom 
declared. The Committee decided that Italy fails to meet the great majority rule, as rules and 
procedures for appointing and electing trade union representatives are not applicable to 
employees with fixed-term contracts, if the contract is for less than nine months. The Committee 
also stated that the situation in Croatia is not in conformity with Article 21 on the ground that 
it has not been established that legal provisions governing the information and consultation of 
workers cover all categories of workers and all undertakings. About Greece, the Committee 
concluded that the works council’s responsibilities regarding information and consultation of 
                                               
43 Art 21 Paragraph 1 was not incorporated into the body text of the Revised Charter; however, the Appendix 
upholds this possibility. 
44 Case C-385/05, Confédération générale du travail (CGT) and Others v Premier ministre and Ministre de 
l'Emploi, de la Cohésion sociale et du Logement, EU:C:2007:37. 
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workers are exercised only if there is no trade union functioning in the enterprise and these 
issues were not subject of a collective labour agreement. The Committee held that trade unions 
thus had a monopoly on representing workers for the purpose of information and consultation. 
According to the Committee, it had the possibility that a works council representing most non-
unionised employees would be deprived of the right to be informed and consulted, while this 
right would be granted to a trade union representing only a minority of employees. 
The Committee further pointed out that despite the existence of legislation on works councils 
since 1988, very few works councils have been established in practice.45 
Norway’s case is quite particular. In Norway the right to information and consultation 
is mainly governed by collective agreements. In the private sector this right is embodied, inter 
alia, in the national collective agreement between the confederation of Norwegian business and 
industry (NHO) and the Norwegian trade union confederation (LO). In firms, this right is 
primarily vested in locally elected trade union representatives (shop stewards) but also in 
bipartite works councils, which must be established in enterprises with more than 100 
employees. Works councils may also be established in smaller enterprises. Besides that, there 
are several basic private sector agreements that were very similar to the one between the NHO 
and the LO. The 2005 amend of the Work Environment Act also includes provisions similar to 
the LO-NHO "basic agreement" regarding employees' right to information and consultation 
within the enterprise. Other branch legislation includes specific provisions on this subject, such 
as the Joint Stock Company Act, which applies to all companies with more than 30 employees. 
The 2005 act requires employers to inform and consult employee representatives in enterprises 
with more than 50 employees. In 2004, around 250 000 workers in total were officially covered 
by a collective agreement. There were also approximately 600 collective agreements in the 
private sector at the same period. All workers, even if they are non-union members, can be 
covered by a collective agreement. This applies to workers at enterprises bound by a collective 
agreement. Based on case-law and agreement practice these enterprises are obliged to apply the 
agreement on unorganized employees in the enterprise comprised by the scope of the 
agreement. In addition, in a survey conducted by Statistic Norway from 2004, 77 per cent of 
the participants stated that they are covered by a collective agreement, including the non-union 
workers. The current report states that during the reference period, approximately 52 per cent 
of all workers in the private sector who are not covered by the LO-NHO "basic agreement" are, 
however, covered by a collective agreement. In total, 70 per cent of all workers in Norway were 
officially covered by a collective agreement during the same period, which means that even 
though social dialogue is quite advanced in Norway, the coverage still does not meet the great 
majority requirement. 
3.2.2. Enforceability of Information and Consultation Rights 
The Committee examines the remedies workers or workers’ representatives has if their right to 
information and consultation under Article 21 has been infringed, particularly with respect to 
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information considered by employers to be confidential. Enforcement methods usually contain 
the right to apply, either to court or arbitration, imposition of fines. The amount of the penalty 
is rather diverse, ranging from EUR 6.5 in Estonia to EUR 50000 in Greece. 
In rare cases national regulations provide for the nullity of an employer’s decision 
violating the information and consultation processes. For example, in Croatia a decision 
rendered by an employer contrary to the provisions of the Croatian Labour Code on 
consultations with works council is null and void. In case of Greece, with a decision of the 
Minister of Employment and Social Insurance, it is possible, after a justified proposal of the 
competent Labour Inspector, to impose a temporary pause on an employer’s operation for a 
time interval longer than three days or even a permanent pause of the operation of a particular 
department, or of an entire enterprise or undertaking. 
It is necessary for Contracting Parties to set up a remedial system in their national 
legislations. In Moldova’s case, the Committee found that the situation is not in conformity 
with Article 21 of the Revised Charter on the ground that it has not been established that 
sanctions are applicable in case employers fail to fulfil their obligation to inform and consult 
workers within the undertaking. 
3.2.3. Specific Rights of Information and Consultation 
While Articles 21 and 22 provide for information and consultation right in general, Article 29 
of the Revised Charter guarantees the right for all employees to be informed and consulted in 
collective redundancy processes. In this regard, information and consultation need to cover 
ways and means of avoiding collective redundancies or limiting their occurrence and means of 
mitigating its negative effects. The Contracting Parties could introduce accompanying social 
measures aiming to redeployment or retraining redundant workers to meet the requirement set 
forth by Article 29. 
 However, according to the Explanatory Report, the relevant EU Directives were 
examined in the drafting process, the term of collective redundancy is not specified by the 
Charter.46 The Committee during the first conclusion cycle concerning Article 29 interpreted 
collective redundancy as a layoff affecting several workers within a period set by the law and 
decided for reasons which have no relevance to the workers as individuals, but are related to a 
reduction or change in the operation of the undertaking.47 
 The purpose of the consultation is provided for by Article 29 requires that sufficient 
dialogue should take place between employer and employees or their representatives regarding 
redundancy and the mitigation of its effects. Thus, it is necessary for an employer to provide 
adequate preliminary information, including the reasons for redundancy, planned social 
measures, the order in which the redundancies will be made, and the criteria for being made 
redundant. If such a process does not take place, the Committee concludes on the non-
conformity. 48  This requirement also sheds light on the importance of the timing of the 
                                               
46 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report, 109. 
47 Conclusions 2003 and 2005, Statement of Interpretation on Article 29. 
48 For example Moldova (Conclusions 2010) or Sweden (Conclusions 2007). 
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consultation. However, what qualifies as a good time varies greatly among Contracting Parties 
from seven days to three months. Moreover, public authorities have to be involved in the 
procedures, however their role – whether it is the mere information on the redundancies or 
involvement in the negotiations – is undefined by the ESC or the Committee. 
3.3. Human Rights Instruments of the European Union 
The Europeanization of industrial relations plays an indispensable role in the strengthening and 
the further development of the social dimension of the European integration. As a part of the 
integration process, first the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers 
(CCFSR) and subsequently the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(CFREU) recognized the rights of workers to information and consultation. The approach of 
Articles 17 and 18 of CCFSR demonstrates the early regulatory techniques of the EU in the 
social field. They specify the issues on which workers are entitled to be informed and consulted, 
such as major technological changes, restructuring, and collective redundancies. 49 CFREU 
demonstrates the shift away from this approach by referring to Community law and national 
laws and practices.50 The new regulatory technique reflects the very different legal, social and 
labour relations backgrounds of the Member States better. Thus, the paradigm shifts indeed 
helped the EU to make a move and to push through long-standing proposals. The following 
section first provides an overview on the regulations of CCFSR, and then analyses the 
evolvement of the right to information and consultation as a human right under the CFREU. 
3.3.1. The Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers 
The Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (CCFSR) was adopted 
in 1989 by all Member States of the EU, except the United Kingdom. The CCFSR is a political 
instrument containing moral obligations aiming to guarantee certain social rights in the Member 
States concerned. The primary scope of the CCFSR concerned the labour market, vocational 
training, social protection, equal opportunities and health and safety at work. The CCFSR was 
followed up by action programmes and specific legislative proposals. 
Two articles deal with participatory rights. Article 17 stipulated that information, 
consultation and participation for workers must be developed along appropriate lines, taking 
account of the practices in force in the various Member States. Article 17 underlined the 
transnational character of the involvement processes, stating that they had to apply especially 
in companies or groups of companies having establishments or companies in several Member 
States of the European Community. Article 18 prescribed that these processes must be 
implemented in due time, and listed specific cases which had to be treated with scrutiny, such 
as technological changes which, from the point of view of working conditions and work 
organisation; restructuring operations in undertakings or in cases of mergers having an impact 
                                               
49 Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (1989), Arts. 17-18. 
50 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 27. 
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on the employment of workers; collective redundancy procedures; and finally, again in 
connection with the transnational importance of information and consultation, in situations 
when trans-frontier workers in particular are affected by employment policies pursued by the 
undertaking where they are employed.   
The CCFSR had declaratory status only; however, it is claimed that it had three effects, 
which were expected to emerge for the CFREU (Bercusson, 2006). First, the Member States’ 
stronger attachment to fundamental social rights as defined in the 1989 Community Charter, 
which appears in Article 151 of the TFEU (ex Article 136 of the TEC). Secondly, the 
Commission’s Social Action Programme was directly linked to the declarations of the 
Community Charter. Finally, CFREU was expected to be used by the European Court of Justice 
as an interpretative guide in litigation concerning social rights. 
Despite the high hopes attached to the CCFRS, the social policy dimension had not 
become a priority for the reform agenda, which, as it was argued, endangered the enlargement 
of the EU and undermined institutional reforms. Therefore, the adoption of the CFREU had 
great importance regarding the social dimension of the EU, as fundamental labour and social 
standards are determined by the economic and political context which forms their content. 
Social and labour rights could be developed only when they find a place on the Community’s 
integration agenda. Thus, the inclusion of social and economic rights related to working life 
into the CFREU confirms that these are to be considered fundamental to the EU social model, 
what it means to be an EU citizen (Bercusson, 2006). 
3.3.2. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
The Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers had already stipulated 
that information, consultation and participation for workers must be developed alongside 
appropriate lines, considering the various national industrial relations in the Member States. 
These provisions can be considered precursors of Article 27 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the Charter of the European Union (CFREU) The continuing significance of the 
institution is illustrated by the structure of CFREU: workers’ right to information and 
consultation appears in the Solidarity chapter, preceding Article 28 which contains the 
traditional right of collective bargaining and collective action. The implication of the Solidarity 
chapter is that the traditional individual and liberal rights and the social rights, which create 
networks of solidarity among the citizens of the EU have a fundamental importance for the 
European Union. Thus, the right to information and consultation is a fundamental right in the 
context of the EU and Article 27’s reference to national laws and practices implies that the 
Member States are obliged to maintain at least the mandatory standards of information and 
consultation provided by statutory law or by collective agreements. This provision is rooted in 
already existing sources in EC law, such as the directives concerning collective redundancies,51 
                                               
51 Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to 
collective redundancies, OJ L 225, 12.8.1998, p. 16–21. 
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transfers of undertakings,52 and European works councils.53 It is noteworthy that this approach 
of induction used by the EU was just the opposite that of the Council of Europe’s deductive 
method, whereas the general obligations of information and consultation appeared first, 
followed by specificities of collective redundancies. 
The notion of a workers’ representative is contested. Article 27 provides that workers 
or their representatives must, at the appropriate levels, be guaranteed information and 
consultation in good time in the cases and under the conditions provided for by Community law 
and national laws and practices. On one hand, it is apparent from the phrasing of Article 27 that 
the employer has the obligation to inform and consult either workers directly, or workers’ 
representatives. Providing direct information and consultation to individual workers could be 
considered an ‘appropriate level’ only in very small companies or establishments. Since 
participation is a collective right and its exercise cannot be restricted to individuals, this practice 
would contradict the guarantee of the freedom of association provided for in Article 12 of the 
CFREU. On the other hand, the guarantee of information and consultation to workers’ 
representatives cannot apply only to works councils excluding trade union representatives, as 
not all Member States of the EU operate a so-called dual-channel system, which distinguishes 
between representatives elected by the workforce in the establishment and trade union 
representatives. Thus, workers’ representatives shall include trade union representatives 
together with works councils.  
The aim of Article 27 is to protect the interests of the individual worker against the 
dominant position of an employer in case workers’ interests are substantially affected. Apart 
from the need to protect workers in extraordinary situations, such as collective redundancies 
and transfers of undertakings, Article 27 also reflects the difficulties associated with 
globalization of the economy and the increased importance of transnational companies. Large 
scale international mergers and acquisitions of undertakings could effectively weaken national 
traditions of workers’ involvement in decision-making processes. 
National traditions of industrial relations created a huge obstacle during the regulatory 
process. The previous wordings of Article 27 reveal the quest for the common denominator 
during the negotiations. The scope of information and consultation is confined to “matters 
which concern them within the undertaking” was deleted in the final text, thus potentially 
increased the scope of information and consultation to include matters beyond the undertaking 
(Blanke, 2006). The reference to “workers or their representatives” was a regression from the 
earlier formulation of “workers and their representatives”. This wording contradicts the 
Community acquis in other directives. Earlier references of Article 27 to “all levels” were 
replaced by the requirement to apply “at the appropriate levels” which could also be considered 
as step back compared to the initial intention of the legislator. On the other hand, the phrasing 
                                               
52 Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating 
to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of 
undertakings or businesses, OJ L 82, 22.3.2001, p. 16–20. 
53 Council Directive 94/45/EC of 22 September 1994 on the establishment of a European Works Council or a 
procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes of 
informing and consulting employees, OJ L 254, 30.9.1994, p. 64–72; the EWC directive as repealed by Directive 
2009/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 on the establishment of a European 
Works Council or a procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings for 
the purposes of informing and consulting employees (Recast), OJ L 122, 16.5.2009, p. 28–44. 
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“information and consultation in good time” was inserted at a later stage, suggesting that the 
information must be given, and the consultation procedure must occur prior to the final decision 
of the management. 
Even though employee involvement signifies a very narrow part of human rights, and 
its recognition is rather low, its importance must not be overlooked. The significance of 
employee involvement in the development of democratic institutions is enormous. The 
estrangement of people from the handling of their own affairs at a workplace will in the long 
run lead to the withdrawal of not only the employees but the citizens from participation which 
is a real danger to democracy. Thus, employee involvement is essential to issues of social 
justice, human rights and democracy and must be promoted as such. Article 27 has as much or 
more to do with the protection of human dignity specified in Article 1 of the CFREU than with 
traditional social rights and the objective of the democratisation of the economy. It expands the 
scope both of traditional social rights and of practices of democratisation to protect workers’ 
dignity in a globalised economy, society and environment (Bercusson, 2006). 
Human rights are primarily oriented toward limiting the power of a state, while labour 
rights predominantly aim to limit the power of private actors in the market. Regarding human 
rights, principal right-holders are individuals, while labour rights are more collectively 
orientated. As opposed to human rights, which are universal and possessed by all human beings 
by virtue of their humanity, the entitlement in case of labour rights can be defined as the set of 
rights that humans possess by virtue of their status as workers (Kolben, 2010). However, this 
status is rather fluid and the identity of the beneficiaries of labour rights is contested. A group 
of employees is a part of an undertaking; it lacks internal structure as they position within the 
undertaking is defined by the unilateral decision of an employer; and the group has no influence 
on its membership either. Moreover, individuals could perform work in great many ways for an 
undertaking. 
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PART III. – REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF 
EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT 
1. Information and Consultation 
The Directive on informing and consulting the employees was the pioneer legal instrument in 
which the EU made it obligatory to all Member States to provide adequate measures for 
employees to obtain regular information and consultation on their employing undertakings. In 
that sense, the Directive indeed signified a vital complement to the higher degree of 
harmonization of social laws in Europe and has had major impact in countries with voluntarist 
tradition (like the UK or Ireland) or in those (mostly new) Member States where employee 
involvement had not become a genuine part of industrial relations (Kun, 2009). 
Directive 2002/14/EC54 has had a great significance in national level information and 
consultation issues in the Member States. The adoption of the Directive was not overly smooth 
due conflicts of the different national industrial relation systems (Barnard, 2012). The Renault 
case55 gave new impetus to the proposals and the Directive was eventually adopted in 2002.The 
Directive provides for minimum requirements applicable throughout the Community and leaves 
the practical arrangements to be defined and implemented in accordance with national laws and 
industrial practices. 
The objective of the Directive is to establish a general framework for informing and 
consulting employees in the European Union. The Directive provides for a right to be informed 
and consulted, thus it is not mandatory: if employees do not request it, employers are not obliged 
to provide information or consult employees (Barnard, 2012). Information is defined as 
transmission of data by the employer to the employees’ representatives in order to enable them 
to acquaint themselves with the subject matter and to examine it. Employees’ representatives 
are those who are defined as such by national laws and/or practices. Thus, Member States can 
provide this right either to standing bodies or to individual representatives. Consultation means 
the exchange of views and establishment of dialogue between employees’ representatives and 
an employer. 
An employer is obliged to provide sufficient information in good time and at an 
appropriate level about the undertaking generally, and to conduct timely information and 
consultation sessions on specific issues in particular, like where there is a threat to employment, 
or in situations that could lead to substantial changes in the organisation. The Framework 
Directive specifies that consultation has to take place: (a) while ensuring that the timing, method 
and content thereof are appropriate; (b) at the relevant level of management and representation, 
                                               
54 Directive 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2002 establishing a general 
framework for informing and consulting employees in the European Community - Joint declaration of the 
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on employee representation, OJ L 80, 23.3.2002, p. 29–
34. 
55 The French car manufacturer, Renault closed its plant in Vilvoorde, Belgium without prior information and 
consultation of the employees. As the Commission pointed out, the existing legal regulations were not protective 
enough, if they did not guarantee the right to information and consultation prior to the decision of the employer. 
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depending on the subject under discussion; (c) on the basis of information supplied by the 
employer in accordance with the notion of information and of the opinion which the employees' 
representatives are entitled to formulate; (d) in such a way as to enable employees' 
representatives to meet the employer and obtain a response, and the reasons for that response, 
to any opinion they might formulate; (e) with a view to reaching an agreement on decisions 
within the scope of the employer's powers concerns information and consultation on decisions 
likely to lead to substantial changes in work organisation or in contractual relations”56 It is also 
provided for that the representatives of employers and employees shall work in a spirit of 
cooperation.57 
The importance of social dialogue and mutual trust between employers and their 
employees in improving risk anticipation and flexibility is emphasised, because the promotion 
of employee involvement facilitates the undertakings’ competitiveness. Recitals of the 
Directive further stress the significance of timely information and consultation for companies 
to compete better in a global environment and declare that the existing legal frameworks for 
employee involvement both at Community and national level pursued an excessively a 
posteriori approach to the process of change. 
2. European Works Council 
Directive 94/45/EC58 introduced European Works Councils or alternative procedures in order 
to ensure information and consultation for employees of multinational companies on the 
progress of the business and any significant decision at a European level that could affect their 
employment or working conditions. This Directive was repealed and replaced in 2009 by recast 
Directive 2009/38/EC.59To overcome some of the shortcomings arising from the insufficient 
measures of the relevant legal instruments,60 especially of those related to the unequal treatment 
of employees concerning procedures for informing and consulting on a transnational scale, the 
recast Directive adopted measures to enhance dialogue to make it possible to employees to 
anticipate and manage changes related to the undertakings.61 
The recast Directive pursues a two-stage approach for transnational information and 
consultation process for community scale undertakings or group of undertakings. The first step 
is based on the voluntary agreement of labour and management, while the second step, when 
no agreement could be reached, is the application of the mandatory provisions provided for by 
Article 7 and elaborated by the Annex of the Directive. The EWC Directive provides for the 
                                               
56 Article 4. of Directive 2002/14/EC. 
57 Art. 1 Para 3. of Directive 2002/14/EC. 
58 Council Directive 94/45/EC of 22 September 1994 on the establishment of a European Works Council or a 
procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes of 
informing and consulting employees, OJ L 254, 30.9.1994, p. 64–72. 
59 Directive 2009/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 OJ L 16.5.2009 28-44. 
60  Apart from Directive 2002/14 as referred above, see Directive on Collective Redundancies (Council dir. 
75/129/EEC (OJ [1975] L48/29) amended by Council Dir. 92/56/EEC (OJ [1992] L245/13) and Directive on the 
Transfer of Undertakings (Council Dir. 77/187/EEC (OJ [1977] L61/26, amended by Directive 98/50 (OJ [1998] 
L201/88) and consolidated in Directive 2001/23 (OJ [2001] L82/16). 
61 Recitals (10)-(15) of Directive 2009/38/EC. 
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establishment of a European Works Council or an Employee Information and Consultation 
procedure. Negotiations are put in focus with the aim to activate central management or 
employees.62 The parties could either decide to set up a European Works Council by concluding 
an agreement on the scope, composition, function and term of service of an EWC; or they could 
agree to implement an Information and Consultation Process (ICP) instead, a less formalized 
form of employee involvement.63 Whether a EWC or an ICP is established, the minimum 
requirements provided for by the Directive do not need to be incorporated into the agreement.64 
In the spirit of autonomy, the parties are entitled to determining the nature, the 
composition, the function, the mode of operation, the procedures and the financial resources of 
an EWC.65 If an agreement is reached, it means that the parties are almost free to set the content 
on the information provided to employees as long as it meets the requirements of the Directive. 
In case the parties agree to set up an EWC, the agreement shall include the details of the 
undertakings covered by the agreement; the composition of the EWC; the number of members; 
the allocation of seats and the term of office; the function and procedure for informing and 
consulting the EWC, the venue, frequency, and duration of meeting of the EWC; financial and 
material resources to be allocated to the EWC; the duration of the agreement; and the procedure 
for its renegotiation.66 
In case the parties decide to set up an ICP instead, they ought to specify the methods by 
which employees’ representatives have the right to meet and discuss the information transmitted 
to them. Data must contain information on transnational matters considerably affecting the 
employees’ interest. 
Regarding confidential information, the EWC Directive allows Member States to adopt 
national regulations to ensure that members of special negotiating bodies or of European Works 
Councils and any experts who assist them are not authorised to reveal any information which 
has expressly been provided to them in confidence.67 The same could be applied to employees’ 
representatives in the framework of an information and consultation procedure. A Member 
State could provide, in specific cases and under the conditions and the limits laid down by 
national legislation, that central management is not obliged to transmit information when, 
according to objective criteria, it would seriously harm the functioning of the undertakings 
concerned or be prejudicial to them. 
The concept of confidentiality is not well addressed. While Article 8.1 provides for that 
confidential information must not be revealed to third parties, it does not specify either what 
type of information can be considered as confidential for the purpose of this Article or who 
these third parties are. Thus, it is the national legislator who has the opportunity to define the 
notion of confidentiality. This provision must be read strictly in the light of the principles of 
transparency and mutual trust. Otherwise the objective of the EWC Directive would be inverted 
and EWC would become a “secret club whose members were sworn to secrecy” (Picard, 2010, 
p. 110). 
                                               
62 Art. 5.1. of Directive 2009/38/EC. 
63 Art 4.1. of Directive 2009/38/EC. 
64 Art. 6.4. of Directive 2009/38/EC. 
65 Recital (19) of Directive 2009/38/EC. 
66 Art. 6. of Directive 2009/38/EC. 
67 Art. 8. of Directive 2009/38/EC. 
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Another aspect of confidentiality was highlighted in the Grongaard case.68 The Court 
ruled that the Directive on Insider Dealing 69 precludes the employees’ representative from 
disclosing confidential information to any third party, unless such disclosure is made in the 
normal course of his employment, profession or duties, unless there is a close link between the 
disclosure and the exercise of his employment, profession or duties and that disclosure is strictly 
necessary for the exercise of that employment, profession or duties. However, due to the lack 
of related cases, it has not been addressed whether informing employees would be in a scope 
the exercise of duties of the employees’ representative.  
The two stage process of the EWC Directive was designed with an aim to encourage 
employers to be open to employees’ initiatives (Barnard, 2012). By reaching an agreement an 
employer can avoid applying mandatory provisions that are formulated with a penalizing 
nature. However, these minimum requirements do not create the impression that the procedure 
provided for by the Annex is equal to a worst-case scenario. The subsidiary requirements 
provide for one information and consultation meeting per year, based on the written report 
drawn up by the central management. 70  Information shall cover structure, economic and 
financial situation of business; probable business development, production and sales; 
employment situation and future trends; investments and substantial changes concerning the 
organization of business; introduction of new working methods or production processes; 
transfers of production; and mergers and cutbacks or closure of undertakings or collective 
redundancies.71 Even though this list is lengthy, the data is combined for many compulsory and 
voluntary reports transnational undertakings are otherwise bounded by, therefore neither the 
quality nor the quantity of information put an excessive burden on employers.72 
3. Participation as an Evolving Scenario  
Reflecting to the recent financial crisis and its effect to businesses, the Opinion of the European 
Economic and Social Committee (EESC) states, that adopting a multi-stakeholder approach 
involving the investors, employers and employees and a positive approach towards efficient 
social dialogue is necessary to mitigate the negative effects of the crisis. The EESC opinion 
recalls that business sustainability also strongly relies on the different forms of employee 
involvement, such as information, consultation and, where applicable, co-determination too. To 
achieve a good business management concept, the voice of employees has to be respected in 
business decisions. This obligation also follows from Article 27 of the EU’s charter of 
                                               
68 Case C-384/02, Criminal proceedings against Knud Grøngaard and Allan Bang, EU:C:2005:708. 
69 Council Directive 89/592/EEC of 13 November 1989 coordinating regulations on insider dealing, OJ L 334, 
18.11.1989, p. 30–32, replaced by Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 
January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse), OJ L 96, 12.4.2003, p. 16–25. 
70 See Annex 2. In addition to this, a select committee comprised of no more than five members of the EWC shall 
be set up. This committee can be informed of important decisions matters significantly affecting the employees’ 
interest, like collective redundancies, factory closures and so forth. Upon its request, the select committee has the 
right to meet the management as soon as possible.  
71 Annex 1. to Directive 2009/38/EC. 
72For example the Global Reporting Initiative on sustainability. 
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Fundamental Rights, making employee involvement a part of the legal framework of European 
democracy (European Economic and Social Committee, 2013). 
The EESC urges the European policymakers to create appropriate incentives and 
improve the requisite legal framework, without interfering with the national competences, 
however. Further, the EESC implies that European company law shall cater for more employee 
involvement. The role what employee involvement could play in regaining economic 
competitiveness underlines the need for corrective actions against the short-term of corporate 
values and for increased corporate transparency. It is suggested that a sustainable company is 
centred on the principle of ‘fair relationship’, which is a part of the multi-stakeholder 
management approach. 
The Opinion outlines possible new directions to improve employee involvement rights 
on a transnational level. The standpoint of the opinion is to safeguard national diversity to keep 
European businesses competitive while standardizing of divergent definitions to ensure 
consolidation and provide for more legal certainty. Making employee participation in company 
boards obligatory and creating binding minimum standards for restructuring are also key 
elements of the proposal. 
 Although the Opinion envisages an innovative approach to mitigating the negative 
effects of economic turmoil by strengthening the role of employee involvement in business 
management, it only focuses on business activities located in the territory of the European 
Union. Such limited personal scope overlooks that transnational companies often operate 
subsidiaries outside of the Member States. The activity of these undertakings significantly 
contributes to the overall performance of a group. To mention but one aspect, transnational 
companies often benefit from cheap labour force and low influential power of employees 
working in non-Member States. While acknowledging that the different, albeit generally lower, 
standards of the non-EU countries constitute a competitive edge for most European 
multinationals, consolidation of business practices cannot be complete if it does not reach out 
to branches situated outside of the European Union.  
While the theoretical discussion has been going on for many decades, the economic 
crisis has provided a solid reference point for researchers to study the interrelatedness of firms’ 
performance and the different forms of social dialogue from 2007 onwards. Although the 
negative consequences of an economic turmoil typically reach the labour market with delay, 
this time the effects were almost immediately visible, forcing social partners to act quickly. 
Even though the crisis was described as an “omnipresent phantom in the autonomous European 
inter-professional social dialogue” (Clauwaert & Schömann, 2011, p. 75), the various forms of 
social dialogue at national, sectoral and company levels have been proven to be effective 
instruments in mitigating the negative social and economic impacts of the crisis.  
Differences in methodology and scope make it impossible to fully compare researchers’ 
findings, it seems unquestioned that social dialogue in general and enterprise level dialogue in 
particular has had measurable positive effect in combating the detrimental impacts of the crisis 
and it was positively associated with better social performance by companies. A sustainability 
analysis of large European companies listed on the stock market in 2012 demonstrated that in 
almost all cases companies with employee representation performed better than those without. 
Companies’ performances related to environmental protection was also much more positive 
where any forms of employee involvement existed. Thus, the strengthening of employee 
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involvement may also contribute to companies’ sustainability (European Trade Union Institute, 
2014).  
The plant-level is relatively free from the often politicized negotiations between trade 
unions and employers’ associations or governments (Galgóczy & Glassner, 2009). European 
Works Councils (EWC) also played an important role in mitigating the adverse effects of the 
economic crisis (Guyet, et al., 2012). EWCs are important elements of transnational social 
dialogue at a company level and while in some cases stimulating results have been delivered 
by them, there are important limitations on the scope of their actions which need to be 
highlighted (Guyet, et al., 2012). EWC instruments are claimed to be ineffective in forcing 
employers to provide information in a timely manner, and to be slow in providing prompt 
responses for decision-making (Cremers, et al., 2013). Therefore, the information and 
consultation rights of EWCs are often not respected. Moreover, the situation has worsened as 
the recent labour law reforms triggered by the crisis undermine workers’ rights across Europe 
to information and consultation, especially during collective redundancy and transfer 
procedures. Continued deregulation not only constitutes a backward step in workers’ protection, 
but “undermines any remaining hopes of European social integration” (European Trade Union 
Institute, 2014, p. 68). 
Social dialogue has been able to function and forge adequate responses to the crisis 
through national social pacts and collective agreements at various levels, except in cases where 
these forums have been prevalently overridden by governmental unilateralism, as happened in 
those Western and Eastern European countries most affected by the economic, debt and political 
crises (such as Ireland, Greece, Spain, Hungary and Romania). However, there are major 
differences between the factors hindering the institutional, political and legal framework of 
social dialogue in the old and the new Member States. Most new Member States experienced 
severe external pressures to restructure their public finances, as the Council of the European 
Union issued several Excessive Deficit Procedures73 and the pressure on the governments’ side 
to meet austerity plans often overrode the demands of organized labour. Hence, Central-Eastern 
European (CEE) countries not only experienced political instability like their Western 
counterparts, but also abrupt changes in social partnership that coincided with the fiscal 
consolidation measures in the region. Despite the unconstructive circumstances, social dialogue 
was still used as a debate forum by all the countries under examination, with the exception of 
the atypical cases of Romania and Hungary where social dialogue technically broke down.  
The growing inequalities in incomes and the rising shares of populations at risk of 
poverty or social exclusion demonstrate that austerity measures signify a roll-back of national 
social protection. Deregulation – rooted in the European Union’s liberal approach to social 
legislation and becoming a part of the European governance process – affected individual and 
collective labour law in all member states. Despite the restricted rights in the arena of collective 
labour law and strategies pursued by multinational companies to challenge employee 
                                               
73 The excessive deficit procedure is governed by Article 126 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, under which the Member States are obliged to avoid excessive deficits in national budgets. When the 
Council decides that an excessive deficit exists in a Member State, it firstly makes recommendations to the State 
concerned, with a view to rectifying the situation within a given period. If the Member State fails to comply with 
these recommendations, the Council may instruct it to take appropriate measures for reducing the deficit. If 
necessary, the Council has the option of imposing penalties or fines and of inviting the European Investment Bank 
(EIB) to reconsider its lending policy towards the Member State concerned.   
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representatives to coordinate their activities across borders, the different forms of employee 
involvement have demonstrated significant contributions in mitigating the negative effects of 
the crisis. 
4. Problems related to the European Participation 
Model 
The main purpose of Directive 2002/14/EC is to set up a framework for an effective information 
and consultation procedure.74 In accordance with the ECJ’s case law on ‘effet utile’, during the 
process it ought to be ensured that the employees are entitled to formulate their opinions, to 
have response together with the related reasoning from management, to raise their ideas and to 
participate in decision-making processes related to employment. 75  Having considered the 
advantages of social dialogue, Article 5 of the Framework Directive provides the opportunity 
for Member States to entrust management and labour at an appropriate level, including the level 
of the undertaking or establishment with the right to define freely the practical arrangement of 
the information and consultation procedure. Effectiveness is further guaranteed by the timely 
and adequate ways – meaning the appropriate level and the fashion – of the information and 
consultation process.76 However, due to a wide margin of appreciation Member States’ national 
solutions often tone down the effect of the Directive (Clauwaert & Schömann, 2011). 
The most problematic area where inequality could seriously harm the principles of 
participation is the protection of employees’ representatives. The Directive provides for 
adequate protection for employees’ representatives to perform their roles properly. However, 
the vague wording of the Directive does not provide distinct criteria whether the protection shall 
include favourable working conditions, paid working time or prohibition of dismissal. Some of 
the Member States apparently used this room to reduce the level of protection where possible. 
For example in Poland employees’ representative supposed to carry out their tasks outside 
working hours, in Ireland it is unclear whether employees’ representatives are entitled to any 
earnings for the time spent for exercising their role, in Bulgaria only trade union members enjoy 
protection, while in the Czech Republic no protection is provided at all (Clauwaert & 
Schömann, 2011). 
Ambiguity in domestic laws leads to great inequality. The Framework Directive 
indicates that effective, dissuasive and proportionate administrative and judicial procedures and 
sanctions ought to take place in case of the infringement of the obligations.77 In other words, 
Member States are free to choose between civil and (or) criminal sanctions. Due to the lax 
wording of the Directive, domestic courts struggle to judge the threshold where the action of 
the employer impedes the right of information and consultation. Especially at times of economic 
constrain, labour courts tend to adopt restrictive interpretation.  
                                               
74 Arts. 1. 1-2. of Directive 2002/14/EC. 
75 Art. 4.4. of Directive 2002/14/EC. 
76 Arts. 4.1 and 4.3. of Directive 2002/14/EC. 
77 Arts. 8.1-2 and Recital 28. 
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Sanctions imposed on employers in case of violation of the right to information and 
consultation of employees is another sensitive area. National legislations provide for various 
sanctions. In some Member States a fine can be imposed on the employer who violates the right 
to information and consultation, both the process and the fine’s amount vary greatly.  
Differentiation for the same unlawful action of employers is hardly justifiable. In 
Croatia a decision rendered by an employer contrary to the law’s provisions on consultations 
with the works council is null and void. In case of a violation of information and consultation 
obligations a fine of HRK 31,000 to 60,000 (EUR 4,217 to EUR 8,163) can be imposed on an 
employer as a legal person. In case of Denmark, employers who fail to inform and consult 
workers in accordance with the applicable rules may be fined as well. In Greece a failure to 
comply with the obligations emanating from the provisions of the decree results in the 
enforcement of administrative penalties. On an employer who violates the provisions of the 
Labour Law a fine for each violation, from EUR 500 up to EUR 50,000 is imposed. Temporary 
and even permanent pause of the operation is possible too. With regard to Bulgaria, a recent 
amendment of the Labour Code has increased the fines applied in case of violation of the labour 
legislation with penalties from 10,000 to 15,000 BGN (EUR 5,113 to EUR 7,669) and in case 
of a repeated violation, the penalties applied are from 20,000 to 30,000 BGN (EUR 10,226 to 
EUR 15,339). In Estonia employers who violate this right may be sanctioned with 
administrative fines ranging from 100 to 6000 Estonian Kroons (EUR 6.5 to EUR 385). In the 
case of Italy the provincial labour directorates, which are part of the ministry of labour and 
social protection, are responsible for enforcing employees' right to information and 
consultation. Employers who fail to respect this right are liable to fines ranging from EUR 3,000 
to EUR 18,000. Regarding Romania, employers who fail to meet the obligation to inform and 
consult their employees are liable to a fine of RON 1,000 to 20,000 (about EUR 245 to EUR 
4,907), while offenders who have failed to meet the requirement to establish consultation 
procedures with workers’ representatives are liable to a fine of RON 2,500 to 25,000 (about 
EUR 613 to EUR 6,133). Lastly, if the information provided by employers is incomplete or 
incorrect and hence prevents workers’ representatives from adopting an informed opinion with 
a view to future consultation, the statutory fines range from RON 5,000 to 50,000 (about EUR 
1227 to EUR 12,267). 
In some other Member States fines cannot be imposed, but employees or their 
representatives could seek judicial and/or administrative remedies. For example, in Belgium 
any body that represents employees, or any individual employee may take a case to the courts 
alleging failure to respect the obligations imposed by the relevant legislation. In Bulgaria each 
representative of workers or employees elected, whether a representative of a trade union 
organization or not, is entitled to lodge a claim in the court. 
Even though Directive 2002/14/EC was crafted with the best intentions and manoeuvred 
rather well between the fairly different interests and traditions of industrial relations of the 
Member States, the sometimes vague wording and the ample room for national transpositions 
resulted in a variety of domestic systems with very different level of actual rights and 
obligations. Practically, such a flexible framework is not suitable to provide equal level of 
information and communication for workers of the European Union.  
As a part of the 2010 work Programme an evidence-based survey was conducted by the 
European Union on the effectiveness of information and consultation rights of employees in the 
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European Union. 78 In particular, Directives 98/59/EC on collective redundancies, 2001/23/EC 
on transfer of undertakings and 2002/14/EC on a general framework of information and 
consultation were examined. The general findings of the survey suggest that the mentioned 
directives address stakeholders’ needs, as stakeholders are suitable to increase trust between 
management and labour, to involve workers in decisions affecting them, to protect workers, to 
contribute to increased adaptability, and to improve staff and company performance. It was also 
underlined that especially Directive 2002/14/EC was found capable to effectively promote 
workplace performance and to improve management and anticipation of change. It was also 
pointed out that the actual efficacy of the Directive 2002/14/EC depends on several factors, 
especially on the industrial relations system and social dialogue traditions of a Member State, 
on the size of an establishment and on the attitudes of labour and management. The EU seems 
to be satisfied with the results, conferring the information and consultation system to be 
relevant, effective, coherent and mutually reinforcing. 
 The opinion of the European Economic Social Committee’s opinion referred to by the 
Fitness Check points out the urgent need of a more effective formulation of information and 
consultation rights in EU and suggested the serious reconsideration of the various definitions 
of information and consultation rights for greater standardisation.79 
 The assessment also suggests that consultation is less likely to take place and tends to 
cover operational issues, like working time or work organisation, rather than business strategies. 
Evidence was also found that the arrangements concerning the working time, benefits and 
resources concerning employee representatives vary greatly among Member States. 
  
                                               
78 Communication form the Commission to the Eureopan Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Commission Work Programme 2010 COM (2010) 135 final, 
Commission Staff Working Document, Fitness Check on EU Law in the area of Information and Consultation of 
Workers, SWD (2013) 293 final. 
79Employee involvement and participation as a pillar of sound business management and balanced approaches to 
overcoming the crisis. Opinion of the EESC. SOC/470. Brussels, 20 March 2013. 
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PART IV. – GLOBAL EXTENSION OF 
DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION 
Globalization has brought many new challenges to business management. Competition has 
become fiercer, and the quest for profit maximization has made large concerns spur on social 
dumping to continuously fight for yet lower production costs. Such practices often lead to 
human rights violations at workplaces (Kolben, 2010). The frequency and the severity of these 
malpractices tend to be higher in premises where national laws are less protective, and the 
influential power of workers is low. If the right to participate is a human right with substantial 
effect on economic competitiveness, it has to be extended to employees working outside of the 
European Union. 
 Building on the Weimar traditions, the European Union has developed an outstanding 
framework for employee involvement, which is at the same time capable of protecting 
employees’ rights and is suitable to meet business needs. Due to the lack of extraterritorial 
regulatory power of the EU, non-Europe based multinational companies (MNC) are not obliged 
to respect these protective rules of the EU. MNCs tend to draw up internal codes of conducts 
(COC) to promulgate minimal standards to be applied by their subsidiaries and subcontractors. 
However, these internal rules often prove to be non-efficient in most of the fields they are 
intended to regulate, and are not capable to halt human rights violations, to improve working 
standards, or to enhance the voice of workers. Moreover, these company statutes do not form a 
ground for liability when workers’ rights are violated. 
 While the EU considers employee involvement as a prerequisite for the success of the 
restructuring and adaptation of undertakings to new conditions created by globalisation,80 it 
explicitly reserves this right to employees working within the territory of the European Union. 
Since human rights are indivisible and universal, it is necessary to examine the possible 
extension of the personal scope of the respective EU Directives to cover subsidiaries of Europe-
based MNCs located outside of the territory of the European Union. 
1. OECD Standards for Employee Involvement  
Formation of regulations is no longer an exclusive domain of states and governmental 
authorities, and the role of non-state actors in standard setting is increasingly diverse (Peters, et 
al., 2009). In this norm setting method the process is not unilateral but often international and 
the formation of regulations is at least partially taken over by private sector actors, particularly 
in areas where governmental efforts failed, or where stakeholders are concerned that 
international treaties do not adequately took their interest into account. 
The OECD Guidelines aim to ensure that operations of multinational enterprises are in 
harmony with government policies, to strengthen the basis of mutual confidence between 
enterprises and societies in which they operate, to help improve foreign investment climate, and 
                                               
80 Directive 2002/14/EC, Recital (9). 
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to enhance contribution to sustainable development made by multinational enterprises. The 
Guidelines are comprehensive catalogues of social and economic norms, and multinational 
enterprises and their subsidiary companies are expected to carry out their business activities in 
line with these principles. They are supposed to be applied not only within the territory of 
OECD but world-wide, especially in developing countries (OECD, 2011). Thus, the Guidelines 
have an important role in promoting the observance of these standards and principles among 
multinational enterprises. 
The Guidelines were established in 2000 and reviewed in 2011. They are 
recommendations jointly addressed by governments to multinational enterprises, they provide 
principles and standards of good practice consistent with applicable laws and internationally 
recognised standards. The 2011 updates enhanced the binding nature of the Guidelines by 
adding that the countries adhering to the Guidelines make a binding commitment to implement 
them in accordance with the Decision of the OECD Council on the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises. Furthermore, matters covered by the Guidelines may also be the 
subject of national laws and international commitments. The updates in 2011 extended the 
reporting obligations of the multinational enterprises. The aim was to encourage improved 
understanding of the operations of multinational enterprises. The revision underlines the 
importance of clear and complete information on enterprises to a variety of users, including 
shareholders, workers, local communities, special interest groups, governments and society at 
large. The updates make further suggestions and encourage the corporations to communicate 
additional information that could include a value statements or statements of business conduct 
intended for public disclosure including information on the enterprise’s policies relating to 
matters covered by the Guidelines; policies and other codes of conducts to which the enterprise 
subscribes; information on internal audit, risk management and legal compliance systems; and 
information on relationships with workers and other stakeholders.  
The Guidelines deal with employment and industrial relations. According to its 
provisions, enterprises should, within the framework of applicable law, regulations and 
prevailing labour relations and employment practices; and within the framework of applicable 
international labour standards provide information to workers’ representatives. Such 
information is needed for meaningful negotiations on conditions of employment, as it enables 
employees to obtain a true and fair view of the performance of the entity, or where appropriate, 
the enterprise as a whole. The revised text adds that enterprises shall also promote consultation 
and co-operation between employers and workers and their representatives on matters of mutual 
concern. 
The Guidelines set important standards by providing that employment and industrial 
relations must not be less favourable than those observed by comparable employers in the host 
country. The Guidelines also aim to provide directions for cases when multinational enterprises 
operate in developing countries. It obliges the enterprises to provide the best possible wages, 
benefits and conditions of work, within the framework of government policies. These standards 
are subject to the economic position of an MNC but should be at least adequate to satisfying 
the basic needs of the workers and their families.  
  The Guidelines provide for a similar process for collective redundancies to the one 
described in the respective EU Directives, stating that reasonable information has to be given 
to representatives of workers about their employment and their organisations, and, where 
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appropriate, to relevant governmental authorities, and co-operate with workers’ representatives 
and with appropriate governmental authorities to mitigate to the maximum extent practicable 
adverse effects, preferably prior to the final decision being taken.  
 The OECD Guidelines are often compared with the ILO MNE Declaration. Distinctions 
between the function and aim of the two instruments are made in the Commentary of the 
Guidelines. The Commentary specifies that while the ILO MNE Declaration sets principles in 
the fields of employment, training, working conditions, and industrial relations, the OECD 
Guidelines cover all major aspects of corporate behaviour. The OECD Guidelines and the ILO 
MNE Declaration refer to the behaviour expected from enterprises and are intended to be 
parallel and not to conflict with each other. The ILO MNE Declaration can, therefore, be of use 
in understanding the Guidelines to the extent that it is of a greater degree of elaboration. 
However, the responsibilities for the follow-up procedures under the ILO MNE Declaration 
and the Guidelines are institutionally separate. 
1.1. National Contact Points 
The Guidelines are supported by a unique implementation mechanism of National Contact 
Points (NCPs), agencies established by adhering governments to promote and implement the 
Guidelines. NCPs assist enterprises and their stakeholders to take appropriate measures to 
further the observance of the Guidelines. They provide a mediation and conciliation platform 
for resolving practical issues that may arise with the implementation of the Guidelines. 
However, the NCP’s action does not always satisfy its clients. The activity of the Swiss NCP 
was widely criticised in the Triumph International case, questioning the efficiency and the 
unbiased nature of OECD monitoring capacity. The below case also demonstrates that 
European companies, trusted with promoting human rights and safeguarding labour rights – 
like Triumph International – use double standards for their employees working at overseas 
subsidiaries regarding participation. 
One of the key features of the textile industry – one of the principal industries of the 
global economy – is that labour-intensive production is increasingly allocated to countries with 
cheap wages and lax labour standards, especially to countries in South Asia. Triumph 
International, headquartered in Germany is present in 120 countries, employing over 44,500 
people worldwide; its turnover exceeds EUR 1.9 billion. The company set up an EWC for its 
European branches in 1996. Triumph International owns about 60 per cent of the production 
sites in its supply chain, which is considered as a very high ratio in the garment industry. In 
December 2009 a coalition of labour unions, NGOs and labour support groups filed a complaint 
against Triumph International for carrying out massive layoffs without consulting unions in the 
Philippines and Thailand. Most of the workers who were laid off were union members, 
including union leaders. 
Triumph International’s subsidiaries in the Philippines (TIPI) decided to close its local 
factory in July 2005, resulting in 1663 workers losing their jobs. TIPI had a collective 
agreement effective with the local union, however, the ‘separation money’ offered to the 
workers was not in line with the provisions of the collective agreement. TIPI warned the union 
that if they had planned any organized action against the decision, they would have withdrawn 
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their offer on the separation money and would sue individually all the workers involved. The 
trade union refused to accept the offer, claiming that no information had been given to them on 
the closure. The factory was eventually closed down and severance payment was paid to the 
workers.  
Few years later in August 2009, nearly 2,000 workers were suddenly dismissed from 
Triumph's Thai factory (BFT), including 13 out of 19 union representatives, cutting the factory's 
workforce by half. BFT paid severance payment to the workers, but not according to the Thai 
Labour Relations Law and the effective collective agreement concluded with the workers’ 
representative trade union. 
The union and its affiliates filed inquiries to many international organizations, including 
the Delegation of the European Commission in the Philippines, but received no acceptance. In 
December 2009 the Unions turned the case to OECD and asked the Swiss NCP to set a concrete 
timeline for handling this case, as well as to facilitate communication and exchange between 
the parties in an impartial, transparent and objective manner. Although Triumph initially 
appeared to be open to the NCP process, the company subsequently refused to enter any 
mediation meetings in which the issue at the core of the complaint would be discussed. The 
NCP refused to hold meetings in Thailand or the Philippines and was also not willing to provide 
funding to help bring the victims to Switzerland or for translation of key documents. According 
to one of the complainants, the NCP performed the bare minimum of forwarding the letters 
between Triumph and the unions, but never made a constructive proposal to facilitate a 
mediation meeting or to investigate independently the case (OECD Watch, 2010).  
In its final statement, the NCP did not make any determination as to whether the OECD 
Guidelines have been breached by Triumph, nor does it make recommendations to enhance the 
implementation of the Guidelines. As a summary of the proceeding, the NCP stated that ‘[the] 
parties concerned had a different understanding on the objectives of the proceeding and it was 
therefore not possible to reach such an agreement. In view of this situation, the NCP sees no 
possibility to further contribute to the solution of the conflict (National Contact Pont of 
Switzerland, 14 January, 2011). The end of the procedure was indeed abrupt and questioned the 
ability of the Swiss NCPs to perform its role as an unbiased mediator. 
The lesson learnt from the Triumph case is that the impact of OECD Guidelines on 
economic and social sustainability is relatively low. It is welcomed that the OECD takes part in 
the discussion of employee involvement and that the revised Guidelines refer to ILO norms. On 
the other hand, the Guidelines are merely recommendations, which make the effective 
application of the provisions rather questionable. It is even more uncertain how the Guidelines 
could be enforced in the non-Member Countries of the OECD. On the other hand, it is apparent 
that even European MNCs are bypassing its regulations due to the lack of effective 
enforceability.  
2. World Works Council 
Adopting the transnational approach of the international instruments facilitating employee 
involvement, management and labour have tried to initiate different methods to enhance 
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cooperation. There are four major forms of transnational structure for employee representation 
on an undertaking level: World Company or Group Councils; World Works Councils; extended 
EWCs; and global information committees (Rüb, 2002). 
World Works Councils (WWC) are standing bodies operating on bilateral terms. Their 
operation is based on the agreement of employee representatives and central management. 
Probably the best-known example for WWC is that of Volkswagen’s. At Volkswagen (VW) 
efforts to include employees on a global scale date back to the 1970s. The EWC agreement 
concluded in 1992 (two years before the Directive was adopted) served as a blueprint for WWC 
set up in 1999, consisting representative from all companies in which VW has the predominant 
stake. The guiding principles of the agreement between the central management and trade 
unions reflect well the approach of management towards employee participation (Rüb, 2002). 
The structure and mode of operation allows both sides to see a contribution towards global 
cooperation and joint resolution of the possible conflicts by constructive dialogue and 
cooperative resolution of economic, social and ecological challenges.81 Unlike most WWCs, 
the one at VW is still quite active. 
The extension of the EWCs, including to non-European participants, contains two 
models: one is based on agreement, where the central management agrees to hold plenary EWC 
meetings and the other on the independent decision of the employee side, which is solely for 
internal meetings. An example could be Danone’s case: the international union of the food 
sector managed to conclude an agreement with the central management in 1996, agreeing that 
a consultative committee representing Danone workers from all European countries would be 
informed about the strategic decision of the company. 82  Even though the agreement was 
concluded before the substantive enlargement of the EU, it is striking that a clear distinction 
was drawn between European and non-European countries, the latter are simply represented by 
the trade union, and are not members of the committee. 
Information committees offer the most limited form for global employee representation, 
mostly dealing with ad-hoc specific issues. However, they could be important signs from the 
management side, marking the initial acceptance of global employee representation as a part of 
management. 
Unfortunately, both the historical development and the current status of global employee 
representation forms are poorly documented. As far as it could be tracked, some of the forums 
rarely meet after their establishment, sometimes only once in five years or even less often (Rüb, 
2002). The limited financial resources, management opposition, language barriers and poorly 
defined powers were the most frequently reported obstacles of global cooperation. 
Global structures for employee representation in transnational undertakings are still in 
their infancy. One of the major impediments resulting in poor stability and lack of continuity is 
the absence of solid regulatory background. Soft law regulations are unable to ease dependency 
on the willingness of management to play an active role in participation, to disclose information 
                                               
81  Agreement for Cooperation between Volkswagen Group Management and the Volkswagen Group Global 
Works Council from 20 May 1999. 
82  Information concerning the economic and financial situation, technological projects, major investment 
decisions, organizational issues, training, health and safety, environmental issues, equal opportunities, trade union 
rights and others mutually agreed upon. See: Agreement on the Constitution of an Information and Consultation 
Committee for Danone, 11 March 1996, in: Rüb, 2002, 51. 
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or to finance the activity of global representative bodies. Representative bodies at companies 
with solid traditions in participation and pre-existing patterns of employee participation could 
carry on a significantly better performance (Rüb, 2002). 
While the different soft law mechanisms could successfully facilitate cooperation on a 
global scale and could also contribute to lowering the resistance of management concerning 
employee involvement, without an enforceable legal framework these mechanisms could not 
provide sufficient guarantees for participation. It is the state’s responsibility to create hard legal 
norms. However, the Sinzheimerian principle of economic democracy ought to be respected: 
legal norms are to protect labour, yet at the same time it has to respect the autonomy of 
economic actors. 
2.1. World Works Council in Practice – The Chattanooga Experiment 
A research based on interviews with 2400 American workers showed that there is a large 
representation and participation gap at American workplaces. The majority of the interviewed 
people claimed that they prefer more influence over their employers to have a greater say in 
issues affecting them at workplaces and they imagined this involvement to take the form of an 
elected committee. On one hand, employee participation is a bridge between employees and 
management, it allows employees to take part in decision-making and at the same time it serves 
as a tool to achieve a more inclusive economy through the democratization of workplaces. On 
the other hand, regulatory differences create a large gap in participation rights of employees of 
transnational corporations. The establishment of World Works Councils could be a solution to 
approximate the protection level of employees working in the EU and in the US for the same 
employer. However, due to the very different industrial relations rules, implementing such 
institution to American workplaces is rather challenging. 
Industrial democracy challenges the authoritarian and bureaucratic structures of a 
capitalist enterprise. However, participation is not fundamentally alien to the American 
industrial relations system. Participation challenged the Taylorist-Fordist model, which 
favoured flat hierarchies and direct orders (Marshall, 1950). The paradigmatic transformation 
brought new production concepts and management techniques, which offered more leeway for 
self-regulation and responsibility to rank-and-files. The Hawthorne studies evidenced in the 
early 20th century the ability of employees to exercise informal control over productivity (Mayo, 
1933). The recognition of legitimate power for employees paved the way for the development 
of industrial democracy (Argylis, 1960). However, implementation of participative models was 
usually made with an eye to securing a higher level of competitiveness. 
Therefore, a fresh approach is needed in American industrial relations to provide a voice 
at work that improves the economic conditions of employees and that enhances efficiency and 
equity in economy and society Since unionization is declining even among those workers who 
belong to a bargaining unit and the proportion of those who are not benefiting from union 
services has been growing. There have been many attempts to introduce alternative forms of 
representation and participation especially concerning transnational corporations. Most of these 
methods are originally connected to fair investment policies to developing countries and are in 
various forms of soft law measures, but the traditional dichotomy of unionized and non-
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unionized workplaces does not enhance new forms of representation, which could correct the 
information asymmetry between individual employees and management (Mironi, 2010). 
Moreover, there are hard law obstacles in the United States, which prevent the implementation 
of new ways of participation. 
At American workplaces employees are represented through traditional labour unions 
organized and operated independently from employers. Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA) does not allow employers to “dominate or interfere” with labour 
organizations. Instruments of employee participation like works councils form a part of 
employers’ organization as their core purpose is to involve employees in the employers’ 
decision-making process. This section has been interpreted in a rather restrictive manner to 
suppress non-union, employer-sponsored representation models. However, this strict 
understanding of the regulation may lead – especially read together with Section 302 of the 
Labor-Management Relations Act – to a complete ban of any non-union labour organization, 
including works councils. Even though works council is by no means a ‘sham union’ and 
constitutes no threat to fair labour-management relations envisaged by the drafters of NLRA in 
1935.  
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) interpreted Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA 
and concluded that any organization is a labour organization, if (1) employees participate, (2) 
the organization exists, at least in part, for the purpose of ‘dealing with’ employers, and (3) 
these dealings concerns ‘conditions of work’ or concern other statutory subjects such as 
grievances, labour disputes, wages, rates of pay, or hours of employment (Drutchas, 2016). 
Therefore, works councils are labour organizations and deal with the employer under section 
8(a)(2). To examine works councils’ conformity with NLRA, it is necessary to check whether 
employers dominate, interfere with or influence their operation in the meaning of Section 
8(a)(2). 
Judges often rely on implicit factor tests to decide whether an employer dominates a 
labour organization. The most often cited issue is when an employer sets the agenda of a 
meeting for a labour organization. Since works councils have to be informed regularly on 
certain topics, it is indispensable for an employer to provide an outline for each. This duty 
however does not hinder works councils to initiate a meeting whenever an issue affecting the 
majority of employees occurs (Drutchas, 2016). 
Financing or supporting of a labour organization constitutes unfair labour practice under 
NLRA section 8; moreover, Section 302 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 
prohibits an employer from engaging in any “payment or lending” to any employee 
representative or labour organization representing its employees. This provision was created to 
prevent employers from bribing unions and labour representatives. It is the employer’s duty to 
facilitate employees’ participation, therefore it is the employers’ duty to cover the operational 
costs of a works council. This means that a European type works council would not pass the 
assessment of the National Labor Relations Board. An interesting ‘experiment’ is happening in 
Chattanooga, Tennessee to test how the European works council model could survive in the 
US. 
In August 2013 United Automobile Workers (UAW) International Union and 
Volkswagen Group (VW) decided to set up an employee representation in Volkswagen’s 
Chattanooga, Tennessee plant. UAW introduced a new collaboration model involving both 
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blue-collar and white-collar workers to work together with VW management on various issues 
concerning working conditions by providing information and consultation rights. After the 
union lost a closely contested election open to all the plant's 1,500 workers in February 2014, a 
unit called ‘Local 42’ was created. Besides, a group of VW Chattanooga workers formed the 
American Council of Employees (ACE), which was – according to their press release – “an 
independent employee council created to ensure that VW-Chattanooga employees have a voice 
on the Volkswagen Global Works Council” (Ramsey, 2015).  
The Chattanooga works council is not subject to German law, however a contract 
concluded between VW management and VW Group’s European and Global Works Councils 
is binding. VW’s Charter on Labor Relations is effective since 2009 and it established 
participation rights of democratically elected employee representatives. Accordingly, VW 
promised that the Chattanooga works council would be represented on the Global Council. 
UAW Local 42 initially was not established as a bargaining unit for any VW-Chattanooga 
worker. In 2015, members of UAW Local 42 asked Volkswagen to recognize the local union 
as the bargaining representative of skilled-trades employees at the Chattanooga plant, although 
VW rejected the claim. Later that year the NLRB ruled in favour of Local 42 and ordered an 
election for 160 skilled trades employees, which resulted in an overwhelming success of Local 
42. However, VW refused to enter into collective bargaining with Local 42, but after UAW 
filed a charge against the employer stipulating that VW unlawfully refused to bargain in 
February 2016, the NLRB denied Volkswagen’s request for a review of the December election, 
and upheld the election and its results. 
Even though there was a heated debate over UAW Local 42 and eventually it was 
recognized as a collective bargaining unit, there is no clarifying answer from the NLRB whether 
a works council is a lawful alternative of employee representation under US law. Since the 
debate is not yet over, insecurity continues. During the most recent election round, in 2019, of 
the roughly 1,600 workers who voted, 833 opposed the unionization effort. The union’s defeat 
appeared in media as a loss that highlighted the difficulty of organizing private-sector workers 
in a political environment that is overtly hostile to labour unions (Scheiber, 2019). Even though 
Volkswagen was also officially neutral during the 2019 election, its posture was much more 
resistant. The company’s election website informed workers that “we prefer to continue our 
direct relationship with you, working together as one team”, and it was interpreted as a language 
that oppresses unionisation (Scheiber, 2019). Moreover, it was argued that state representatives 
said a decision to unionize could threaten tens of millions of dollars in future state incentives 
for the company. From the union’s response it is clear that World Works Council did not get 
accepted by labour representatives and it is seen as a tool to prevent collective bargaining. 
3. Extension of the Personal Scope of the EU 
Directives 
The significance of employee involvement has been gradually growing in the European Union. 
The learning curve from the 1980s has been very long indeed, and during these decades many 
of the initial problems have been addressed in the amends of the Directives addressing the right 
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to be informed and consulted.83 The change in the regulatory technique allowing more room 
for Member States for transposition with regard to the different traditions in industrial relations 
caters better for employee involvement and the strengthened legal status of the CFREU 
symbolizes its importance as a human right. 
However, enjoyment of the right has not been guaranteed to all; in absence of 
enforceable regulations, employee involvement has not penetrated to subsidiaries of European 
multinationals located outside of the territory of the EU. To mitigate the regulatory gap, both 
international organizations and multinational enterprises have developed regulatory solutions. 
What legitimizes the norm-setting exercises of non-state actors are more transparent decision-
making processes and the possibility of representing a broad range of views. Indeed, soft law, 
voluntary codes of conduct, and other non-binding instruments have an important role in 
facilitating employee involvement. However, voluntary actions have proven to be insufficient, 
and thus cannot be substitutes of enforceable legal instruments. 
The EWC Directive is not only applicable to undertakings or groups of undertakings 
that are located within the territory of the EU, but also addresses non-European businesses by 
stating that the mechanisms for informing and consulting employees in undertakings (or groups 
of undertakings) operating in two or more member states shall encompass all establishments, 
regardless of whether its central management is located inside or outside of the territory of the 
Member States. The aim of this extension is the protection of the European workforce, and it 
does not constitute extraterritorial legislation as it refers to business activities that take place 
within the EU. 
The key element in the scope of the Directive is the transnational character of business 
issues. According to Article 1 Para 4, those matters have a transnational character that concern 
the entire undertaking or group, or at least two Member States. These include matters that are 
of importance to the European workforce in terms of the scope of their potential effects or that 
involve transfers of activities within the Member States. 
To ensure that the right of information and consultation is effectively realized at 
subsidiaries of the Europe-based multinational companies located outside of the territory of the 
EU, the personal scope of Directives 2002/14/EC and 2009/38/EC should be expanded in a way 
that encompasses all branches under the control of the controlling undertaking domiciled in the 
EU. 84  The notion of a controlling undertaking in its current form could create a link to 
                                               
83  Apart from Directives 2002/14 and 2009/38 as referred above, see Directive on Collective Redundancies 
(Council dir. 75/129/EEC (OJ [1975] L48/29) amended by Council Dir. 92/56/EEC (OJ [1992] L245/13) and 
Directive on the Transfer of Undertakings (Council Dir. 77/187/EEC (OJ [1977] L61/26, amended by Directive 
98/50 (OJ [1998] L201/88) and consolidated in Directive 2001/23 (OJ [2001] L82/16) 
84 Directive 2009/38/EC on European Works Council defines community-scale undertaking as any undertaking 
with at least 1,000 employees within the Member States, and at least 150 employees in each of at least two Member 
States; a ‘group of undertakings’ means a controlling undertaking and its controlled undertakings; and a 
‘community-scale group of undertakings’ means a group of undertakings with the following characteristics: at 
least 1,000 employees within the Member States, at least two group undertakings in different Member States, and 
at least one group undertaking with at least 150 employees in one Member State, and at least one other group 
undertaking with at least 150 employees in another Member State. The Directive also provides for the definition 
of a controlling undertaking: for the purposes of the Directive, a ‘controlling undertaking’ means an undertaking 
which can exercise a dominant influence over another undertaking (the controlled undertaking) by virtue, for 
example, of ownership, financial participation, or the rules which govern it. The ability to exercise a dominant 
influence has to be presumed, without prejudice to proof to the contrary, when an undertaking, in relation to another 
undertaking directly or indirectly: (a) holds a majority of that undertaking’s subscribed capital; (b) controls a 
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subsidiaries located outside of the EU territory. It is indeed necessary, as the impact of these 
‘third country subsidiaries’ are very important resources for European MNCs. Therefore, issues 
related to their activity increased importance for the entirety of the workforce. All branches 
should be included in the concept of the transnational character of a matter. 
It may be argued that the enlarged territorial scope would constitute a competitive 
disadvantage to European multinational companies and therefore would encourage businesses 
to move their seats outside of the Member States. Since participation enhances competitiveness, 
the expansion of the material scope of the respective Directives would further improve 
European MNCs’ competitive advantage, as globalisation pushes industrial relations toward 
convergence. (Weiss, 2007). All-encompassing participation would support the idea of 
cooperation, participation and joint responsibility. If the democratisation of the economy is 
understood as an element that promotes and stabilises democracy in society, workers should 
have a similar chance to influence decisions by which they are affected. 
3.1. The Doctrine of Implied Power 
The competences of the European Union have been expanded by a doctrine of the implied 
powers, developed by the Court of the European Union, which has the last word on competence 
issues.85 The doctrine of implied powers indicates that the EU can either originates its powers 
expressly promulgated in the Treaties, or its competences can be implied (Delereux, 2009). For 
example, Article 352 (1) TFEU states that ‘[if] action by the Union should prove necessary, 
within the framework of the policies defined in the Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set 
out in the Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, the Council, acting 
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the 
European Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate measures.’ 
Such an expansion of competences, especially in the field of employment and industrial 
relations, would not be free from controversy. However, the international scope of the activity 
of the EU has to be guided by principles which have inspired its own creation, development, 
and enlargement, and which seek to advance in the wider world: democracy, rule of law, the 
universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human 
dignity, principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for principles of the United Nations 
Charter and international law.86 
Implied powers exist where internal power has already been used in order to adopt 
measures which come within the attainment of common policies, 87  yet are not limited to 
common policies, but cover all Treaty objectives.88 The importance of employee involvement 
both as a human right and as a tool to enhance economic competitiveness is significant for 
                                               
majority of the votes attached to that undertaking’s issued share capital; or (c) can appoint more than half of the 
members of that undertaking’s administrative, management, or supervisory body. 
85 Case C-104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A., EU:C:1982:362, paragraph 17, and Case 
C149/96 Portuguese Republic v Council of the European Union, EU:C:1999:574, paragraph 34. 
86 Art 205 of TFEU and Art 21 of TEU. 
87 Joined Cases 3,4 and 6/76 Cornelis Kramer and others EU:C:1976:114. 
88  Opinion given pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 228(1) of the EEC Treaty - International 
Agreement on Natural Rubber. Opinion 1/78, EU:C:1979:224. 
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democracy. 89  Moreover, back in 2001, the European Commission proclaimed that a more 
coherent and consistent approach to human rights in its internal and external policies, with a 
view to promoting human rights and democratisation commitments in external relations 
consistent with the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights is needed.90 Thus, a possible action to 
enlarge the scope of Directives 2002/14/EC and 2009/38/EC would fulfil the above 
requirements and therefore could justify extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
3.2. Territorial Expansion of EU Law 
It is generally accepted that a state can exercise territorial jurisdiction over conducts that occur 
within a state and persons who are present within the territory of a state (Staker, 2018). States 
can also provide access to their territory, or the enjoyment of a given status within their territory, 
given that a person or a corporation complies with their laws. In the context of participation this 
is the case with third country businesses who set up subsidiaries in two or more Member States 
and who have to be in line with the rules set forth in Directive 2009/38/EC. It also means that 
if the presence of a natural or legal person within a state can constitute a basis for the exercise 
of territorial jurisdiction, then territorial jurisdiction may be exercised over persons who are 
present but their conduct in question takes place abroad. States or actors can also make access 
to their territory, or the enjoyment of a given status within their territory, given that a person or 
a corporation complies with their laws. In the context of participation this is the case with third 
country businesses who set up subsidiaries in two or more Member States and they have to be in 
line with the rules set forth in Directive 2009/38/EC. It also means that if the presence of a 
natural or legal person within a state can constitute a basis for the exercise of territorial 
jurisdiction, then territorial jurisdiction may be exercised over persons who are present but their 
conduct in question takes place abroad (Scott, 2014).  
The EU relies on this legislative technique to gain regulatory power over activities that 
take place abroad, if a foreign conduct generates effects for the EU. This happens in areas like 
competition law, environmental protection,91 financial services,92 air transportation93 and ship 
                                               
89 Art 205 of TFEU and Art 21 of TEU. 
90 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – 
The European Union’s role in promoting human rights and democratisation in third countries, COM/2001/0252 
final. 
91 Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme 
for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC); 
Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 of the Eureopean Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 laying down 
the obligations of operators who place timber and timber products on the market; Directive 2012/19/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE). 
92 Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on credit 
rating agencies; Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on 
Alternative Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations 
(EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010. 
93  Directive 2008/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 amending 
Directive 2003/87/EC so as to include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance 
trading within the Community; Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
14 December 2005 on the establishment of a Community list of air carriers subject to an operating ban within the 
Community and on informing air transport passengers of the identity of the operating air carrier, and repealing 
Article 9 of Directive 2004/36/EC. 
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inspection.94 This technique allows the EU to govern transactions that do not take place in its 
territory and enables the EU to influence the nature and content of third country and 
international law. The EU’s global regulatory power is exercised to effectuate a specific 
legislative instrument adopted by the EU. 
Another example for extraterritoriality is when the EU aims to adopt international 
agreements and to encourage states to sign up to and comply with existing international norms. 
This was the case with climate change and air security, even though in this case there is no EU 
legislation. 
It also has to be noted that multinational corporations are not traditional subjects of 
international law and it is controversial which national law is able to impose direct duties on 
them; thus, they often “fall through the cracks of the international regulatory system” (Zerk, 
2006, p. 104). The picture becomes even more complicated by adding that multinational 
corporations are increasingly reliant on their supply chains, which are only connected to them 
through civil law contracts. Therefore, enforcement of any corporate norms binding to the 
parent company in its supply chain is next to impossible. 
Expanding the personal scope of Directives 2002/14/EC and 2009/38/EC would 
contribute to the recognition of the right to be informed and consulted both as a human right 
and as a tool for enhancing the economic competitiveness of European multinational 
companies. As a human right, it would be just and fair to provide the same rights (and duties) 
to every employee of a given corporation regardless of their location, as human rights are 
universal. Employee involvement can be seen as a tool for democratization (Dukes, 2014); thus, 
it would also support the democratization of industrial relations in the host countries. The 
expansion would create stronger ties between the headquarters and their third-country 
subsidiaries and could serve as a tool for combating human rights violations caused by 
multinationals (Zerk, 2006). As an economic tool, the employer would benefit from the 
feedback and innovative ideas of its employees more extensively han before. By improving the 
employment conditions for workers worldwide, European companies could be better trusted 
and evaluated by consumers and therefore their market positions would be stronger. 
3.3. Implementation Difficulties 
Taking the Chattanooga example, it is very difficult to implement European participatory 
instruments to a different industrial relations system. Any unfavourable interpretation of section 
8(a)(2) of NLRA would jeopardize the setting-up and operation of non-union employee 
representation instruments. Some commentators suggest that a genuine works council would 
not violate NLRA requirements, especially if they demonstrate good will towards the Board 
and towards public opinion to avoid being viewed as illegally sponsored company unions. It is 
also recommended to UAW and ACE to gain financial independence and to enter into various 
agreements emphasizing independence from the employer or to gain national presence to be 
more powerful in case a more aggressive action is needed against the employer.  
                                               
94Directive 2008/106/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on the minimum 
level of training of seafarers (recast); Regulation (EC) No 391/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 23 April 2009 on common rules and standards for ship inspection and survey organisations (Recast). 
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These kinds of strategies miss the point of a cooperation-based instrument, which is 
designed to allow employees to participate in managerial decision by being informed and 
consulted before such decisions are made. Other solutions offered by authors include the 
complete or partial repeal of section 8(a)(2) (Kaufman, 2001). Those arguing for the complete 
repeal argue that section 8(a)(2) has failed to achieve its intended purpose: which was the 
collective bargaining model that enables collaboration, mostly because of the rigid 
interpretation. Due to the high level of workers’ dissatisfaction a fundamentally new system 
has to be built to allow employees and employers to freely experiment with new models of 
representation. Moreover, a full repeal of section 8(a)(2) would convey a message that the US 
is hospitable to labour innovations. A full repeal would go too far in claiming that complete 
deregulation would allow employers to suppress unions even more by establishing 
management-dominated organizations (Estreicher, 1994). The idea of reforming the US labour 
system implies that employers and unions have to be put on a more equal footing and the 
objective of NLRA to protect employee rights of self-organization and collective bargaining 
has to be accomplished. The suggested solution would be to expand the range of lawful 
participation devices while guarding against the use of such devices for anti-union purposes 
(Befort, 2004). 
Any comparison between the American and European industrial relations systems must 
be taken with caution. However, the benefits employee involvement has on employees are equal 
regardless of the legal system. However, enjoyment of the right has not been guaranteed to all; 
without hard law obligations employee involvement has not penetrated to subsidiaries of 
European multinationals located outside of the territory of the EU. 
To mitigate the regulatory gap, international organizations and multinational enterprises 
have developed regulatory solutions. What legitimizes the norm-setting exercises of non-state 
actors is the more transparent decision-making processes and the possibility of representing a 
broad range of views. Indeed, soft law, voluntary codes of conduct and other non-binding 
instruments have played an important role in facilitating employee involvement. However, 
voluntary actions have proven to be insufficient, and thus cannot be substitutes of enforceable 
legal instruments. One solution could be the expansion of the scope of the relevant EU 
Directives. Another step towards filling the regulatory gap would be to reform the US industrial 
system and abolish the threat of an unfavourable interpretation of NLRA regarding section 8 
(a)(2) by allowing alternative forms of genuine employee representation.  
The right to employee involvement must be protected both as a fundamental right and a 
tool to enhance economic competitiveness. Moreover, this protection cannot be limited to the 
territory of the European Union in the context of globalization. The recognition of the humanity 
of workers through involvement is a shared responsibility of global economic actors 
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PART V. – EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT DURING 
THE ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 
1. The European Social Model and Social 
Dialogue 
The European welfare and employment regimes and the European Social Model are 
experiencing a convergence towards neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is defined as “a political 
project that is justified on philosophical grounds and seeks to extend competitive market forces, 
consolidate a market-friendly constitution, and promote individual freedom” (Jessop, 2013, p. 
70). Social and labour policies in the EU have been under stress since the 1980s and this issue 
was associated with the fiscal and legitimacy crisis of the Keynesian welfare state in the 1970s. 
The new consensus considered social policies and labour rights as an impediment for the new 
growth model that created rigidity in the labour marked and welfare dependency (OECD, 1981). 
The overarching objective of Social Europe is to create a more equal society: ending 
poverty and poverty wages, guaranteeing fundamental human rights, essential services and an 
income that enables every individual to live in dignity. The Commission’s 1994 White Paper 
on social policy (European Commission 1994) described a ‘European social model’ in terms of 
values that include democracy and individual rights, free collective bargaining, the market 
economy, equal opportunities for all, social protection and solidarity. The model is based on 
the conviction that economic progress and social progress are inseparable. A defining feature 
of the European social model, when contrasted with that of the US, is the important role 
attributed to organisations of workers and employers in Europe. Neoliberal employment 
however fails to provide security under the pressure of the global and local trends affecting 
employees (Standing, 2011). Social and economic rights are increasingly dependent of the 
market which may jeopardize the foundational values of Europe. Since the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, the EU reinforced the capacity to influence social and employment policy in the 
Member States and overcome the difficulties of coordination, especially in the areas of welfare 
and work which remained in the Member States domain.95 
Social dialogue is one of the main pillars of the European Social Model, a unifying and 
protective umbrella in which social justice and good economic performance are compatible 
goals. Social dialogue has a long democratic tradition of decision reaching processes in many 
Member States of the EU, even though it was already under pressure before the financial crisis 
occurred. Researches clearly show, that the contexts presenting stronger social models, based 
on trust between social partners, were better equipped to come up with solutions to protect 
workers and national economies (Araújo & Meneses, 2018). 
                                               
95 The Treaty of Amsterdam was signed on 2 October 1997. 
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Arguably, the European Social Model has been declining in the past two decades (F. Scharpf 
2009) (F. W. Scharpf 2002) (Sapir 2006) (Ferrera, Anton Hemerijck and Rhodes 2007).The 
existing constitutional asymmetry between policies designed to promote market efficiency and 
social protection is striking (Schiek 2017). The answer of the European institutions to the 
international financial crisis and economic recession started in 2008 combined aggressive 
austerity, privatization, internal devaluation, labour market deregulation, fragmentation of 
labour relations and erosion of the welfare state. Structural reforms adopted during the crisis 
had many similarities across Europe (Hermann, 2017). The cuts in social benefits and pensions, 
the promotion of atypical employment and the erosion of employment protection, as well as the 
decentralization of collective bargaining and the weakening of workers’ interest representation 
were all common features of the national reform agendas. Social dialogue was allegedly a 
harmful constraint of fast economic recovery. 
1.1. The Austerity Paradigm 
Even though social dialogue is mainly seen as a national level tripartite dialogue between the 
government and the representatives of employers and employees or a bipartite collective 
bargaining on sectoral or on workplace levels, participation as a direct form of employee 
representation could play an important role in mitigating the negative effect of the crisis. 
The European Social Model is not only about labour or social justice, but also about 
economic efficiency. Before the crisis and as expressed in the Lisbon Agenda, Europe wanted 
to stand out in the globalized world as an economy able to combine competitiveness and social 
cohesion.96 However, when the EU starts failing economically it has a detrimental effect on the 
promotion of the social model and the principles of justice (Vaugghan-Whitehead, 2015). 
Vaughhan-Whitehead argues that austerity packages on social dialogue had severe impact in 
three major areas. First, tripartite mechanisms were weakened or stopped. Most legislative 
changes in Europe aimed at relaxing employment protection legislation were introduced with 
only limited social dialogue. Second, in the public sector there was an unprecedented wave of 
adjustments introduced in a context of rare negotiations and consultations with social partners. 
Third, collective bargaining came under attack, which led to a profound decentralization and 
erosion of collective bargaining systems.  
The absence of alternatives and lack of democratic dialogue combined with the threat of 
future uncertainity had major consequences for citizenship (Araújo & Meneses, 2018). On one 
hand, it evoked fear and resignation, but, on the other hand, it increased the perception of 
injustice. A wave of protests spread throughout Europe, including movements like Occupy and 
Indignados, claiming that democracy cannot be subject to rules dictated by financial markets. 
These movements wanted to promote a new model of democracy that is open to the voices of 
citizens and takes seriously the values inscribed in European treaties and national constitutions 
(Araújo & Meneses, 2018). For trade unions, industrial action (strikes, street protests and the 
like) was often the only way to have a say in decision-making processes. Forms of social 
                                               
96 "The Union has today set itself a new strategic goal for the next decade: to become the most competitive and 
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better 
jobs and greater social cohesion” Lisbon European Council 23 and 24 March 2000, Presidency Conclusions. 
65 
 
dialogue that are based on cooperation, like works councils, could not voice employees’ needs 
as much as the more confrontational alternatives. 
In countries where social dialogue is embedded in a democratic tradition of reaching 
decisions, like Austria and the Netherlands, social dialogue had a stabilising function in times 
of crises and helped to overcome the economic crisis. For example, the social partnership 
structure in Austria is defined by cooperation, concertation and the accordance of interests 
between different actors, and the relationship between negotiation partners is based on mutual 
trust. Consultations are frequent, including voluntary and informal ways of cooperation (Meier 
& Tiefenbacher, 2018). The Netherlands also has a strong tradition of social dialogue within 
the context of labour law developments and it is historically known for its well-functioning 
social dialogue system. The process of social dialogue is a consensus-based decision making 
process, aimed to avoid severe public confrontations both on the governmental side as well as 
on the side of the social partners (Vries & Safradin, 2018). Cooperation-based models have 
resulted in fewer strikes, improved protection of employees and employee satisfaction and 
increased employment and higher labour productivity (Araújo & Meneses, 2018). 
The former Soviet Bloc went through neoliberal system transformations with a radical shift 
from the previous communist regimes even before their accession to the EU. Central and 
Eastern European welfare regimes, however, are still shaped by their past as planned economies 
and they combine current neoliberal trend with socialist traditions of welfare states. Social 
dialogue is usually very centralized by the State; however, it is existent and more alive on the 
workplace level as there is larger space left for trade unions’ manoeuvring. 
In Hungary national level social dialogue has a weak impact on policy formation or on 
regulatory issues, while sectoral level social dialogue has never been well developed. Social 
dialogue is the most effective at the workplace level; however, bipartite negotiations became 
increasingly difficult due to the changes in trade unions’ rights after 2012 when the new Labour 
Code came into effect. In Croatia social dialogue was not satisfactory. However, bipartite 
negotiations were much more successful because both parties were interested in setting terms 
and conditions for labour to restart economic growth. Tripartite negotiations were formal and 
social partners’ opinion are overlooked during the decision making. Social dialogue was not 
valued by the government and in addition to this matter officers representing the government 
during the negotiations lacked the required professional knowledge on labour and social law 
issues. In Slovenia social dialogue was ineffective until a new regulation concerning the 
Economic and Social Council were negotiated and adopted between social partners and the 
government in December 2016. After that negotiations became more operative. While sectoral 
level collective bargaining remained an important element of social dialogue, workplace level 
negotiations lost their importance. The challenges related to social dialogue were arguably due 
to the lack of trust between social partners and the fact that in many cases terms and conditions 
of already concluded agreements were not respected by either party (Horváth, et al., 2019). 
Even though reasons vary in Central-Eastern European countries why detrimental changes 
were introduced to social dialogue, it could be observed that governments tend not to involve 
social partners when implementing austerity measures. This might be explained by the fact that 
social dialogue is perceived as sluggish and governments wanted to be quick in implementing 
measures during the crisis to mitigate its negative effect. Another explanation might be that 
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governments are more pragmatic, and, indeed, even autocratic about crisis management in this 
region. 
2. A Case Study of Hungary 
Policy reforms in Hungary have been heavily influenced by the economic crises, as in many 
European countries. However, in Hungary the recent economic downturn was accompanied by 
the landslide victory of the current governing party, the conservative Fidesz and its politically 
subordinated ally, KDNP (Christian Democratic People’s Party). The two-third majority 
allowed the coalition to practically re-codify major policy areas with no opposition, while 
triggering substantial attention from national and European institutions due to the removal of 
democratic guarantees from the political processes.97 Major legislative bills were adopted in the 
social and labour fields catering for more flexibility while removing substantial elements of 
security and even the Constitution was replaced.98 
The character of reforms in employment policy is rather mixed, neo-liberal and state-
socialist elements could equally be detected in legislation (Kollonay-Lehoczky, 2013). 
Fundamental elements of democratic control, like participation or trade union rights, were 
largely eliminated to cement the executive power of the coalition, whereas centralisation was 
made in almost all areas from education to health care. Social rights were largely curtailed, 
increasing vulnerability and poverty in a disproportionate manner. The democratic gap was 
further widened when the Basic Law abolished the right of the Constitutional Court to ex-post 
review laws related to budgetary issues, such as legislation on taxation and social insurance, 
both unquestionably central to social policy (Halmai & Scheppele, 2012).99 So-called ‘cardinal 
laws’ were introduced to regulate issues related to social policies. Cardinal laws are subject to 
amends with two-third majority, making it unfeasible for any future government to initiate 
substantial changes in social legislation with simple majority. 
Since 2011 the government has made great efforts to narrow down the influence of 
social partners. The National Council of Interest Reconciliation, which had been the forum of 
the national tripartite social dialogue functioning since the 1989-90 political regime change – 
was terminated. One of its main functions was that social partners agreed on wage policy and 
statutory minimum wage on a tripartite basis. By its termination triparitism was also abolished. 
The legislative objective was to replace the existing social dialogue with a centralised system 
which ensures only consultation rights. A National Economic and Social Council (NESC) 
established in 2012 was set up to replace the National Council of Interest Reconciliation. 
                                               
97 Some examples are: European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on 
three legal questions arising in the process of drafting the new constitution of Hungary (No 614/2011, 28 March 
2011) (Venice Commission Op 614/2011); Opinion on the new Constitution of Hungary, (No. 618/2011, Venice). 
17-18 June 2011) (Venice Commission Op 618/2011); European Parliament resolution on the Revised Hungarian 
Constitution [2011].  
98 Basic Law of Hungary (2011). 
99 The removal of fiscal laws from the jurisdiction of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, originally meant as a 
temporary measure, was later made into a firm part of the new Fundamental Law, with the consequence that the 
Parliament can now enact fiscal laws that violate the constitution and individual rights, and the Constitutional 
Court is not just temporarily but permanently barred from reviewing them. 
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However, this newly established body has no substantive rights to make decisions, it is a mere 
consultative and advisory body, which is independent from the Parliament and the Government. 
It is not a tripartite forum, since it consists of six different interest groups,100 and at the same 
time the Government is not a member of the NESC, and its ministers are only permanent guests 
with consultation rights. Even social partners do not consider NESC to be suitable for 
discussing the merits of the national reform programmes. Furthermore, in 2012 an informal 
tripartite forum was established, the Permanent Consultation Forum (PCF) of the Private Sector 
and the Government. The Government invited only selected trade unions and employers’ 
associations to PCF. Interviewees agreed that the reason the government established the PCF 
was that negotiations in NESC about wages, including minimum wages, would not be possible.  
The case of Hungary represents very well that the ambiguity of provisions could lead to 
serious harm in national legislations. The vague wording of Directive 2002/14/EC allowed the 
Hungarian lawmaker to adopt a new employee involvement system, which by and large meets 
the formal requirements of the Directive but bypasses its objectives. 
2.1. Overview of National Legislation 
Political changes were rather rapid in Hungary, between 1988 and 1992 key legislative 
movements laid down a completely new system of industrial relations. The third Labour 
Code101 was based on the principle of freedom of association and strived to create a genuinely 
democratic form of participation. Works councils were institutionalised, despite the lack of 
genuine historical origins or theoretical foundations (Kiss, 2005). New works councils followed 
the German dual-channel system; however, eventually it became a significantly weaker 
institution than the original model.102 Works councils and trade unions were provided with 
similar, sometimes competing, rights at a workplace level, creating a horizontal dual-channel 
system (Tóth, et al., 2004).  
The formulation of the third Labour Code was naturally subject to political debates and 
the implementation of a dualistic model of participation indeed was a result of a political 
compromise. During the crisis of industrial relations the role of trade unions was significantly 
weakened, but due to the provisions of the third Labour Code on participation trade unions 
could, to some extent, keep their former positions at a workplace-level. 103 
Decisions of the Constitutional Court concerning trade unions shaped the reforms of 
industrial relations and had an important impact on the bargaining position of trade unions 
(Kollonay-Lehoczky & Ladó, 1996).104  Trade unions could represent employees in issues 
                                               
100  The representatives of the economy (e.g. employers’ representative organisations), trade unions, civil societies, the 
representatives of the sciences, the arts and the registered (historical) churches. Act XCIII of 2011 on National Economic and 
Social Councils, Subsection (1) Section 4 
101 Act No XXII of 1992. 
102 In Germany works councils possess strong co-determination rights at a workplace level, thus employers have 
to take them as relevant negotiation partners; works councils’ activities successfully complement sectoral-level 
social dialogue. 
103 Reforms concerning the National Council of Trade Unions (Szakszervezetek Országos Tanácsa, SZOT) the 
national level umbrella organization of trade unions set up by the stalinist Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party 
started in 1988, and were focusing on two major areas: separation from Party politics and decentralisation. 
104 The relevant decision concerning trade union rights were 8/1990 (IV.23.) ABH and 42/1991 (VI. 23.) ABH 
(Constitutional Court decision. 
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related to their living and working conditions, in the name of and on behalf of employees even 
in the absence of a special authorization. The Constitutional Court decided that the right of the 
trade unions to represent employees without authorization violated the Constitution. The 
Constitutional Court argued that the socio-economic environment where the representation of 
employees fell within the exclusive competence of trade union has radically changed as part of 
the political transformation process, and the representation of the employees' interests has now 
been placed upon a pluralistic basis. 105 The Constitutional Court did not find the disputed 
provision unconstitutional in violating the freedom of association, but rendered its decision 
considering the provisions on the right of personal disposal. The right of disposal is an integral 
part of the right to human dignity, it is a natural right of which no one may be deprived. The 
Constitutional Court stated that the right of disposal is a general right to personhood, which 
encompasses various aspects, such as the right to free personal development, the right to free 
self-determination, the general freedom of action or the right to privacy. On the basis of the 
disputed provision, it may not be ruled out that the trade union may choose to exercise its right 
of representation in spite of an employee's explicit request to the contrary. The risk of infringing 
an employee's interest is at its greatest when the non-trade-unionist employee's personal matters 
are concerned. Thus, the provision in question was annulled by the Constitutional Court. Even 
though the Constitutional Court was based on a stereotypical image of socialist-style, 
paternalistic trade unions alienated from workers, rather than a recognition of genuine trade 
union functions, this decision was as an important step in acknowledging the personal freedom 
of workers. 
The rights of trade unions and works councils regarding information and consultation 
were not clearly formulated resulting in a rather controversial dual channel model by creating 
different stances for works councils and trade unions at workplaces (Tóth, 1997). The former 
Labour Code tied the right of concluding a collective agreement to the results the trade union 
achieved on works council election. Act No XX of 1992 stipulated that those trade unions were 
entitled to conclude a collective agreement with the employer, whose candidates had received 
more than half the votes in the works council election.106 Since trade union representativeness 
was tied to the results of the works council election, the two institutions horizontal 
interdependence was further enhanced and their and trade unions got works councils under their 
influence (Neumann, 1997). 
This mixed system, where the trade unions’ right to conclude a collective agreement 
was tied to the results of the works council election, was a result of an unfortunate trade-off 
                                               
105 Pursuant to Article 70/C (1) of the Constitution (Act No XX of 1949) everybody shall have the right to form 
an organization with others with the aim to protect their economic and social interests or to join such an 
organization.  
106 Major changes concerning the rules of the election were introduced by Act No LV of 1995. If more than one 
trade union maintained a local branch at a given employer, a collective agreement could only have been concluded 
jointly by all the trade unions, provided that the candidates of such trade unions had jointly received more than 
half the votes in the works council election. If the above conditions for having the trade unions jointly conclude a 
collective agreement were not fulfilled, the so called representative trade unions had the right to conclude a 
collective agreement together, provided the candidates of such trade unions have jointly received more than half 
the votes in the works council election. If the conditions for having the representative trade unions jointly conclude 
a collective agreement were not fulfilled either, the trade union whose candidates jointly had received more than 
sixty-five per cent of the votes in the works council election became entitled to conclude a collective agreement.  
In that respect, representatives were those trade unions, whose candidates received at least ten per cent of the votes 
in the works council election. 
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(Prugberger, 2004). 107  This regulation blurred the line between collective bargaining and 
consultation and gave employers an opportunity to avoid bargaining with trade unions (Tóth & 
Frege, 1997). Employers did not have prevailing counterparts at the bargaining table, and they 
were not interested in providing higher standards in employment relationships than the 
minimum requirements of the Labour Code. Thus, collective agreements could not become 
genuine sources of labour law, and the anti-union inclination of employers was generally high. 
Notwithstanding, researches had controversial findings on the relationship between works 
councils and trade unions (Ladó & Tóth, 1994).  
Since the boundaries of collective bargaining and participation were blurry, a nation-
wide study showed that at workplaces where both trade union and works council operated, the 
majority of the trade union officers believed that works councils swindled trade unions from 
the participatory rights, which traditionally belonged to them (Benyó, 2003). Due to these 
regulations, trade unions were only interested in the election, but not in the effective operation 
of works councils (Kisgyörgy, et al., 2003). However, in this way, collective agreements 
concluded at workplaces by trade union could genuinely represent the interest of employees at 
a given establishment (Kollonay-Lehoczky, 2013). The new Labour Code abolished the mixed 
system of trade union representation. Dissenting opinions still exist.  
The dual channel system was widely criticised. After a heated academic debate some 
labour law scholars concluded that previous regulatory regime of employee involvement clearly 
failed (Berke, et al., 2009). This failure could be explained by the wrong initial concept 
regarding the dual channel model: the numerous overlaps in trade union and works council 
rights, which completely lacked solid dogmatic foundations, did not serve the purposes of 
employee involvement. These problems had a significant impact on the new Hungarian Labour 
Code, which came into effect on July 1, 2012 (Kun, 2009).108 
The new Labour Code of Hungary while generally maintaing the democratic principles 
of its predecessor concerning works councils, has brought substantive changes to industrial 
relations. The structure of the Labour Code suggests that the lawmaker intended to emphasise 
the importance of works councils, even to the detriment of trade unions: many of the former 
rights of trade unions are now allocated to works councils. While the confusion regarding trade 
unions’ and works councils’ rights was mostly cleared away, the novelties of the re-codification 
are not uncontested. Even though trade union’s former information and consultation rights are 
now delegated to works councils, works councils are not empowered by the necessary powers 
to effectively exercise these rights. 
The economic plans drawn up by the government after the landslide victory of the 
current conservative governing party Fidesz and its politically subordinated ally, KDNP 
(Christian Democrats) emphasise the role of collective labour law in particular in economic 
development and the importance of autonomous regulations in the world of work.109 However, 
                                               
107  T Prugberger, A kollektív munkajog intézményei, a munkavállalói érdekképviselet és participációs jogok 
tartalma, mechanizmusa és érvényesülése a jogharmonizációs jogalkotási követelmények tükrében, in, I Horváth 
and R Rácz (eds), Tanulmányok a munkajog jövőjéről (Budapest, 2004, Denzoprint),75; Kisgyörgy-Pataky-
Vámos: Helyzetkép az üzemi tanácsokról (Budapest, 2003, FES); B Benyó, ‘Tekinthetjük-e jelentéktelennek a 
munkavállalók részvételét Magyarországon’ (2003) 47 Munkaügyi Szemle 1-2. 
108 Act No I of 2012. 
109 Hungarian Economic Reform program (Széll Kálmán Plan) 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nrp/nrp_hungary_en.pdf, Hungarian Labour Plan 
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these sources refer to both individual and collective autonomy as new and forward-looking 
ideas to reform Hungarian labour law. This undistinguished point of reference disregards the 
historical fact that the strengthening of individual autonomy would rather was a step backwards. 
It is by and large unquestioned that the origins of labour law dates back to times when state 
actor started controlling the autonomy of parties entering to an employment relationship to 
protect the weaker party, the employee. Collective autonomy – as opposed to individual 
autonomy – is an effective tool to control the unilateral regulating power of employers. 
The economic plans aimed to encourage social partners to enter into collective 
agreements; however, the new Labour Code does not provide employees’ representatives with 
strong, enforceable rights to achieve this goal. Most notably, the 2012 Labour Code allows 
individual labour contracts to alter from the Code to the detriment of workers, providing enough 
flexibility for employers to govern labour relations without concluding collective agreements. 
Moreover, standards stipulated by the Labour Code are already providing for minimum 
requirements, therefore trade unions are usually not willing to enter into negotiations to further 
lower these standards and effectively jeopardize living standards and dignity of employees 
(Kollonay-Lehoczky, 2013). 
2.1.1. Establishment of Works Councils 
An employee representative or a works council has to be elected if, during half-year prior to the 
date when an election committee was established, the average number of employees at the 
employer or at the employer’s independent establishment or division is higher than fifteen or 
fifty, respectively. The number of works council members is proportionate to the size of the 
division represented by the works council. 110 A unit of an employer has to be considered 
independent if the head of the establishment is vested with competence which concerns the 
works council’s rights of participation.111 This notion does not require physical (geographical) 
separation: divisions located at several places could belong to one works council. If there are 
more than one independent units, multiple works councils could be elected at the same 
employer. Works councils are elected for terms of five years.112 The justified expenses incurred 
in connection with the election of the works council is borne by the employer.113 
 Concerning active election rights, all workers employed by the employer and working 
at the given fixed establishment have to be entitled to participate in the election of works council 
members. Members of the works council have to be elected by secret ballot and popular vote. 
                                               
http://brdsz54.hu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=249:nemzeti-munkaterv-szell-kalman-
terv&catid=84&Itemid=476. 
110 Three, if the number of employees does not exceed one hundred; five, if the number of employees does not 
exceed three hundred; seven, if the number of employees does not exceed five hundred; nine, if the number of 
employees does not exceed one thousand; eleven, if the number of employees does not exceed two thousand; 
thirteen, if the number of employees is more than two thousand. A new works council member shall be elected if 
the number of employees and the number of works council members are not consistent with the above provisions 
for at least six months due to an increase in the number of employees. 
111 Section 236 Para 2 of Act No I of 2012. 
112 Section 236 Para 3 of Act No I of 2012. 
113 Section 236 Para 4 of Act No I of 2012. 
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All eligible employees have to have one vote.114 Regarding passive election rights, employees 
nominated as works council members have to have legal competency115 and must have been 
employed by the employer for a period of at least six months, and have to work at a given fixed 
establishment. 116  Persons exercising employers’ rights, those who are relatives of the 
employer’s executive officers or are members of the election committee cannot be elected.117  
A candidate may be nominated by at least ten per cent of the employees eligible to vote 
or by at least fifty employees eligible to vote, or by the local trade union branch represented at 
the employer. An election has to be declared valid if more than half of those eligible to vote 
have participated. To this end, an employee eligible to vote cannot be counted – provided that 
she/he did not participate in the election – who, at the time of the election, was incapacitated to 
work due to illness or was on leave of absence without pay.118 
Nomination of candidates has to be construed valid if the number of candidates reaches 
the number of members that can be elected to the works council.119 The persons receiving the 
highest number of votes, or at least thirty per cent of the valid votes are construed as having 
been elected members of the workers’ council.120 In the event of equality of votes, the length 
of the employment relationship with the employer has to be taken into consideration. Persons 
receiving at least twenty per cent of the valid votes are regarded as substitute members of the 
works council.121 If there are not enough candidates who received thirty per cent of the valid 
votes, the works council cannot be established. It means that establishments with overly active 
employees have lesser chances to elect works council members, as if there are too many 
candidates running for the office, it could easily happen that the votes are fractured as much 
that not enough candidates could meet the threshold. 
Employees could be represented by an employee representative, a works council, a 
central works council, or by a corporate-level works council. 122  The new Labour Code 
maintained the option of works councils forming a central works council in case more than one 
                                               
114 Section 243 of Act No I of 2012. 
115  See, Section 2:8 of Act No V of 2013. Regarding the requirement of having legal competency, at an 
establishment where only employees with either no or limited legal competency are employed (which is 
theoretically possible due to Section 212 of the Labour Code), employees would be deprived to exercise their right 
to information and consultation. Neither the European Social Charter, nor Directive 2002/14 contains any 
provisions regarding the legal competency of employee representatives. 
116 Section 238 Para 1 of Act No I of 2012. 
117 Section 238 Para 2 of Act No I of 2012. 
118 In the event of an invalid ballot, the election shall be repeated within a period of ninety days. The new election 
may not be held within a period of thirty days. The second election shall be declared valid if more than one-third 
of those eligible to vote have participated. The nominee receiving the highest number of votes, or at least thirty 
per cent of the valid votes shall be declared an elected member of the works council. If the repeated election is 
declared invalid, a new works council ballot shall be held after one year at the earliest. 
119 Section 242 of Act No I of 2012. 
120 An election shall be declared invalid if the required number of candidates did not receive thirty per cent of the 
votes cast. The nominees having received thirty per cent of the votes shall be declared elected members of the 
works council. A new election shall be held within a period of thirty days to fill the remaining positions. For the 
new election, new candidates may also be nominated up to the fifteenth day prior to the election. The second 
election shall be declared valid if more than one-third of those eligible to vote have participated. The nominees 
receiving the highest number of votes, or at least thirty per cent of the valid votes shall be declared elected members 
of the works council. Persons receiving at least fifteen per cent of the valid votes shall be regarded as substitute 
members of the works council. If the repeated election is declared invalid, a new works council ballot shall be held 
after one year at the earliest. 
121 Section 246 of Act No I of 2012. 
122 Section 236 Para 1 of Act No I of 2012. 
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works councils operate at an employer.123 Members of the central works council have to be 
delegated by the works councils from among their members. A central works council may not 
have more than fifteen members.124  
 A novelty of the new Labour Code is the introduction of corporate-level works 
councils.125 Central works councils or, in their absence, works councils may set up a corporate-
level works council at a recognized126 or de facto group of companies.127 Members to such 
works councils have to be delegated by the central works councils or the works councils from 
among their members. The number of members of the corporate-level works council is limited 
in fifteen.128 General provisions pertaining on works councils apply to a central works council 
and to a corporate-level works council.129 
 Procedures for informing and consulting employees in a European Works Council were 
introduced by Act No XXI of 2003130 to satisfy the obligation concerning the transposition of 
Directive 94/45/EC. The Act sets forth a regulation regarding the applicability of the Hungarian 
rules for the election of a works council. The Hungarian rules have to be applied when the 
central management of a Community-scale undertaking, or group of undertaking is located in 
Hungary. The Hungarian regulations also have to be applied regarding the protection of 
employee representatives, if the registered office of the controlling company is not situated in 
a Member State, but the management of a fixed establishment or company operating in a 
Member State and controlled by the central management is situated in Hungary, or a 
Community-scale undertaking or a group of undertaking has a representative agent in Hungary; 
or if the Community-scale undertaking or controlled undertaking employing the greatest 
number of employees in Hungary.131 
                                               
123 Section 250 Para 1 of Act No I of 2012. 
124 Section 250 Para 2 of Act No I of 2012. 
125 Section 251 Para 1 of Act No I of 2012. The regulations concerning corporate-level works councils are aligned 
with those of the group of companies stipulated by the Civil Code. The rules of cooperation have to be laid down 
within the group of companies by the works council having the right to adopt decisions relating to employees and 
by the corporate-level works council. Section 3:50 Paragraph 3 of the Civil Code stipulates that the autonomy of 
the controlled companies of the group may be restricted in the manner and to the extent specified in the control 
contract with a view to achieving the common business objective. The control contract has to provide for the 
protection of the rights of the controlled members, and for the protection of creditors’ interests. That provides for 
that decisions regarding participation are made on the level of the controlling company. 
126 Section 3:49 of the Civil Code (Act No V of 2013) defines the notion of recognized group of corporation as a 
form of cooperation featuring a common business strategy between at least one dominant member that is required 
to draw up consolidated annual accounts and at least three members controlled by the dominant member under a 
control contract. A group of corporations may consist of limited companies, private limited-liability companies, 
groupings and cooperative societies. If a group of corporations is led jointly by several legal persons, they shall 
enter into an agreement to determine the one enabled to exercise the rights of the dominant member in accordance 
with the control contract. 
127 If the conditions for the control contract prevail for at least three consecutive years, at the request of either of 
the parties with legal interest the court may order the de facto dominant member and the controlled companies to 
conclude the control contract and to apply to the court of registry for the registration of the group of corporations. 
If a group of corporations de facto operates for at least three consecutive years, the court - at the request of either 
of the parties with legal interest - shall have authority to apply the regulations governing the relations between the 
managements of the dominant member and the controlled member even in the absence of a control contract and 
without being registered as a group of corporations. See, Section 3:62 of Act No V of 2013.    
128 Section 251 Para 2 of Act No I of 2012. 
129 Section 250 Para 3 and Section 251 Para 4 of Act No I of 2012. 
130 Amended by Act No CV of 2011. 
131 Para 4 of Section 1 of Act No XXI of 2003. 
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2.1.1. Competencies and Responsibilities of Works Councils 
Substantive changes were introduced concerning the role of works councils. Works councils 
aim to promote cooperation between employers and employees and to facilitate participation in 
decision making.132 The role of works councils is to monitor compliance with the employment 
regulations. The ministerial reasoning further explains that this change in the new Labour Code 
is justified by “international standards.” 133  It is regrettable, however, that the ministerial 
reasoning does not specify which international standards are being referred to, as works 
councils are traditionally the instruments of participation (Barnard, 2012) and their rights 
generally do not enable them to effectively control employers’ practices, which would require 
powers dissuasive enough to prevent employers from malpractice. 
Moreover, the protection of works council members was narrowed down and it is only 
the chairperson of a works council who is protected against unfair dismissal. This regulation is 
suitable to effectively withhold regular works council members to stand up for workers’ rights. 
 As it was pointed out, the compromised solution of the Labour Code of 1992 was 
unnecessarily blurred the lines between the powers and responsibilities of trade unions and 
works councils by providing rights of information and consultation to both. Now these rights 
are solely vested in the works councils. However, it ought to be noted that trade unions are 
traditionally in a better position to monitor employers’ practices and working conditions, as 
works councils are instruments of mutual cooperation and participation in decision making. 
Works councils are entitled to request information and to initiate negotiations, with the 
reason indicated, which the employer may not refuse. Notification means transmission of 
information specified by law as related to industrial relations or employment relationships in 
order to enable the recipients to acquaint themselves with the subject matter and to examine it, 
and to formulate an opinion to prepare for consultations, and ‘consultation’ means the 
establishment of dialogue and exchange of views between the employer and the works council 
or trade union.134 These definitions are the same as provided for by Directive 2002/14/EC.135  
To the extent required for their responsibilities, works councils are entitled to request 
information and to initiate negotiations, with an indication on its reason. The employer must 
not refuse the initiative of the works council. Moreover, an employer has to provide information 
to the works council in every six month on matters affecting employers economic standing; 
changes in wages, liquidity related to the payment of wages, characteristic features of 
employment, utilization of working time, characteristics of working conditions; number of 
workers in employment and the description of the jobs they perform. 
Consultation has to take place with a view to seeking an agreement, in such a fashion as 
consistent with the objective thereof and ensuring a) that the parties are properly represented; 
b) the direct exchange of views and establishment of dialogue; c) substantive discussions.” 
Regarding the issue of timing, employers have to consult the works council at least 15 days 
prior to passing a decision in respect of any plans for actions and adopting regulations affecting 
                                               
132 Section 235 Para 1 of Act No I of 2012; ministerial reasoning concerning Sections 235-37 of the Labour Code. 
133 Ministerial reasoning concerning Section 262 of the Labour Code. 
134 Section 233 Para 1 Points a) and b). 
135 Article 2 Points (f) and (g) of Directive 2002/14/EC. 
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a large number of employees. The quality of the dialogue is supposed to be further protected as 
an employer must not carry out the proposed action during the time of consultation, or for up 
to seven days from the first day of consultation, unless a longer time limit is agreed upon. In 
the absence of an agreement an employer has to terminate consultation when the said time limit 
expires. 
The scope of plans or actions that require consultation especially covers the following 
matters: proposals for the employer’s reorganization, transformation, the conversion of a 
strategic business unit into an independent organization; introducing production and investment 
programs, new technologies, or upgrading existing ones; processing and protection of the 
personal data of employees; implementation of technical means for the surveillance of workers; 
measures for compliance with occupational safety and health requirements, and for the 
prevention of accidents at work and occupational diseases; introduction and/or amendment of 
new work organization methods and performance requirements; plans relating to training and 
education; appropriation of job assistance related subsidies; drawing up proposals for the 
rehabilitation of workers with health impairment and persons with reduced ability to work; 
laying down working arrangements; setting principles for remuneration of work; measures for 
the protection of the environment relating to the employer’s operations; measures implemented 
with a view to enforcing principle of equal treatment and to promote equal opportunities and 
work-life balance.136 
 Both the ministerial reasoning and the Commentary of the Labour Code emphasise the 
importance of confidential information (Kardkovács, 2012). An employer is not obliged to 
communicate information or undertake consultation when the nature of that information or 
consultation covers facts, information, know-how or data that, if disclosed, would harm an 
employer’s legitimate economic interest or its functioning. 137  Employers’ prerogatives are 
mirrored as obligation of employees’ representatives, as representatives acting in the name and 
on behalf of works councils or trade unions are not authorized to disclose any facts, information, 
know-how or data which, in the legitimate economic interest of an employer or in the protection 
of its functioning, has expressly been provided to them in confidence or to be treated as business 
secrets, in any way or form, and they are not authorized to use information in any other way in 
connection with any activity in which this person is involved for reasons other than the 
objectives specified in the Labour Code.138 Any person who is acting in the name or on behalf 
of a works council or a trade union has to be authorized to disclose any information or data 
acquired in the course of their activities solely in a manner which does not jeopardize 
employer’s legitimate economic interest and without violating rights relating to personality.139 
The notion of ’business secret’ – or in the wording of the new Civil Code, ’trade secret’ 
– includes any fact, information and other data, or a compilation thereof, connected to economic 
activities, which are not publicly known or which are not easily accessible to other operators 
pursuing the same economic activities, and which, if obtained and/or used by unauthorized 
persons, or if published or disclosed to others are likely to imperil or jeopardize the rightful 
                                               
136 Section 264 of Act No I of 2012. 
137 Section 234 Para 1 of Act No I of 2012. 
138 Section 234bParas 2 and 3 of Act No I of 2012. 
139 Amended by Point e) of Para 34 of Section 175 of Act No CCLII of 2013 in accordance with the new Civil 
Code. 
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financial, economic or commercial interest of the owner of such secrets, provided the lawful 
owner is not subject to actionability in terms of keeping such information confidential. 140 
Commercial secrecy also has to apply to technical, economic and other practical knowledge of 
value held in a form enabling identification, including accumulated skills and experience and 
any combination thereof, if acquired, used, disclosed or published in violation of the principle 
of good faith and fair dealing. It is noteworthy that the breach of commercial secrecy must not 
be relied on as against a person who has obtained trade secrets or know-how from third parties 
in good faith, in the course of trade for consideration.141 These regulations are in line with the 
provisions of Article 6 of Directive 2002/14/EC, Article 8 of Directive 2009/38/EC as well as 
Article 21a of the Revised European Social Charter, which allow employers to withhold certain 
information which could be prejudicial to the undertaking or which are confidential. 
2.1.2. Co-determination Right of Works Councils 
The new Labour Code brought detrimental changes related to works councils’ co-determination 
rights. Most importantly the subject matter of co-determination was curtailed, the previous 
Labour Code provided co-determination right to works council related to the appropriation of 
welfare funds, and the appropriation of welfare institutions and real estate property of such 
nature, as specified in the collective agreements, now it is limited to the appropriation of 
welfare funds.142 Thus, the new Labour Code eliminated the co-determination right concerning 
the appropriation of welfare institutions and real estate property, and it ceased to link these 
rights to the provisions of the collective agreement effective on a workplace. Although the 
limitation of the subject matter is not explained by the ministerial reasoning, it has positive 
aspects too. 
Ceasing the linkage with the provisions clears the boundaries between trade unions and 
participation. Moreover, Section 65 of the previous Labour Code led to controversial 
interpretations. The question referred to the Supreme Court of Hungary was whether the works 
council had the right of co-determination related to the utilization of welfare-related real estate 
property in the absence of a specific provision of a collective agreement. 143  The Court’s 
decision was in the affirmative. However, when this section was amended in 2007, it became 
clear that the lawmaker interpreted this question in a manner contrary to the quoted ruling of 
the Supreme Court. 144 Act No XIX of 2007 did not amend the text itself, but edited the existing 
sentence that changed the interpretation in a way that the works council shall not have the right 
                                               
140 Section 2:47 of the Civil Code (Act No V of 2013). 
141 Section 2:47 Para 3 of of the Civil Code. 
142 Section 65 Para 1 of Act No XXII of 1992, amended by Section 1 of Act No XIX of 2007. In 1992 the Labour 
Code originally provided co-determination right to works councils to the adaption of the health and safety 
regulations, however, the related provisions were incorporated in Act No XCIII of 1993 on Employment Safety 
and Health. This amendment was controversial, as the provisions of Act No CXIII of 1993 did not make the 
election of a health and safety committee compulsory; thus, in case the employer did not agree with the election 
of such committee, the works council would have no right of co-determination on safety and health issues. 
143 Case EBH 2004.1148 of the Supreme Court. 
144 Act No XIX of 2007. 
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to co-determination in the absence of specific provisions on the subject matter laid down by a 
collective agreement. 
Formerly, the content of the co-determination was heavily debated in other cases too, 
and it was questioned whether the works council had co-determination rights with regard to the 
sales of a welfare property. The law stipulated that the works council had co-determination 
rights concerning the utilization of welfare-related real estate property. 145 However, the right 
to sell in its nature is a different, yet superior, right compared to the right to utilize, thus, the 
co-determination right of works councils did not cover this area (Prugberger, et al., 1994). 
Critics of the decision argued that the income resulted from sales is a specific form of utilization, 
thus it was involved in the scope of co-determination (Prugberger, 2004). 
 The legal consequences of the breach of the works council’s right on co-determination 
were also changed in 2012. While the previous Labour Code deemed any action taken by an 
employer violating the co-determination rights void, the new Labour Code does not stipulate 
so. 146As no explanation is given by the ministerial reasoning for such a change, a possible 
explanation lies in the decision of the Labour Court in the Budapest Airport case, which delayed 
its privatization process. 147  The former Labour Code stipulated that employers’ measures 
which violated the co-determination or consultation rights of the works council were void. In 
the Budapest Airport case, the Labour Court had to decide whether the transaction related to 
the privatisation of Budapest Airport was lawful and ruled the transaction void because the 
management had failed to consult the works council and therefore violated the Labour Code. 
The decision was highly politicized because major government and opposition parties 
clashed on the high-value transaction, as the repeated tender was won by BAA International 
Ltd, the value of the bid was HUF 464.5 billion (around EUR 1.5 billion). (Neumann & Fodor, 
2005). The privatisation process in Hungary started in the late 1980s; however, companies of a 
certain strategic importance remained owned by the Hungarian state, for example those being 
vital for public transportation, like the Budapest Airport Rt. The Privatisation Act required that 
at least 25 per cent plus one share of Budapest Airport must remain in state ownership. 
Nevertheless, the Hungarian Privatisation and State Holding Company (Állami Privatizációs és 
Vagyonkezelő Rt, ÁPV Rt.) decided to sell the shares of Budapest Airport over this limit, issued 
a call for tenders in June 2005 and shortlisted the potential buyers. The works council of 
Budapest Airport challenged the privatisation at the labour court on grounds that – among other 
complaints – the works council had not been informed or consulted appropriately on the 
privatisation tender; therefore, the transaction had been void. The court upheld the works 
council’s claim. In its ruling, the court referred to Section 65 of the Labour Code of 1992, which 
required employers to consult the works council prior to taking a decision in respect of plans 
affecting a large group of employees, including the employer's privatisation.  
The ruling triggered controversial comments in both business and academia. Those who 
disagreed with the Court’s decision argued that the Labour Code did not specify any obligations 
for the employer’s owner regarding the duty of consultation, even if the decision or the action 
influences the working conditions of the employees. The Labour Code stated that the power to 
inform and consult the works council was vested in the employer, not in the owner, regardless 
                                               
145 Section 65 Para 1 of Act No XX of 1992. 
146 Section 67 of Act No XXII of 1992. 
147 Ruling of the Municipal Labour Court No 2.Mpk. 50.329/2005/9-I. 
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of the entity of the decision maker, therefore an action of the owner of the employer (in this 
case, ÁPV Rt.) could not be deemed void under Sections 65 and 67 of the Labour Code of 1992. 
Another argument was that the Labour Court did not have the competence to decide on civil 
law issues, such as the validity of a privatisation tender (Gyulavári & Kun, 2012). 
Although widely criticised, the Budapest Airport case was a landmark decision, 
reinforcing the strongest power of works council, the right for co-determination. Arguments in 
favour of the labour court’s ruling emphasised that participatory rights must be enforceable in 
all cases, including commercial transactions. Nonetheless, those sections of the Labour Code 
having transposed the EU Directive on transfers of undertaking refer clearly to the superior 
organisations’ decision making and maintains the information and consultation duty of the 
management. Moreover, the Privatisation Act also stipulated detailed procedural rules for 
information and consultation. 148 Previous court rulings related to selling companies’ social 
welfare facilities were also cited, as examples for the co-determination right of works councils 
in civil law matters. Having regard to the changes introduced by the 2012 Labour Code the 
works council could only file a claim to state that the employer’s action violated the right of 
co-determination and without an enforceable sanction stipulated by the Labour Code, the Court 
most probably would not deem the action void. 
The importance of the legal consequences of the breach of the works council’s right on 
co-determination is striking. Without dissuasive sanctions and proper remedies, participation 
rights are not safeguarded. The European Social Charter therefore stresses that enforcement 
methods are crucial; administrative fine and nullity of the employer’s decision violating the 
rights of information and consultation are the most common sanctions in the pan-European area.  
The former Labour Code of Hungary stood on the ground that employers action 
violating works councils’ rights are null and void. However, as the relevant case law 
demonstrates, Courts’ interpretations on this matter were heavily contested. Undoubtedly, the 
meaning of nullity is hard to understand in many cases. For example, what would be the 
decision in a theoretic case when the employer makes unilateral decision over the welfare fund 
– say, purchases music concert tickets for the employees? In case of nullity, what would be the 
consequences of infringing the co-determination right of the works council? Should the 
employer take back the tickets? What would happen if, by the time the court rules the case, the 
music concert is already over? Should the money spent on the tickets be paid back, even though 
the employees enjoyed the concert, despite they had wished to listen to different genre of music 
or to have meal vouchers instead? 
Even though nullity is a sanction difficult to apply in most of the cases, it would have 
been advisable to revisit other possible sanctions when the new Labour Code was drafted, for 
example an administrative fine would have been introduced. Even though monetising a 
violation could easily lead to malicious employment practices, as it would be easier to treat a 
potential fine as an additional cost item during the decision-making process. It is also argued, 
that the most severe punishment for a business is when the decision-making process needs to 
be repeated in a relatively short timeframe, therefore it is more dissuasive than fines. This is 
well demonstrated by the Budapest Airport case. Regarding the nature of the subject matter of 
consultation rights, I believe that a system which contains both elements, nullity and an 
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administrative fine would serve the interest of employees the best. Labour courts could be 
entitled to decide which sanction to be imposed based on the nature of the violation. 
2.1.3. Collective Redundancies and Transfer of Undertaking 
The new Labour Code designates information and consultation rights to works councils, 
however, there are two areas when this solution raises concerns regarding the effectuality of 
information and consultation rights. During collective redundancy and transfer procedures 
employees are deprived of their information and consultation rights in the absence of a works 
council. 
 Regarding collective redundancies, the Labour Code stipulates that in case the employer 
is planning to carry out collective redundancies, it has to initiate consultation with the works 
council.149 The negotiation may lead to an agreement; 150 however the employer’s duty of 
consultation does only due up to 15 days from the initiation of the consultation. The Labour 
Code only refers to the content of the agreement in one aspect, namely that it may contain the 
scope of workers affected by the termination of employment relationships,151 and it does not 
refer to any sanction or remedies may due upon the infringement of the agreement, e.g., a 
termination of an employee against the rules accepted by the parties. 152  However, this 
agreement has to be considered as a workplace agreement, and its violation has to have the legal 
consequence of unlawful termination.153 However, this assumption is rather weak as a possible 
remedy.  
 Concerns arise about cases when there is no works council operating at an establishment 
in question. Since the Labour Code only refers to the duty of consultation with the works 
council, a strict interpretation of the text suggests that in the absence of works council there is 
no such obligation on the employer’s side, not even in the case when a trade union is present at 
the establishment. 
Directive 98/59/EC states that workers' representatives means the workers' representatives 
provided for by the laws or practices of the Member States.154 This notion is rather vague, 
allowing Member States to interpret it in line with their national industrial relations’ traditions. 
At the first glance, EU law does not inspire Member States to create new forms of representation 
system, but the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union specifically made 
mandatory for the United Kingdom to establish adequate representation for workers where it 
had not existed with regard to collective redundancies. 155  The Court set forth that “[the 
                                               
149 Section 72 Paragraph 1 of the Labour Code. 
150 See Article 2.1 of Directive Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of 
the Member States relating to collective redundancies (Official Journal L 225, 12/08/1998 P. 0016 – 0021). 
151 Section 76 Para 1 of Act No I of 2012. 
152 Act No XXII of 1992 specifically invoked the consequences of unlawful termination is such cases; see, Section 
94/F Para 1 of Act No XXII of 1992. 
153 On a similar opinion T Gyulavári (ed) Munkajog [Labour Law] (Budapest, 2013, Eötvös Kiadó), 228-229. 
154 Article 1b of Diretive 98/59/EC. 
155 Case C-382/92 Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, EU:C:1994:233; and Case C-383/92, Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, EU:C:1994:234. 
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Directive 77/187/EEC on transfers of undertaking] require[s] Member States to take all 
measures necessary to ensure that workers are informed, consulted and in a position to intervene 
through their representatives in the event of collective redundancies [or the transfer of 
undertaking].”156 
 Member States’ laws and practices for the designation of workers’ representatives 
must ensure that they are able to sufficiently protect employees’ interests under 
circumstances like collective redundancies or transfers (Bercusson, 2009). Thus, the aim of 
the regulation is to provide adequate voice for workers during these procedures. The 
Hungarian Labour Code clearly fails to achieve this goal. As argued above, the right to 
information and consultation is an individual right and employee representatives are to 
facilitate the process. Even in the absence of a standing body, individual employees shall not 
be deprived of their basic right to gain information concerning a workplace, especially 
regarding issues severely and disadvantageously affecting their employment, such as 
collective redundancies. A possible solution to overcome this shortcome would be that trade 
union officers or, in the absence of a trade union at the establishment, ad-hoc representatives 
elected by all employees employed at a given establishment could take up the task to 
negotiate with the employer. 
 A similar gap concerning information and consultation rights could be detected 
regarding regulations of transfer of undertaking. In case of a transfer of undertaking, an 
employer needs to inform employees in writing about the date or proposed date of the transfer, 
the reason of the transfer, the legal, economic and social implications of the transfer to 
employees, and any measures envisaged in relation to the employees. 157  An employer is 
required to consult the works council 15 days prior to the decision making regarding any plans 
for actions and adopting regulations affecting a large number of employees; specifically in case 
of transformation and business reorganisation. 158  Again, this regulation means that in the 
absence of works council, employees are not consulted, only informed, about the employer’s 
decision. However, Directive 2001/23/EC provides for that "representatives of employees" and 
related expressions shall mean the representatives of the employees provided for by the laws or 
practices of the Member States. 159 
Thus, the Hungarian Labour Code violates Directive 2001/23/EC because it does not provide 
for adequate protection of workers during the transfer if there is no standing body elected. Also, 
trade unions are not referred by the law with regard to the procedure of transfer as possible 
representatives of employees. Thus, a revision of the regulation would be necessary, providing 
that trade union officers or, in the absence of a trade union at the establishment, ad-hoc 
representatives elected by all employees employed at a given establishment have to be 
consulted by the employer with regard to the issues related to the transfer of undertaking. 
                                               
156 Case C-382/92 paragraph 23; and Case C-383/92, paragraph 26. 
157 Section 38 Paragraph 2 of the Lasbour Code 
158 Section 264 Para 1 of the Labour Code. 
159 Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of 
undertakings or businesses, OJ L 82, 22.3.2001, p. 16–20; Article 2c. 
80 
 
2.2. Workplace Agreement 
One of the most contested regulations of the new Labour Code concerns workplace agreements. 
Works councils are now enabled to conclude a workplace agreement in subject matters 
designated to collective agreements, except the issue of wages. Such workplace agreements 
may be concluded on condition that the employer has not concluded a collective agreement 
covering a given workplace, or there is no representative trade union at the employer which is 
entitled to conclude a collective agreement. 
This regulation signifies a severe misconception on the nature of employee participation 
and works councils. Even though works councils represent employees’ interests, they are not a 
part of the collective bargaining process but are instruments of employee involvement in 
decision making. Collective bargaining transforms decision making processes and the 
collective agreement, as a result of the bargaining, merges the will of the two contracting 
parties. In contrast, through participation the decision-making process becomes more 
democratic, yet the decision itself will remain a unilateral act of the employer (Kollonay-
Lehoczky, 2013). It is especially true in the case of the Hungarian works councils, which do 
not possess as strong competences as their counterparts in Germany or in Austria. Moreover, 
works councils have a nature of a public law, rather than a private law instrument (Kiss, et al., 
2010).160 Thus, works councils could never become the contractual partners of employers.  
This is not the first time that this misconception appears in the Hungarian Labour Codes. 
Originally workplace agreement was introduced by an amendment of the Labour Code in 1995, 
which allowed works councils and employers to conclude an operative agreement on issues 
pertaining to the rights of a works council and its relations with the employer.161 This scope 
was largely extended by the radical changes in 1999.162 The amend allowed employers and 
works council to regulate issues, which were subject matters of a collective agreement. Both 
the general and the specific parts of the ministerial reasoning remained silent on the reasons 
why such a drastic amendment was necessary. The Hungarian trade unions did not find the 
matter justifiable either, even though concluding such normative workplace was only possible 
if there were no trade union representation at a workplace. They argued that works councils 
were not meant to be protecting employees’ interest against employers, and they were 
defenceless at the bargaining table. Works councils do not possess any rights which would help 
them to put pressure on employers, most importantly, works councils were (and still are) not 
allowed to organize a strike.163  
Therefore, Act No LVI of 1999 introduced an instrument fundamentally alien to the 
newly established Hungarian works councils. This measure revoked the state-socialist 
mechanism, which forced trade unions to represent employees’ interests against that of the 
                                               
160 The ministerial reasoning of the new Laboru Code for example states that the provisions of Regulation (EC) 
No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual 
obligations (Rome I) cannot be applied in case of employee participation, as these regulations are not based on 
private law. 
161 Section 64/A of Act No XX of 1992. 
162 Act No LVI of 1999. 
163 Works councils had to remain unbiased in relation to a strike organized against employers. Consequently, they 
could neither organize a strike, nor could support or impede a strike. The term of works council members 
participating in a strike were suspended for the duration of the strike. See, Section 70 of Act No XX of 1992. 
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employer’s and at the same time, to exercise their participatory rights. The 1999 amendment 
restricted the scope of unilateral decisions of employers in issues like working time banking, 
the order of work, matters pertaining the employees’ health, culture or welfare, and 
improvement of their living conditions.164 In the absence of a collective agreement, these areas 
were subject to internal rules, unilaterally drawn up by an employer. Thus, workplace 
agreement might have been able to increase employee control over these issues. However, due 
to the continued contest of trade unions, concerned regulations were taken out from the Labour 
Code – as silently as they were introduced – in 2002.165 
To distinguish between the right to bargain collectively and the right to participate, the 
principal differences between Article 6 and Article 22 of the Revised Social Charter ought to 
be also mentioned. Despite of the overlap of their material scope, there are substantial 
differences in their stances. Consultation process set forth by Article 6.1 of the Charter with 
relation to the right to bargain collectively does not establish any rights or duties; it refers to an 
exchange of views of parties on an equal footing in a situation where the conflicting interest of 
the bargaining parties are to be confronted. In contrast, Article 22 of the Charter grants an 
enforceable right to consultation to workers in a vertical, unequal situation, where the 
managerial prerogatives of an employer are recognized (Kollonay-Lehoczky, 2010). 
Thus, the new Labour Code did not increase the terrain of collective autonomy, the right 
of works councils to conclude such workplace agreements is nothing more than a rubber stamp 
on the unilateral action of employers to drawn up working conditions (Kollonay-Lehoczky, 
2013). Not to mention, the model of vesting participatory and bargaining rights in such way 
solely to one party has already failed twice in the history of Hungarian labour law. 
2.3. Remedies 
The protection of workers' representatives is safeguarded by ILO Convention No 135. 
According to its provisions, workers’ representatives in the undertaking have to enjoy effective 
protection against any act prejudicial to them, including dismissal, based on their status or 
activities as a workers' representative or on union membership or participation in union 
activities, in so far as they act in conformity with existing laws or collective agreements or other 
jointly agreed arrangements. 166  The Convention further specifies the term workers' 
representatives, it means “persons who are recognised as such under national law or practice, 
whether they are (…) elected representatives, namely, representatives who are freely elected by 
the workers of the undertaking in accordance with provisions of national laws or regulations or 
of collective agreements and whose functions do not include activities which are recognised as 
the exclusive prerogative of trade unions in the country concerned.”167 This notion was adapted 
by the European Social Charter: “[w]ith a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right of 
workers' representatives to carry out their functions, the Parties undertake to ensure that in the 
undertaking: they enjoy effective protection against acts prejudicial to them, including 
dismissal, based on their status or activities as workers' representatives within the undertaking.”  
                                               
164 Section 119 of Act No XX of 1992. 
165 14 Para 4 of Act No XIX of 2002, effective of 2 July, 2002. 
166 C135 - Workers' Representatives Convention, 1971 (No. 135). 
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168 The same requirement also appears in Directive 2002/14/EC: “Member States shall ensure 
that employees’ representatives, when carrying out their functions, enjoy adequate protection 
and guarantees to enable them to perform properly re duties which have been assigned to 
them.”169  
All the above-mentioned instruments state that protection serves the effective exercise 
of the right of workers’ representative to carry out their function. This notion has utmost 
importance regarding the new Hungarian Labour Code. The former Labour Code provided 
protection against unfair dismissal of all trade union officers and works council members 
without prejudice to their positions within the trade union organization or the works council 
respectively. The new Labour Code unnecessarily narrows down the scope of protection to a 
specified number of trade union officers and to the chairperson of the works council. Works 
council’s consent is required for terminating the employment relationship of the chairperson of 
the works council by notice, or for temporary reassignment.170 If the works council does not 
agree with the proposed action, the statement shall include the reasons. Failure by the works 
council to convey its opinion to the employer within the above specified time limit has to be 
construed as agreement with the proposed action. 
The new provisions of the Labour Code do not satisfy the requirements set forth by the 
ILO, the European Social Charter and the EU Directive, because all members of the works 
councils are actual employee representatives, not only the chairperson of the works council, 
therefore, they would deserve the same level of protection. 
2.4. Social Dialogue During the Economic Crisis 
Prior to the outbreak of the global financial crisis in September 2008, Hungary managed to 
achieve substantial fiscal consolidation gains and the general government deficit shrank, from 
9.4% in 2006 to 3.7% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2008. However, following the 
outbreak of the crisis Hungary faced one of the most severe recessions among OECD countries 
(and among other transition countries) with a steep fall in real gross domestic product in 2009 
being double the OECD average. Despite financial assistance from international organisations, 
the recession hit hard on the labour market. (Horváth, et al., 2019) 
The Hungarian labour market could be characterised by a moderate unemployment rate, 
a relatively low labour market participation rate and highly flexible labour market institutions 
(Köllő 2011). Union coverage has been radically declining, and the unions have little power 
(Gyulavári and Kártyás 2016). Employment protection is lower than the EU average, while the 
adjustment of wages is also relatively easy (Eurofund 2019). According to some research, the 
former Labour Code of Hungary was one of the most liberal in Europe, but after the introduction 
of the new Labour Code in 2012 it got even more flexible (Kun 2014).  
After the abolition of the tripartite nation interest reconciliation forum in 2010 a two-
tier social dialogue model emerged in Hungary. On one hand there is an official body which 
involves representatives from many different areas of the society, but it operates without any 
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government agents. On the other hand, there is an informal council established by the 
government by a civil law contract and only selected organisations are part of it. The common 
denominator for these forums is that neither of them meet the requirements for national level 
tripartite social dialogue set forth by ILO Convention No 144.171 
The disfunctional character of the social dialogue on the national level has, 
unsurprisingly, negative consequences on the lower levels of social dialogue too. The 
consequences are manifold, effecting the general support and smooth functioning of the unions 
on local level. By stigmatizing the representatives of alternative opinions and turning them into 
political scapegoats, a general sense of fear and insecurity is created among existing union 
members and supporters. These processes lead to further deterioration of union support by its 
members, and it serves a major obstacle to further unionization. Another symptom the 
Hungarian unionism has been struggling with since 1989 is related to the internal struggles and 
tensions between various confederations and the related unions, leading to general 
fragmentation of the entire union system (Neumann 2018). In the fight for union members, 
some of the confederations close to the political power-center have “poached” members on a 
large-scale, going after entire unions with a full membership (Neumann, 2018, p. 330). Since 
the return of the Orbán government to power in 2010, it has actively contributed to this 
fragmentation, further enhancing and stimulating the weakening of the unions (Neumann, 2018, 
p. 331). Furthermore, the emptied out and thus meaningless national level mechanisms of SD 
create disillusionment and lack of interest among the representatives and likewise among those 
being represented. 
The 2012 Labour Code pursued a new regulatory concept, and now allows collective 
agreements to depart from the provisions of the law without restriction, that is, even to the 
employee’s detriment. The new concept allows social partners to have much more influence on 
shaping working conditions through agreements. The new Labour Code significantly curtailed 
trade union rights at the workplace; and trade unions which had not been overly strong in the 
past either are in an increasingly difficult position to protect employees’ interest (Kollonay-
Lehoczky, 2013). Against this background it would have been necessary to reinforce the 
positions of works councils, as trade unions have lost most of their influencing power. 
Law on paper suggests that the new Labour Code clearly favours the instruments of 
employee participation over collective bargaining. However, the preference of the lawmaker is 
by and large exhausted in declarations and, in fact, works councils do not possess stronger rights 
than before. The preferential treatment of works councils does not empower works councils as 
much as trade unions’ rights. Works councils remains the diluted version of the German model, 
having no considerable power. Even though the scope of consultation was enlarged compare to 
that of the previous Labour Code, the right of co-determination was curtailed. 
 There is a fundamental misconception of works council to state that the function of 
works council is to monitor the compliance of employers’ practices with employment 
                                               
171 The Convention on Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards), 1976 (No. 144). The Conventions 
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regulations. Currently, the rights of works council are not enough to provide effective control 
over employers and the protection of employee representatives is not sufficient either.  
The available remedies are not as effective as they were before. The new Labour Code 
introduced substantial changes to the system of remedies in case an employer violates the right 
of consultation or the right of co-determination of works councils. The sanctions related to the 
unlawful practices of employers, e.g., the violation of information, consultation and co-
determination rights are not dissuasive enough to prevent malpractice of employers. Sanctions 
and remedies are indispensable instruments and create the core of the information and 
consultation rights as genuine and enforceable human rights (Kollonay-Lehoczky, 2010). 
Without dissuasive sanctions and proper remedies, the right to conclude a workplace agreement 
covering subject matters of a collective agreement is not a sign of empowerment of works 
councils, but a rubber stamp on workplace rules unilaterally drawn up by employers  
Legislative changes lead to segmentation of the workforce, alienation, a feeling of being 
threatened, and weakening voices of labour self-representation without the mass support of 
workers. In this situation, the government is directly interested to silence any ambitious 
collective claims, its interest is to preserve alienation and the sense of fear. For this, political 
tools are being used just like on the national level of social dialogue, by creating political 
enemies out of dissident voices. 
Employee participation is not in the limelight of political debates, however, the 
detrimental changes in works councils’ rights show that even on workplace level cooperation 
and social dialogue is not supported. Despite the severe and long-lasting social injustices and 
increasing precarity of workers in different sectors of the Hungarian labour-market, the 
workers’ support for trade unions and works councils has not increased, which means that 
employee representation could not really capitalize on the situation. However, this is not 
necessarily their “fault”, it is more part of the “game”, of the nature of the increasingly 
authoritarian or, as it likes calling itself, illiberal political regime developed in Hungary by the 
ruling party by the end of 2010s. This is a political regime built on the fragmentation of the 
society, on individual fears, where existential anxieties overrule the possibility of a strong 
collective voice (Árendás & Hungler, 2019).  
The economic crisis helped the government to severely turn down social dialogue to the 
point that is does not fulfil its role neither on national, and sectoral, nor on workplace level. 
Institutions of social dialogue are in place and operate, meeting the formal criteria of democratic 
provisions. However, some of the legal solutions do not meet international standards, especially 
that of the ILO on tripartite social dialogue, and some of them bypasses democratic legislative 
process, like the establishment of the PCF by a civil law contract. Social dialogue as a 
democratic process is disfunctional since these institutions and mechanisms are not 
implemented in a democratic way, and no real dialogue or no actual debates take places. Instead, 
these mechanisms work in a top-down manner, the illiberal state and its central governing 
bodies expect certain solutions and answers, leaving no scope for a transparent democratic 
dialogue with the relevant social partners. The government uses institutions of social dialogue 
to preserve the image and impression of a democratically functioning state of the EU, however, 
not surprisingly, it is unable, and it seems unwilling, to preserve the values and achievements 
of the European social model. 
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PART VI. – SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Participation at workplaces encompasses different mechanisms used to involve the workforce 
in decisions at all levels of an organization – whether direct or indirect – conducted with 
employees or through their representatives. In its various pretexts, the issue of employee 
involvement has been a recurring theme in economic theories, industrial relations, and human 
right instruments. Employee involvement as a direct from of participation was analysed from a 
dual perspective: as an economic tool, which enhances competition and as a human right, which 
develops human dignity at workplaces. 
The right to participate in decisions affecting one’s life is a basic value in a democratic 
society. This principle should be present in all areas of civil society, encompassing political and 
economic spheres, including workplaces (Kollonay-Lehoczky, 1990). Democratic decision-
making is required at a state level, and it is argued to be also justifiable at workplace level 
(Mayer, 2001). Involvement in decision-making which affects one’s life – such as issues 
concerning employment – is an essential part of human dignity (Sinzheimer, 1920). 
Without participation, workers’ alienation is inevitable at workplaces, which, on a long 
run, involves that workers also become indifferent towards public affairs, which is a real danger 
to democracy as a whole (Kahn-Freund, 1960). Critics claim, however, that participation is 
often used as a manipulative device of management to weaken trade unions and control 
workers’ mood or morals (Rhenman, 1968). 
According to Sinzheimer, participation could enable all economic actors to jointly form 
economic conditions of a workplace and share related responsibility). Therefore, employees 
would be freed from subordination, and equality would be brought to the economic sphere. Like 
political democracy, economic democracy could contribute to the emancipation of individual 
workers vis-à-vis economic power (Sinzheimer, 1976). Sinzheimer believed that political and 
social democracy could only exist if they are accompanied by economic democracy. Protection 
of employees has essential importance to society, as the working power of man is not only an 
individual but also a social asset (Dukes, 2014). Workers serve the employer directly, but also 
serve society indirectly, argues Sinzheimer further, and thus society owes the worker an 
equivalent return for his service, and this equivalent return is the protection itself. On a Kantian 
recognition of human dignity Sinzheimer argued that the democratization of the industrial 
sphere through the economic constitution can bring equality and real freedom for workers—
freedom which is not manifested in the way that freedom of contract allowed exploitation, but 
freedom from subordination in employment relations (Dukes, 2011). 
Although they are related in many ways, industrial democracy and economic democracy 
convey different meanings. These differences are strongly related to diversity in industrial 
traditions. Historically, industrial democracy became an effective force within workers’ 
movements primary as an idea of representative democracy (Müller-Jentsch, 1995). The 
principle of industrial democracy implies the replacement of unilateral regulations with joint 
decisions on matters concerning the workplace or the employment conditions. Industrial 
democracy challenges both the authoritarian and bureaucratic structures of a capitalist 
enterprise and the centralized regime in state socialist planned economies. Participation also 
implied a criticism of the Taylorist-Fordist model, which favoured flat hierarchies and direct 
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orders. Participation considers that workers are not only bearers of labour power, but members 
of democratic societies from which they derive a set of civil, political and social rights 
(Marshall, 1950).  
Participation in decision-making processes could exist in many ways, starting from the 
mere right to be informed, it could also include consultation, and, the strongest influence could 
be provided by means of co-determination. Employee participation could be of a different 
nature, depending on the models of workers representation, public or private nature of 
employment relationship (Casale & Tenkorang, 2008), organizational dimensions of the 
enterprises and markets, as well as relationship between legislative and contractual sources of 
regulations (Bronstein, 1999). Naturally, participation reflects the industrial relations systems 
within which it is applied (Schregle, 1970). Globalization of capital, product and labour markets 
has increased the need for effective and functioning models of participation (Chaykowski & 
Giles, 1998). 
Definitions of participation include diverse notions and disciplines concerning a non-
unitary and diverse set of workers’ rights originating in laws or in agreements, or in both (Arrigo 
& Cassale, 2010). The notion of participation (nowadays often used as a synonym for 
involvement) is in most countries based on a distinction of powers and roles between employers 
and employees (Blanpain, 1994). Through the different means of participation, workers seek to 
influence certain decisions made by the enterprise employing them and may also share some 
the economic and financial consequences of these decisions. Another interpretation considers 
participation as a means to modify or improve employment relationships and conditions, 
together with socio-economic conditions of a society (Carby-Hall, 2017). 
Workers’ participation in company’s decision-making shows considerable differences 
across Europe. Neither the institutional structure nor the intensity of participation is on a similar 
level, and these differences originate from the different systems of industrial relations between 
the Member States of the European Union. As Manfred Weiss points it out, in view of the 
heterogeneous situation it would be largely unrealistic to shape the structure of workers’ 
participation identically throughout the EU, however, approximation of the systems in a 
functional sense would help employees to have better influence on decision making (Weiss, 
2000). If democratisation of the economy is understood as a tool to promote and stabilise 
democracy in society as a whole, workers throughout the EU should have a similar chance to 
influence decisions by which they are affected. Therefore, in a globalised environment the right 
to participate in decision making had to be extended beyond national borders the EU should 
address the transnational dimension of involvement. Both as an economic tool and as a human 
right, participation should not remain a privilege of European citizens, but have to be treated as 
a universal right of all workers. 
The institutionalized system of employee representation through works councils is 
generally connected to the labour movements of the Weimar Republic. However, some 
rudimentary forms of representation could be found in an earlier stage of history. The Works 
Council Act was a part of the framework established by the Weimar Constitution.172 Article 
165 of the Weimar Constitution provided that workers and employees, in order to look after 
                                               
172 Adopted on August 11, 1919. Ceased de facto operation with the enactment of the Enabling Act on March 23, 
1933. 
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their economic and social interests, ought to cooperate with employers on an equal footing 
regarding the regulation of salaries, working conditions, as well as in the entire field of the 
economic development of the forces of production. The scheme provided for a parliamentary 
form of governance, similar to and parallel with that of the political state. The detailed 
regulations of Factory Works Councils were promulgated in the Act on Works Council, but 
District Workers Councils and the National Economic Council had never been set up. The Act 
on Works Council constituted the most extensive and most important piece of social legislation 
of its times. It covered every phase of labour and social legislation, such as the Code of 
Industrial Regulations, agreements, labour exchanges, mediation and arbitration. Even though 
the final text of the law was compromised, its significance is unquestioned.  
In the light of the provisions of the Weimar Constitution, the dual nature of employee 
involvement appears in a germinal form in the Works Council Act. First, the concept of 
‘collective economic interest’ of the employees and the envisaged parliamentary form of 
interest representation through District Works Councils and the National Economic Council 
projects the Sinzheimerian ideal of economic democracy. Sinzheimer argued that employees 
are empowered with real freedom in their employment if they are involved in the formation of 
business conditions. Employees cannot take part in this process individually due to the power 
imbalance between contracting parties, so the state has to ensure this as a collective right 
(Sinzheimer, 1936). In Sinzheimer’s views, the democratization of the economic sphere is 
necessary for freeing employees from subordination in employment relations, which is essential 
to their human dignity. Second, the furthering of the ‘economic aims’ of the establishment 
appears as a common goal of both labour and capital, for which they ought to strive in a 
cooperative manner. Cooperation is not manageable if the economic aims of the establishment 
only contain profit-maximalisation, business owners have to strive for efficiency and high 
productivity (Fritzsche, 1996). The concept of an economic constitution and the idea of works 
councils have long survived the overthrow of the Weimar Republic (Mommsen, 1998). The 
economic democracy theory meant much more than the transfer of parliamentary forms of 
democracy to workplaces, but more importantly it conveyed the principle of democracy and the 
resolving of industrial conflicts through social dialogue. The Works Council Act incorporated 
the duty of an employer to consider not only the interests of shareholders, but also those of the 
employees. The contemplation of employees’ interests improved the living and working 
conditions of workers, thus largely contributed to better social development. 
Participation also introduced an important limitation on the misuse of the economic 
power of employers. By establishing the long-term development of an establishment as a shared 
goal of labour and capital, the responsibility for the economic decision was also shared between 
the parties, but in a proportionate manner, which created a productive balance of interest. When 
seen this way, participation was an important factor in the stabilisation of economic and social 
order. Finally, the Weimar model of participation chiefly influenced the current employee 
involvement system of Germany, which has had further impact on the European model of 
participation. 
The economic input of employee involvement has been researched for decades, many 
hypotheses exist on both sides, aiming to prove either the inefficiency or the efficiency of 
employee involvement. Proponents of the efficiency theory, Freeman and Lazear examined the 
voluntary or mandatory nature of works councils and suggested that to maximise social gains 
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the rules governing information and consultation processes should carefully balance the power 
of labour and management, and fit the broader industrial relations system in which the 
representative bodies function (Freeman & Lazear, 1995). Path dependency theories argue that 
there is a normative consensus according to which corporate leaders should run a company in 
the best interest of their shareholders (Kershaw, 2002). In contrast, Roe argues that opting-out 
of the established system of corporate law is extremely difficult due to the different factors 
lying behind path dependence, such as culture, politics and legal systems; therefore, even if 
more efficient alternatives exist, business owners stick with the existing models, like forms of 
the limited liability company. Thus, high transition costs of deviation may prevent socially 
desirable innovations (Roe, 1996) (Roe, 2002).  
Property rights theories in economy have addressed the problem of specification of 
individual rights that determines how costs and rewards are allocated among the participants of 
the organization (Alchian, 1950) (Demsetz, 1967). Human Resource Management theories 
approach employee involvement from an organisational efficiency point of view, 
acknowledging that managers are no longer seen as the sole custodians of authority and 
employees are able to bring their workplace experiences to the decision-making table (Blair, 
1999). Findings suggest that employees’ satisfaction levels correlate with the degree of their 
influence in decision making, and the higher level of employees’ satisfaction level raises 
productivity and reduces organizational change cynicism (Brown & Cregan, 2008). 
The human right nature of employee involvement has long been questioned. The ‘older 
brother’ of participatory rights, the right to bargain collectively gained recognition in a much 
less contested way and now is acknowledged by most major human rights instruments. 173 
However, it has been long argued that the Europeanization of industrial relations plays an 
indispensable role in the strengthening and the further development of the social dimension of 
the European integration In the contrary, employee involvement first appeared in 1988 in the 
Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter. A year later, the Community Charter of 
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers also incorporated it,174 and subsequently it appeared in 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of European Union. However, the right to involvement does 
not appear in human rights instruments outside of the aegis of Europe. The low recognition 
could raise concerns whether the right to involvement is a fully-fledged human right. The 
regulatory technique of the European Union used for labour rights in the above-mentioned 
human rights instruments could also be seen as an area of concern. These instruments require 
certain level of adjustability to national characteristics of the Member States. Therefore, these 
instruments do not define the notion of employee. However, the delegation of the the scope of 
the right-holders to national laws could lead to highly diverse practices. The uneven level of 
protection could therefore result in significant inequality both on national and international 
level. Thus, vague personal scope could dilute the intended protection of employees and further 
alleviates the recognition of employee involvement as a human right. 
The inclusion of social and economic rights related to working life into the CFREU 
confirms that these are to be considered fundamental to the EU social model, what it means to 
be an EU citizen (Bercusson, 2006). Thus, the right to information and consultation is a 
                                               
173 For example, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98). 
174 Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (1989), Arts 17-18. 
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fundamental right in the context of the EU, and the reference in Article 27 of CFREU to national 
laws and practices implies that the Member States are obliged to maintain at least the mandatory 
standards of information and consultation provided by statutory law or by collective 
agreements. The aim of Article 27 is to protect the interests of the individual worker against the 
dominant position of the employer in situations in which those interests could be substantially 
affected. Apart from the need to protect workers in extraordinary situations, such as collective 
redundancies and transfers of undertakings, Article 27 also reflects the difficulties associated 
with globalization of the economy and the increased importance of transnational companies and 
mergers of undertakings. Article 27 has as much or more to do with the protection of human 
dignity specified in Article 1 of the CFREU as with traditional social rights and the objective 
of democratisation of the economy. As such, it promises to greatly expand the scope of both 
traditional social rights and of practices of democratisation, to encompass threats to workers’ 
dignity in the many new forms these threats assume in a globalised economy, society and 
environment (Blanke, 2006). 
Even though employee involvement signifies a very narrow part of human rights and its 
recognition is rather low, its importance should not be overlooked. Inclusion of the right to 
information and consultation in this instrument signifies the stance of employee involvement 
as a fundamental human right. The significance of employee involvement in the development 
of democratic institutions is enormous. The estrangement of people from the handling of their 
own affairs at a workplace in a long run will lead to the abdication of not only employees but 
citizens towards participation which is a real danger to democracy. Thus, employee 
involvement shall be seen as essential to issues of social justice, human rights and democracy 
and must be promoted as such. 
The European Union addressed employee involvement in three major directives, the 
European framework directive on information and consultation (2002/14/EC), the (recast) 
directive on European works councils (2009/38/EC) and the directive on employee involvement 
in the European Company (2001/86/EC). 175The learning curve from the 1980s has been indeed 
very long and many of the initial problems have been addressed in the amends of the respective 
Directives. The change in the regulatory technique allowing more room for Member States to 
implement a method which fits their traditions of industrial relations. 
The Framework Directive provides for minimum requirements applicable throughout 
the Community176 and leaves the practical arrangements to be defined and be implemented in 
accordance with national laws and industrial practices.177 This ambiguity provides considerable 
room for Member States to manoeuvre when they decide on their own domestic system, which 
could lead to uneven level of workers’ protection in different countries. This shortcoming is 
especially visible in the national measures concerning the definitions of an undertaking and an 
establishment, the practical procedures, the notion of confidentiality, the protection of the 
                                               
175 Besides this general frame, a range of directives secure the right of information and consultation of workers in 
specific situations, such as in case of collective redundancies (98/59/EC), transfer of undertaking (2001/23/EC).  
The directive on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at 
work (89/391/EC) also contains important regulations on participation. In total, more than 15 directives deal with 
information and consultation in some kind of a general or specific sense and thus form part of the social acquis in 
this regard.  
176 Art. 1.1. of Directive 2002/14/EC. 
177 Art 1.2. of Directive 2002/14/EC. 
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employees’ representative, and the issue of sanctions (Clauwaert & Schömann, 2011). Though 
Directive 2002/14/EC was crafted with the best intention and managed to harmonise not only 
the fairly different interests of Member States but the various traditions of industrial relations 
as well, the sometimes vague wording and the ample room for national transpositions resulted 
in a variety of domestic systems of rights and obligations. This flexible framework is not 
suitable to provide an equal level protection of employees’ information and consultation rights. 
Council Directive 94/45/EC introduced European Works Councils or alternative 
procedures in order to ensure information and consultation for employees of multinational 
companies about significant transnational business matters significant decision at European 
level that could affect their employment or working conditions. This Directive was repealed 
and replaced in 2009 by the recast Directive 2009/38/EC.178 The EWC Directive provides for 
the establishment of a European Works Council or an Employee Information and Consultation 
procedure. Parties either could decide to set up a European Works Council by concluding an 
agreement on   scope, composition, function and term of service of an EWC; or could agree to 
implement an Information and Consultation Process (ICP) instead, a less formalized form of 
employee involvement. 179  Whether an EWC or an ICP is established, the minimum 
requirements provided for by the Directive do not need to be incorporated into the agreement.180 
Globalization has brought many new challenges to business management. Competition 
has become fiercer , due to profit maximization, and companys’ efforts to keep production costs 
low have made employees prone to social dumping. Frequency and the severity of human rights 
violation tend to be higher in premises where national laws are less protective, and workers’ 
influential power is low. Due to the lack of regulatory power of the EU, European based 
multinational companies are not obliged to respect the protective rules of the EU. MNCs tend 
to draw up internal codes of conducts (COC) to promulgate minimal standards to be applied by 
their subsidiaries and subcontractors. These internal rules however are often proved to be non-
efficient in most of the fields they intend to regulate, to be unable to halt human rights 
violations, to improve working standards, or to enhance worker’s voice. Moreover, these 
company statues do not form a ground for liability when workers’ rights are violated. 
While the EU considers employee involvement as a competitive advantage in the global 
economy,181 it explicitly reserves this right to employees working within the territory of the 
European Union. Since human rights are indivisible and universal, it raises the issue of how the 
existing level of protection provided by the EU could be transferred to subsidiaries of Europe-
based MNCs located outside of the territory of the European Union. The limited personal scope 
of legal instruments (European Social Charter, CFREU, various EU Directives) concerning 
employee involvement overlook the fact that transnational companies often operate subsidiaries 
outside of the Member States. The activity of these undertakings significantly contributes to the 
overall performance of a group, and the different and often lower standards of the non-EU 
countries constitute a competitive edge for most European multinationals. 
The personal scope of Directive 2002/14/EC on Information and Consultation, together 
with Directive 2009/38/EC on the European Works Council, has to be enlarged to ensure that 
                                               
178 Directive 2009/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 OJ L 16.5.2009 28-44. 
179 Art 4.1. of Directive 2009/38/EC. 
180 Art. 6.4. of Directive 2009/38/EC. 
181 Directive 2002/14/EC Recital (9) 
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all employees employed by a European multinational company have sufficient access to 
information and are consulted on matters relevant to their employment. Both directives are 
equally important in that sense, as Directive 2009/38/EC is the ‘agent’ that enables employees 
to have access to information and serves as a forum for consultation.182  
Of course, one of the biggest challenges to controlling the activities of European 
corporations operating outside of the territory of the EU is the territorial sovereignty of the 
States. The exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction faces both legal and political obstacles. A 
general rule of international law affirms that one state cannot take measures on the territory of 
another state by means of the enforcement of national laws without the consent of the latter. 
Such an expansion of the competences, especially in the field of employment and industrial 
relations, is not free from controversy. On the other hand, the international scope of the activity 
of the European Union has to be guided by principles which have inspired its own creation, 
development, and enlargement, and which seek to advance in the wider world: democracy, rule 
of law, universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for 
human dignity, principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United 
Nations Charter and international law.183 The importance of employee involvement, both as a 
human right and as a tool to enhance economic competitiveness, is significant regarding 
democracy. 
The right to employee involvement has to be protected both as a fundamental right and 
a tool to enhance economic competitiveness. Moreover, this protection cannot be limited to the 
territory of the European Union in the context of globalization. The recognition of workers’ 
human dignity through involvement has to be seen as a shared responsibility of global economic 
actors. 
The importance of the dual nature of employee involvement can be demonstrated with 
the Hungarian case. Political changes were rather rapid in Hungary, between 1988 and 1992 
key legislative movements laid down a completely new system, including industrial relations. 
As a part of the reforms, works councils were institutionalised, although it is argued that the 
introduction of works councils was lacking genuine historical origins or theoretical foundations 
(Kiss, 2005). Due to the recent re-codification of Labour Law although the democratic 
principles related to works councils are maintained, works councils lost their importance. 
Protection of works councils’ members is abolished and there are no dissuasive sanctions to 
prevent employers from violation of participation rights. This practice goes against the 
requirements set forth by Directive 2002/14/EC and violates Article 22 of the European Social 
Charter as well as the provisions of ILO Convention No 135. 
The success of the European model of participation lies in two interconnected factors: 
first, the notion of participation that encompasses employee involvement as a human right and 
as a tool for economic efficiency; and second that participation has a solid foundation based on 
principles of democracy. Acknowledging participation as a human right is a guarantee that a 
person is not treated as subject or serf but a person with human dignity who has a say in 
decisions made on matters affecting her life. Participation at workplace helps to fight 
commodification and objectification of human beings. More specifically, employee 
                                               
182 Art 1. 2 of Directive 2009/38/EC. 
183 Art 205 of TFEU and Art 21 of TEU. 
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involvement at workplaces is an important tool in employees’ hand to balance the superior 
economic power of employers. Through the democratization of decision making at the 
workplace freedom could be brought to employees and therefore they could be eased from 
subordination in employment relations. While businesses are required to respect their 
employees’ right to get involved in decision-making processes and employees need to learn 
how to leverage their participatory rights, it is the state’s responsibility to create enforceable 
legal norms and promote economic democracy.  
Only democracy can create an environment that fosters the substantive freedom of 
people to lead lives which they have reason to value, that enhances the real choices they have, 
and that, thereby, promotes social justice. The protection of the human dignity of employees 
has essential importance to society, as human working power is not only an individual but also 
a social asset. The right to employee involvement has to remain protected and be promoted not 
only as a tool to enhance economic competitiveness but also as a fundamental right. 
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